Negotiated identity, contested belonging and political inclusion: national identity and political culture in Scotland and Quebec by Henderson, Ailsa
THE UNIVERSITYofEDINBURGH
Title Negotiated identity, contested belonging and political inclusion: national




Thesis scanned from best copy available: may
contain faint or blurred text, and/or cropped or
missing pages.
Digitisation notes:
• Pagination error in origina
Page number 174 missing.
Scanned as part of the PhD Thesis Digitisation project
http://librarvblogs.is.ed.ac.uk/phddigitisation
Negotiated Identity, Contested Belonging





Department of Politics, Centre of Canadian Studies
University of Edinburgh
2000
I hereby declare that this thesis is the result of research and composition
undertaken solely by myself.
Ailsa Henderson
To my grandmothers,
Annie Bella Henderson and Barbara Summers Buchan,
who both love to talk about politics,
and with whom I've shared so many happy afternoons
while completing this work
Acknowledgements
Several people have made the construction of this thesis much easier than it might
have been. In particular I wish to thank my supervisors, Professor Alice Brown,
Professor Ged Martin and Professor Lindsay Paterson, who each devoted time and
effort to reading countless chapters and drafts over the years, and my examiners,
Professor David McCrone and Professor Michael Keating. Each has raised issues and
challenged assertions that have enriched this work. I am also indebted to the Centre
of Canadian Studies, its Director Colin Coates, and administrative secretary Grace
Owens, who have provided me with advice and support throughout my tenure in
Edinburgh, and to Dr Andy Thompson, who has provided invaluable assistance with
statistics and methods. A thank you also to friends and colleagues who have read
chapters, papers, presentations and drafts and who have been both kind and rigorous
in their comments and suggestions.
I am grateful to the various funding agencies who provided grants and scholarships
for fees and research costs: Rotary International, the Overseas Research Scheme, the
University of Edinburgh Centre for Canadian Studies, the British Association for
Canadian Studies, the Delegation Generale du Quebec, the Canadian High
Commission, and the Canadian Political Science Association.
Thank you to my research subjects who took time out of busy schedules to meet with
me. Without them this thesis would not have been possible. I am also grateful to all
those who provided statistical and opinion polling data for this thesis: the Economic
and Social Research Council, Edinburgh University data library, Canadian Electoral
Study team, Queen's University Centre for the Study of Democracy Public Opinion
Archive, Senator Joan Fraser, formerly of the Council for Canadian Unity, Chris
Baker at Environics, and Patrick Beauchamp at Ekos.
A final thank you to my parents. It was their trans-Atlantic migration that initially
sparked my interest in belonging and identity, rights and inclusion.
Abstract
Early political culture research, in its attempt to determine which combination of
attitudes, values and behaviours created the ideal electorate, often treated national
identity as tool of integration. If individuals felt a sense of national identity then the
political culture would be in a healthier state than if citizens expressed their loyalty to
rival sub-groups, or felt no national identity at all. Since these works, little attention
has been paid to the role of national identity within political culture. Altered by
discussions of post-materialism, mundane political culture, or rational choice theories,
political culture has abandoned the initial interactive focus of examination to other
literatures studying social capital and new social movements. The thesis argues that
national identity has remained an under-explored aspect of political culture, and that
an integrated approach would benefit analyses of States where nationalist movements
have sought greater political autonomy. Relying on case studies of Scotland and
Quebec, the thesis examines the way in which national identity is treated by political
actors to create a hierarchy of belonging within the nation. Perceptions of national
inclusion, as determined by this hierarchy, affect the patterns of interaction within the
political culture. The sense of ease with which people feel integrated in the political
system is not currently explored by surveys of trust, efficacy, satisfaction and
confidence. Relying on survey data and qualitative interviews, the thesis seeks to
demonstrate that the way in which individuals draw boundaries around themselves,
their nations and political systems forms an integral part of political culture.
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Introduction: Scotland and Quebec in Context
Within two years electorates in Quebec and Scotland each found themselves voting in
referendums that would determine their future levels of self-determination. In Quebec,
the October 1995 referendum offered the second chance since 1980 to re-negotiate the
political partnership with the rest of Canada, with the option of full sovereignty should
negotiations prove fruitless. The close result, 50.6 % to 49.4% for the federalists,
directly reflected a campaign that promised no clear winner and the extent to which the
issue of sovereignty divided - and continues to divide - the population. For Scots, the
September 1997 referendum on a devolved Parliament provided an opportunity to alter
fundamentally the unitary character of the British state and deliver a much sought after
measure of autonomy. Backed by 64% of the electorate, a tax-varying Parliament has
recently opened its doors.1 Despite the similar constitutional nature of the two
referendums, the electorates each voted on packages that promised differing levels of
autonomy, and produced disparate margins of victory on the backs of two differing
turnout levels.
The establishment of the Scottish Parliament provides a useful opportunity to reflect on
the success and struggles of other regional or sub-national Parliaments, particularly those
where nationalist parties seek to form a government. Comparisons between Scotland and
Quebec became increasingly plentiful when it appeared that following an expected Labour
win in the May 1997 General Election Scotland would acquire its own legislature for the
first time in 300 years (Keating 1996a, Keating 1997, Bateman 1996).2 Given the
1 In response to the first question, should there be a Scottish Parliament. 74% voted yes. Sixty-four
percent backed the second question, granting the Parliament tax-vary ing powers.
2 PhD dissertations on the topic have a longer history. See, for example Newman 1989, Teghtsoonian
1988.
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frequency with which politicians on either side point to the other as proof of success or
failure, the extent to which Quebec provides lessons for the establishment of the Scottish
political system warrants attention. For Scottish nationalists, the electoral strength of the
Parti Quebecois would provide evidence that nationalist parties can govern prudently
while at the same time calling for greater autonomy in key areas ofjurisdiction. For
nationalists in Quebec, radical constitutional change in Scotland would offer a striking
example ofmovement noticeably absent in the Canadian arena. For those less enamoured
of separatism, the presence of a nationalist party bent on increasing political autonomy
presents a serious danger to the ability of the government to function and thus poses a
threat to the economic and social well-being of all within its borders. As Scottish
politicians, on either side of the separatist divide, each use Quebec to prove their case, a
deeper examination of the differences and similarities between the two cases seems
prudent.
Political circumstances in the Balkans, and, closer to home, in Northern Ireland, serve as
reminders of the potentially destructive salience of national identity. The much-vaunted
end of nationalism, as unlikely now as when first heralded, remains a normative
construction of politics, along with idealised theories of the good citizen and the good
State. (Carr 1965, Fukuyama 1993, Smith 1981) The obvious saliency of nations,
nationalism and national identity to individuals in the modern polity stands above debates
concerning the extent to which modern nationalist troubles stem from exclusive
applications of national pride and autonomy, or represent the failure of nationalism itself
to include all within its boundaries. But, just as two attempts to achieve increased levels
of political autonomy follow different paths and achieve different results, so too do
nations, and nationalist programmes, encourage distinct markers of identity and motives
for belonging to achieve greater senses of collective power. As a result, each nation
promotes its own identity, includes its self-defined population and determines its goals in
accordance with the context in which it works, This thesis examines these constructions
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ofmembership and identity to determine how two modern, Western nations create their
own political cultures while national society fights for greater political autonomy.
Following the small, if significant, resurgence of political culture studies and a growing
literature on social capital, this work uses national identity in Scotland and Quebec as an
independent variable, and measures its influence upon the dependent political values,
attitudes and behaviour of two electorates. Numerous studies have analysed statistical
data in an attempt to determine which social characteristics, whether union membership,
age, social class, country of birth, language or religion, affect perceptions of national
identity (Adsett and Willmott 1999, Bennie, Brand and Mitchell 1997, Brown, McCrone,
Paterson and Surridge 1999, Cloutier, Guay and Latouche 1992, Mendelsohn 1999), As
receives treatment in chapter two, this thesis argues that while these studies are useful, a
quantitative and qualitative analysis of the effect of national identity on political attitudes,
rather than the other way around, provides for a fuller understanding of how national
identity might interact with other social or political variables. The period preceding the
establishment of new governmental institutions provides a unique opportunity to measure
the prevalence and strength of certain aspects of political culture before new institutions
and influences change. Although measures of such culture can provide, at best, brief
snapshots of attitudes and behaviour at any given moment in time, a (re-) examination of
Scotland and Quebec, in the shadow of a new Parliament and in the wake of a particularly
divisive referendum, provides for a greater understanding of value change as affected
both by time and significant events. Periods of heightened political activity, particularly
when in reference to potential increases in control of, and power over, political affairs,
prompt greater attention to questions of ideal political structures and relationships.
Debates concerning how governments, citizens and society should interact highlight the
distance between the ideal future and the present political climate. Traditional measures
of political culture such as trust, efficacy, satisfaction, confidence and levels of
participation surface as popular gauges of a healthy democracy, fn this context the thesis
3
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examines the construction of national identity, its promotion and influence on political
culture in contemporary Scotland and Quebec,
OUTLINE OF TOPIC
Although comparative in nature, the thesis aims to provide more than a study of
nationalism in two contexts. It seeks also to provide a sociological understanding of the
political relationships among citizens, and between individuals and the State in Scotland
and Quebec. To this end, the dissertation examines how the construction and
understanding of national identity in both case studies affects traditional measures of
political culture. As will be examined in chapter two, initial analyses of political attitudes
suggested that national identity could foster a positive sense of cohesion within a political
system. In each case, national identity was equated with State loyalty. Sub-State group
membership, at either the national or local level, posed a potentially destructive influence
on the creation of a stable polity. As a result, most analyses of political culture have
devoted only cursory attention to sub-State identities, and often portrayed these in a
negative light (Pye and Verba 1965, Foster 1982 , Savage 1981, Westle 1993). Rather
than determining whether, and in which contexts, such values pose risks for political
cultures, the dissertation seeks to determine how the promotion of certain markers of
identity can affect the sense of belonging and value acquisition of individuals in Scotland
and Quebec. The thesis argues that the way in which the boundaries of the nation are
articulated leads individuals to assess their level of belonging in the nation. National
membership within the boundaries of the larger State, in this case, Scotland and Quebec,
affects other aspects of political culture. Individuals who feel themselves excluded from
the nation possess different values and exhibit different political behaviours from those
individuals who do not question their membership in the nation.
In its use of political culture, and the corollary subjects of political socialisation, political
attitudes and political behaviour, this thesis aligns itself with a particular comparative
tradition (Almond and Verba 1963, Almond and Verba 1989, Almond, Powell and
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Mundt 1993, Inglehart 1977, Inglehart 1990, Halman and Nevitte 1996). A dissertation
that emphasises the processual politics in a comparative light brings with it several
advantages and disadvantages. Rather than presenting an area studies examination of two
separate devolved governments the thesis attempts to extract from national detail patterns
within political culture that transcend national boundaries. A full description highlights
the ways in which the two political systems possess similar elements.
Of particular importance, this dissertation examines Scotland and Quebec at different
stages in their political paths. When research for this dissertation began, devolution was a
general election away and despite widespread expectations that the political mood would
alter, the dramatic changes in the structure of Scottish political life both added value to
and complicated the Scottish data collection. Thus while it is accurate to draw attention
to the similar vibrancy of nationalist movements, autonomist parties and civic society in
Scotland and Quebec, it is an important distinction that Quebec has had its own
legislature elected by near-universal suffrage since 1867. Although a cursory examination
of the two case studies at present would suggest the two possess remarkably similar
political settlements, the recent acquisition of a parliament in Scotland and the process by
which it was achieved continues to exert a profound influence on its political culture.
JUSTIFICATION OF CASE STUDIES
As will be examined in chapter two, theoretical definitions of the nation coalesce around
two preferred options. According to the first, the nation is defined as a list of
characteristics. Thus, a nation exists when a group of people is united by a common
language, common territory, common history, and common institutions (Geertz 1963). A
second school argues that nations exist as social communities that are willed into
existence. Whether created through a 'daily plebiscite' (Renan 1882) or constructed as
an 'imagined community' (Anderson 1992) the perception of a bond between national
members creates the nation. Thus a nation exists if it is perceived to exist by its
5
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members . 3 For the purposes of this thesis, either definition would apply to Scotland and
Quebec. As receives treatment later in the chapter, both Scotland and Quebec possess
distinct histories and institutions protected, in each case, in eighteenth century documents
that guaranteed their continued existence. Although current differences in the level of
recognition enjoyed by each nation affect the extent to which they can be compared, the
objective list of characteristics which distinguish the Scots and Quebecois from other
Britons and Canadians justifies their treatment as nations.
Before providing a comprehensive analysis of the way in which Scotland and Quebec, and
their host states, differ, terms used throughout this thesis warrant greater clarification.
As previously explained, both Scotland and Quebec are treated as nations. Both case
studies possess vibrant nationalist and autonomist movements although the two should
not be equated. Within this thesis, nationalist is used as a general term to refer to all
social organisations or political parties that seek to strengthen the culture of Scotland or
Quebec or the position of Scotland or Quebec within the host State. If the political party
advocates a policy of independence then it is referred to as separatist or sovereignist. It is
worth noting that there is not a clear-cut division between nationalism and separatism for
social movements and political parties in Scotland and Quebec. Indeed, a belief in the
existence of the nation and a belief in the need for constitutional change could be seen as
two axes along which organisations may move. In other words, a party seeking to
endorse greater autonomy in either location need not rely on the rhetoric of nationalism
to express its policies, A nationalist organisation need not endorse constitutional change.
Before the advent of devolution both the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats were
keen to promote the concept of devolution but reluctant to rely on nationalist justification
for constitutional change. In contrast, the Quebec Liberal Party has often advocated
3 An additional literature discusses whether nations are ancient and primordial (Barth 1969, Brass 1991,
Smith 1971, Smith 1986. Smith 1988, Smith 1992) or modern and constructed (Deutsch 1966, Gellner
1964. Gcllner 1983, Gellner and Smith 1996, Kcdourie 1994, Nairn 1977) . While the differences
between these two groups affects the way that nationalist movements construct their rhetoric, the extent
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constitutional renewal in Quebec and has relied on a Quebec nationalist critique of the
Canadian federation. In both cases, it would be accurate to refer to these parties as
autonomist even though they share different views of nationalism. Post-devolution,
however, both Labour and the Liberal Democrats have ceased to argue for additional
constitutional power and could accurately be referred to as unionist. Thus, there is a
difference between constitutional preference, as explained by the labels unionist,
autonomist, separatist, sovereignist, or pro-independence, and nationalist. Levels of
nationalism may or may not inform constitutional preferences. In this thesis, care has
been taken to ensure that the label applied to any organisation or political party fits its
action at the time. When referring to the entire movement or general consensus for
constitutional change in Scotland or Quebec, the label nationalist is used as a short-hand
for the admittedly diverse views of participants.
The 1995 Quebec sovereignty referendum, and the 1997 Scottish devolution referendum,
demonstrate how two democratically active nationalist movements concerned with
cultural identity have each sought to extend their levels of political autonomy by asking
the people to provide a mandate for constitutional change.4 The success of the Scottish
devolution campaign, and the close referendum result in Quebec, provide a useful
opportunity to examine the influence of identity on political culture in each case. That
two relatively similar contexts (liberal democracies, autonomist movements working
within the political system, absence of violence, an open dialogue between separatist and
non-separatist options5) produced different results allows for a wider understanding of
the interaction between identity, political attitudes and political behaviour. In particular,
to which Scotland and Quebec are modern or ancient nations must follow attempts to determine that they
exist as nations at all.
4 While it could be argued that the 1997 devolution referendum took place at the behest of the British
Labour Prime Minister, it is unlikely that such an event would have been suggested, were it not for the
pressure exerted by the coalition of nationalist and autonomist bodies in Scotland that consistently argued
for a devolution of power.
5 The argument that Scotland and Quebec exist within similar contexts depends, of course, on perception
and point of reference. The pattern of acknowledged national difference lends credence to the nationalist
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the task facing newly-elected members of the Scottish Parliament in defining the
structures and policies of a new legislature will ensure that the current political culture
has an enduring influence over future politics in Scotland. Periods of far-reaching
constitutional change also provide the closest approximation of experimental design in
political science. Although the attitudes and behaviour of individuals should not be
regarded merely as quantitative items awaiting measurement, the existence of a clear
before-and-after context illuminates any examination. The absence of any control group
obviously inhibits the extent to which such situations may mimic scientific experiments,
and yet time-series data, in the form of election studies or political documents, allows for
a comparison between pre-devolution and post-devolution politics in Scotland. Such
unprecedented influence, recent election results in Scotland and Quebec and the ever-
changing strategies of identity-centred nationalist parties form the backdrop for this
examination.
Institutional protection accorded in the 1707 Acts of Union and the 1774 Quebec Act
ensured the distinct nature of key agents of socialisation. While it would be easy to claim
that the education system, Church and legal system have assumed a degree of importance
within Scottish and Quebecois society only because of their very distinctness, cross-
national studies show that such institutions hold similar roles in different
societies.(Almond and Verba 1963, Halman and Nevitte 1996, Inglehart 1977, 1990,
Nevitte 1996, Brown and Gray 1979) The eighteenth and nineteenth century
parliamentary histories of Scotland and Quebec share a common loss of political
autonomy accompanied by institutional protection and integration into the larger
economic, social and political network. The reactions of these territories following this
loss of autonomy have significant ramifications for the creation of political culture.
Sentiments of trust, confidence, satisfaction and political integration within and between
the nation/State stem from the reaction of political elites and their attempts to align or
cause in Scotland that has been lacking in Canada while the existence of federalism in Canada allows for
de facto self-determination in some areas.
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isolate the nation throughout the democratic development of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. For example, high activity levels of Scottish elites within the growth of the
British Empire contrast with the efforts of post-war Quebec political leaders to ensure
that Quebec society enjoyed minimal interference from Canadian politicians. This is not
to say that the political histories of Scotland and Quebec can be characterised by their
consistent levels of isolationism or integration, but rather that at different times, national
political and social elites pursued different courses of action in an attempt to secure
prosperity for the nation.
The nineteenth century witnessed several attempts to accommodate political difference
within the United Kingdom and Canada. Efforts to acknowledge the particular
languages, religions or institutions of Scotland and Quebec took different forms and had
different effects in either State. For Scotland, recognition as one of the historic nations of
the United Kingdom allowed for a series of exemptions that altered the parallel structure
of the union. For example, the 1885/6 creation of the Scottish Office and the later
designation of a Scottish Secretary provided a separate bureaucracy dedicated solely to
the interests of the Scottish population. The further creation of the Scottish Grand
Committee, Scottish Affairs Select Committee and Scottish Question Time sought to
maintain the fundamental character of a unitary state while providing adaptive elements
which suited the interests of the Scots.6 Half a decade earlier, the 1841 union of present-
day Ontario and Quebec at the wishes of the British government aimed to assimilate the
particularities of a French and Catholic province in accordance with the liberal ideals of
the day. That assimilation of the French was seen as a means of emancipation has done
little for the political capital made of the views ofLord Durham by contemporary
nationalists (Ajzenstat 1988). Assimilation, as called for in Lord Durham's report, has
become a symbol of national tragedy and mis-treatment experienced at the hands of the
6 MacCornnck argues that this anomalisation of the union has continued with the introduction of
asymmetrical devolution (MacCormick 1998).
9
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British government (Gouvernement du Quebec 1979).7 Political deadlock and a distinct
cultural consciousness, among other issues, prompted the creation of Canadian
Confederation in 1867, a political settlement engineered to provide a requisite measure of
autonomy for Quebec to ensure the continued vitality of the French language, Catholic
religion, culture and social structure. (Silver 1997, Bonenfant 1967, Martin 1993, Perin
1993) Thus, in two adaptive attempts, the British parliamentary system sought to
accommodate difference, one through its bureaucracy, the other through a separation of
jurisdiction that kept Quebec matters out of federal politics. The differing fortunes
enjoyed by the distinct populations embedded an institutional ethos that has affected the
way Scotland and Quebec interact within their respective States. The various aspects of
these relationships, from political aspects to international recognition, dominate the
following section.
That the two nations enjoyed similar institutional protection following their respective
losses of sovereignty should not obscure the influence of factors inherent in that loss
which served to produce two particularly distinct civil societies. Faced with similar
minority positions, Scotland and Quebec each placed particular emphasis on collective
identity and action. The circumstances of the Conquest and Acts of Union, however,
dictated the importance of these civic values. The military defeat imposed on New
France could not have had the same effect as a voluntary political partnership even in the
face of public opposition to the union arrangement. The political integration of Scots
within the British parliamentary system, despite limited electoral franchise, provided the
nation with a focus of assimilated political activity unmatched in Quebec. Although far
from immediate, political opportunities for Francophones in Quebec existed within a
relatively distinct sphere of activity. Even after the union of the two Canadian provinces
in 1841 Canada East (Quebec) and Canada West (Ontario) possessed their own
representatives in the united legislature. While political participation was eventually an
7
In its post-1997 election policy statement, the Bloc Quebecois presents a brief chronology of Quebec,
noting that 'In 1840, England once again altered the structure of the colonial regime" (BQ nd).
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option in both Scotland and Quebec, the context and outlet of that activity was notably
different.
The accomplishments of political elites in Scotland and Quebec, post-autonomy, point to
the different political cultures in the two areas 8 The successful integration of the
Scottish political elite within the British Empire (Lynch 1992, Paterson 1994a, Kellas
1989) contrasts with visions of a decapitated political and social echelon that either left
Quebec for France or ceded political control to the new arrivals (Brunet 1962, Brunet
1964, Fregault 1956, Iguarta 1974, Seguin 1970).9 Ffere, the legacy of negotiated
partnership versus conquest, even conquest viewed as providential by the religious elite,
influences current political culture In Quebec, 1950s visions of retarded economic
growth and stunted democratic development, as linked to lost sovereignty (Brunet 1964)
or the Catholic Church (Trudeau 1956) have recently ceded ground to more natural
interpretations of economic, social and political development in Quebec (Letourneau
1997). Similar shifts in the degree of goodwill shown the British Empire in Scottish
historiography betray a common trend in the changing use of history. (Finlay 1994b,
Paterson 1994a, Lynch 1992) Whatever the eighteenth century, or indeed mid-twentieth
century view of events, the current interpretations of such historical developments, in all
their revisionism, are what inform current nationalist and political discourse.
The rise ofmodern, organised nationalist movements does not mark the beginning of
dissatisfaction with the constitutional solutions reached following the British Conquest
and Acts of Union. Resistance to Canadian Confederation and the British State has a
long and rich history beyond the scope of this chapter. (McNaught 1988, Lynch 1992).
Beginning first as non-partisan movements and later as pressure groups attempting to
x
Political elites are defined as elected members of democratic legislatures, appointed officials or civil
servants, whereas social or sectoral elites arc defined as members of social institutions who bv their
position and privilege exert a level of influence unmatched in the general population.
9 Oucllet claims the decapitation thesis overemphasises whatever influence the economic elite had in pre-
Conquest Quebec (Ouellct 1966).
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influence existing active parties, modern nationalist movements find their origins in the
post-war realignment of the electorate. (Crewe, Sarlvik and Alt 1977, Denver 1994,
Rose and McAllister 1986, Rose and McAllister 1990). The current Scottish National
Party owes its origins to such diverse groups as the Scottish Home Rule Association, the
National Party of Scotland and the Conservative-splinter group, the Scottish Party.
(Mitchell 1996) The Parti Quebecois, although formed by members of Rene Levesque's
Mouvement Souverainte-Association and the Ralliement Nationale, can trace its
inspiration to autonomist efforts of the Patriotes in 1837 and later, the Bloc Populaire and
Rassemblement pour l'Independence Nationale. (Pelletier 1988) Democratic parties
highlighting national particularity and the goal of greater political autonomy, by virtue of
their efforts to gain members and voters, are afforded greater attention by individuals and
the media, thus bringing what might otherwise represent a narrow cultural movement into
the mainstream political discourse.
The different constitutional structures in Scotland and Quebec have dictated that
nationalist political parties assert themselves and pursue their goals differently. The early
recognition of administrative autonomy in Scotland has provided a generally accepted
recognition of national status. The institutional accommodation available to Scotland and
Wales, particularly in the form of a Secretary of State, was not available for equally
diverse regions in England (MacCormick 1998) Despite the presence of a provincial
government, and role as the de facto representative of French Canada, recognition of
Quebec's nationhood is much less accepted by the rest of Canada. The consensus that
exists among Quebec political parties, and among British parties operating in Scotland,
pre-empts the need for discussions about particularity that drive much of the debate
between Quebec and the rest of Canada. Thus, an accepted view that Quebec and
Scotland constitute nations absolves all but autonomist parties in Quebec from reiterating
the list of characteristics that distinguish the nation from the host State. This lack of
recognition has affected the way in which Quebec nationalists have constructed the
boundaries and membership of the nation. That there is still much convincing to be done
12
Ailsa Henderson, PhD Thesis, Chapter 1
by Quebec suggests that full acknowledgement of Quebec's distinct society could move
the debate away from social characteristics and closer to the value driven debate in
Scotland. At this point, an analysis of the different ways in which Scotland and Quebec
are distinguishable proves fruitful. Relevant distinction, is, obviously and ultimately a
matter of personal discretion. The following aspects exert the greatest influence on
political culture according both to modern understandings of political culture and
interpretations of political activity in Scotland and Quebec. In an effort to demonstrate
that Scotland and Quebec provide a useful comparison for understandings of culture and
identity the following sections examine the political, demographic, international,
economic, cultural and social bases on which the two can be compared.
SCOTLAND AND QUEBEC IN CONTEXT
Political Aspects: Canada and the United Kingdom
As stated earlier, Scotland and Quebec each exist within similar parliamentary systems.
This aids the comparative analysis of the thesis as significant differences between levels of
confidence and satisfaction with the State and politics in general can be attributed to the
particular differences of the national situation rather than to different forms of
representation. That said, the differences in the structure and form of representative
democracy used must be noted. For the purposes of this analysis, the primary unity of
comparison will be the host State, as only a full investigation of the way in which Canada
and the United Kingdom differs can allow for a later comparison of Quebec and Scotland.
As stated previously, despite the possession of democratically-elected legislatures in
Scotland and Quebec, the status of these legislatures, and the process by which they were
acquired, point to differences of political context in each case. Most importantly, Canada
distinguishes itself as a federation of ten provinces and three territories. Although based
in principle on equality between the provinces, the opportunity to opt out of federal
programmes and the exercise of differential political weight through the constitutional
amending formula has allowed for variations in the powers exercised by the provincial
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governments. By establishing its own pension system in the 1960s, for example, Quebec
embraced an opportunity to extend its jurisdiction. The United Kingdom, until recently a
unitary state, has embarked on a project of asymmetrical devolution to three of its four
composite nations. Marking differing degrees of legislative freedom, the three
assemblies, in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, provide for the much-vaunted
distinct solutions to distinct problems. The Welsh assembly exercises all the
administrative power previously held in the Welsh Office without the ability to pass
primary legislation. The inclusion of social security and participation in a North-South
Council with the Republic of Ireland promise the Northern Irish Assembly a greater
degree of power. The Scottish Parliament possesses the largest remit ofjurisdiction, with
the ability to legislate on all issues previously under the remit of the Scottish Office,
although unlike Quebec, the legislature is not sovereign. In addition, the approval of a
second question on tax-varying powers in the 1997 referendum grants the Parliament the
power to raise or lower the basic rate of income tax by three pence on the pound as of
January 1, 2000. The period of constitutional change in Scotland has prompted a sudden
identity crisis of proportions oddly familiar to observers of Canadian political life
(Macmillan 1999, Royle 1999, Wilson 1999). Similarly, the creation of a Parliament has
continued a debate about democratic inclusion and political ideals consistent with the
goals of the Campaign for a Scottish Assembly and the Scottish Constitutional
Convention. (Campaign for a Scottish Assembly 1988, Scottish Constitutional
Commission 1994, Scottish Constitutional Convention 1990, Scottish Constitutional
Convention 1995).
Electoral methods provide an additional comparison. Both, until recently, have relied
exclusively upon First Past the Post (FPTP) elections offering a winner-take-all approach
to government. Until 1993, both Canada and the United Kingdom operated on two, or
two-plus party systems that regularly promised strong governments and the certain
delivery of legislative agendas. Although often different from what was promised in
political manifestos, once decided, the legislative packages of governments rarely met
14
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with substantial difficulty in their travels through the legislative process.1" Just as the
FPTP creates conditions for strong governments so too does it allow for potential
distortions between votes won and seats gained. The 1993 Canadian General Election, in
which the governing Conservative party was reduced to 2 seats, highlighted for some the
inequity of the FPTP system and the regional distortions it can produce. Despite
garnering approximately one fifth of the popular vote, the party constituted less than one
percent of the House. Provinces voting as a block against the federal trend, as in the case
ofQuebec, were guaranteed a greater representation of regional voice than those
supporting second parties to a lesser degree. The exacerbation of regional voting
patterns has heralded a change in the pan-provincial cohesion of federal politics (such as
it ever existed), prompting much work on the psephology of vote choice and the future
fortunes ofCanada (Clarke, Jenson, Leduc and Pammett 1996). In Britain, the ability of
the Labour and Conservative parties to gain 95% of Commons seats despite only winning
75% of the votes highlights both the rigidity and strength of the two party system and the
potentially distorting influence ofFPTP .11 Even in Scotland, the ratio between the
percentage of votes and percentages of seats has often exposed the ability of the electoral
system to reward the most popular party with additional seats. Since 1964, for example,
the Labour party has consistently received a higher percentage of votes that the
Conservative party by a margin of between four and almost eighteen percent. At its most
popular, the Labour party received almost 50 percent of the votes in 1966. At its least
popular, the party received 35 percent of the votes. And yet, between 1964 and 1992 the
party consistently gained between 57 and 69 percent of the Scottish seats at Westminster.
Similarly, the disparity between regional voting patterns and federal trends, is a familiar
10
Exceptions although plentiful, are not nearly as frequent as a list such as this might suggest. Some of
the more popular examples include speedy elections following the February 1974 election of a minority
Labour government, and the Clark government's inability to pass its budget in 1979. Opposition to
devolution in 1979 forced the British Labour government to amend its bill significantly, in particular by
adding the provision of a referendum which effectively prevented approval of the bill. In addition, the
assent of constitutional packages eluded Brian Mulroncy's Conservative governments twice in eight
years.
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event in Scottish politics. The electoral weight of the south of Britain often vetoed the
electoral preferences of Scottish voters. At its most obvious, a 32% gap developed
between the voting preferences of the Scottish and English electorate. In the 1983 and
1987 elections, for example, English voters backed the Conservative Party by margins of
19% and fourteen percent respectively. Scottish Labour votes exceeded Conservative
votes by seven percent in 1983 and eighteen percent in 1987.12 , The resulting gap, of
25% in 1983 and 32% in 1987, emphasises the propensity for regional voting patterns in
Britain. Facing Conservative governments long after a majority of voters ceased to voice
a preference for Tory prime ministers such as Margaret Thatcher, the democratic deficit
in Scotland educated the electorate on the potential for inconsistency within an apparently
sound electoral system. That said, the democratic 'deficit' argument rarely notes that in
four cases, English voting preferences have been overturned by the overall preferences of
UK voters. In 1910, 1950, 1964 and in the second election of 1974 the Conservative
party won a majority of the seats in England but the combined effect of voting trends
throughout the UK led to non-Conservative governments.
Table 1.1 Partisan distribution in Canada and the United Kingdom






# % seats % votes
Liberal 155 51 38 Labour 417 63 43
Reform 60 20 19 Conservative 160 24 31
Bloc Quebecois 44 14 11 Liberal Democrat 46 7 17
New Democratic 21 7 11 Ulster Unionists 10 2 1
Party
Progressive 20 7 19 SNP 6 1 2
Conservatives
Other 1 0 2 Other 20 3 6
Total number of Total number of
seats 301 seats 659
11 The 1997 general election results signify a change from this trend. While the Labour and
Conservative parties managed to win 74% of the popular vote, they hold 88% of the seats in the House of
Commons.
12 Data for the 1983 example comes from Kellas 1989. Data for the 1987 example was worked out from
voting statistics available from the House of Commons. The raw percentages are as follows: English
votes in 1983: Conservatives 46%, Labour 26.9%; 1987: Conservatives 46.2%, Labour 29.8%; Scottish
votes in 1983: Labour 35.1%, Conservative 28.4%; 1987: Labour 42.4%, Conservatives 24%.
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Partisan competition in Scotland and Quebec, currently hosts domestic autonomist parties
that garner increasingly significant proportions of the popular vote. A summary of the
main patterns of electoral dominance highlight the two-party nature of electoral politics in
Scotland and Quebec. In the immediate post-war period to the mid 1970s, the main
competitors in Quebec elections were the Liberal Party and the conservative Union
Nationale. Following the creation of the separatist Parti Quebecois in 1968, the main
electoral battle has been between the Quebec Liberal Party and the PQ. In Scotland
during early the twentieth century a dominant Liberal party competed with a Scottish
unionist party. By 1922, the earlier extension of the franchise and an increasing class
consciousness turned the campaign for seats into a battle between the Conservatives and
the Labour party. The creation of the Scottish National Party in 1934 did not affect the
electoral fortunes of the two main parties until the second election of 1974, when the
party managed to elect 11 MPs. Since then, the SNP and Labour party have seen
themselves as the main rivals in the Scottish political arena. The extent to which this
presents an accurate reflection of electorate preferences may be found in the following
table.
Table 1.2 Partisan distribution in Quebec and Scotland
Quebec (1998) # % % Scotland (1999) n % % con % reg'l
seats votes seats votes votes
Parti Quebecois 76 61 43 Scottish new
Labour*
56 43 39 34
Quebec Liberal 48 38 44 Scottish 35 27 29 27
Party National Party
Action 1 0 12 Scottish 18 14 16 15
democratique Conservative
du Quebec and Unionist
Party
Scottish Liberal 17 13 14 12
Democrats*
Other 3 2 3 11
Total number of 125 Total number of 129
seats seats
* = coalition partners Where con votes refers to constituency votes and reg'l votes refers to
regional votes.
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Electoral activity at other levels warrants brief attention. The election of municipal
governments and, in Quebec, directly elected mayors, provides an additional outlet for
voter choice. Plagued by activity levels often 30 percent below general elections, as in
the case ofQuebec, the inability to directly elect council leaders, and a series of scandals
in efficiency and propriety have dogged democracy at the local level (Alexander 1997,
Sinclair 1997). The very public and bitter disputes between rival parties in local
government have attracted much negative attention from a general public reluctant to
endorse one questionably sound party over another. Evidence of support for the services
provided by local government co-exists with earlier, less favourable analyses from the
public (Bennie, Brand and Mitchell 1997, Harvie 1998) and the inability to exert a direct
voice at the local level.'3
British voters possess an additional opportunity to elect representatives to the European
Parliament. Until the 1999 European elections, all British MEPs were elected on the
basis of large regional constituencies. As of 1999, the eight Scottish MEPs are elected on
a nation-wide system of proportional representation. This additional outlet for political
expression hazards a potential loss of confidence or satisfaction with political
representation.14 If anything, the low expectations of voters for European politics ensure
that less than overwhelming performances will not particularly damage political
13 Further discussion of the role of local government in post-devolution Scotland may be located in the
consultation papers and final report of the Mcintosh Commission on Local Government and in the
Scottish Executive's response to the Commission report (Commission on Local Government and the
Scottish Parliament 1998a, Commission on Local Government and the Scottish Parliament 1998b,
Commission on Local Government and the Scottish Parliament 1999, Scottish Executive 1999)
14 Whether the locus of democracy matters less than its mere existence, is worthy of greater discussion.
Social capital literature, for example, would argue that the nature of democratic interaction matters more
than the presence of opportunity. Chapter five deals with issues of democratic representation, civic
engagement and resultant satisfaction with the polity.
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satisfaction levels.15 Where the European Parliament provides an obvious benefit is in the
political weight enjoyed by different political parties. For the past two European
elections the Scottish electorate has returned two SNP MEPs among the eight sent to
Brussels. Comparatively, under ten percent of the 72 Scottish Westminster MPs are from
the SNP. In Scotland, what has traditionally been considered the main stage of political
life, Westminster, has witnessed the smallest presence of the nationalist party, effectively
shifting the political expression of nationalism to both a higher, European, and lower,
local council, stage. This has changed with the election of 35 SNP representatives to the
129-member Scottish Parliament. In Quebec, however, the political presence of
separatist parties in both the National Assembly and, for the past two elections, in the
federal House of Commons, ensures that the nationalist debate occupies both provincial
and federal politics.16
Additional parliamentary institutions provide a point of comparison. In both Canada and
the United Kingdom, Heads of State and Upper Houses occupy similar positions. The
Queen, and in the case of Canada, her official representative the Governor General, have,
not surprisingly, near parallel relationships with the population. Removed from the public
by hereditary rule or a selection process dominated by patronage, the office ofHead of
State is effectively de-politicised.17 This distance from the mainstream political arena
limits the frequency and passion of the debate over the office and its cost18. The un-
elected Upper House, in conjunction with the hereditary monarch, serves to concentrate
15
In its 1995 report Footprints in New Snow the Nunavut Implementation Commission highlighted the
danger of unreasonable expectations - either too high or too low - in creating a stable political culture
(NIC 1995).
16 A future study chronicling the amount of time devoted to nationalist issues in the Houses of
Parliament and newspapers would be able to draw a more informed link between political behaviour and
the presence of nationalist issues within the political psyche of a nation.
1 This is not to say that the selection of governors general has been without controversy, but that the
controversy is limited, at most, to concentrated attention every seven years and removed from partisan
politics.
I!< In Australia, the governor general is still seen as a British symbol. In Canada, the assiduous
appointment of Francophones to the post has, in recent years, distanced the position from the British
Crown. The linguistic duality of governors general has reinforced a Canadian, rather than a British
image, making the post seem less foreign.
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the locus of representative democracy outside two institutions, effectively pinning future
State political expectations and their fulfilment on one House. Thus, any substandard
functioning of the Upper House or Head of State, entails a smaller impact on perceptions
of efficacy, confidence and satisfaction because neither institution has been selected by
the population. Public confidence is not lost because it was never invested through a
participatory rite. The absence of nationalist parties from the Upper Houses in both
locations, and the ability of the Head of State to transcend the political debate limits the
effect of these institutions in constructing national identity and political culture.19 The
influence of different institutions within the political sphere receives further attention in
chapter five.
International Influence: Canada and the United Kingdom
Despite the similar political institutions that bind Canada and the United Kingdom, the
evolution towards Canadian independence from 1867 led the former colony down a
different path in international affairs. Although the foreign policies of the two countries
were similar until the Statute ofWestminster in 1931,20 since then Canada's international
weight has increased significantly, a shift mirrored in proportion if not direction, in
Britain. The changing fortunes of the larger Nation State provide, in the case of Scottish
nationalists, an impetus for departure unheralded in more prosperous times. The
consequences for political confidence of declining international weight, and difficulties
with larger economic partners suggest that the benefits of tying national destiny to a
declining hegemonic power resemble an offer of diminishing returns rather than the
promise of security predicted by the architects of the 1707 Treaty ofUnion. Most often,
this argument surfaces as a marriage analogy. The once fruitful partnership of Scotland
and England/Wales is no longer advantageous to either partner (Brown, McCrone and
19 In one of its special edition polls, Angus Reid noted that the percentage of Canadians wishing to leave
the Senate as it is has remained constant in the period 1987 to 1998. at little over ten percent. The
proportion of Canadians wishing to reform the upper house has dropped from 59 to 43 percent, while the
percentage of those w ishing to abolish the Senate has rise from 22 to 41 percent (Angus Rcid 1998)
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Paterson 1998). For separatists in Quebec, the North American Free Trade Agreement
and the series of over-lapping international organisations ofwhich Canada is a member
form the back-drop for Canadian ranking that ranges from one to four on the United
Nations Development Index. If Britain is portrayed as an 'awkward and reluctant
partner' (George 1998) in the European Union, Canada appears to be doing well out of
its international obligations and arrangements.
Historically, the two have occupied different positions within the international, or
imperial, arena. Quebec began as a colony of France and later, following the 1760
Conquest ofNew France, became a British colony. Scotland, in comparison, has
simultaneously enjoyed the disadvantages of English imperial attention and post-union,
economic and political advantages as an imperial partner.21 Colonial critiques of the
present nationalist movement in Quebec and Scotland surface in the literature. Hechter
claims that Britain operates along a system of internal colonialism, where disadvantaged
peripheral regions are exploited for the benefit of an increasingly powerful centre
(Hechter 1987).22 In Canada, Laforest claims that the power exercised by the federal
government in the appointment of Senators, Supreme Court Justices, and as holder of the
public purse, mirrors closely the power of imperial centres over colonies (Laforest 1998).
Laforest's contemporary analysis sits among older theories that attribute Canada's
political development to its former colonial economic dependence on Britain (Creighton
1956, Innis 1930). Associated with such critiques, differing notions of national
confidence and success permeate the contemporary discourse.
20 The Statute ofWestminster repealed the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865, which ruled illegal any
colonial law that contradicted a British law.
21 In addition to military campaigns within its borders in 1715 and 1745 and the subsequent proscription
of markers of highland life between 1746 and 1752, the persistent if not malicious anglicisation of
Scotland can be directly attributable to the union (Lynch 1992).
22 McCrone subjects Hechter's analysis to careful scrutiny in Understanding Scotland, arguing that by
splitting Britain between highland and lowland areas, Hechter treated Scotland as a highland region in
its entirely, ignoring the diversity within the Scottish economy (Hechter 1975, McCronc 1992).
According to McCrone, Hechter's decision to adapt his analysis (Hechter 1982) by arguing that Scotland
represented an over-developed, rather than under-developed region further limits the degree to which his
analysis can be considered useful (McCrone 1992).
21
Ailsa Henderson, PhD 'Uresis. Chapter 1
Participation in international organisations and groups such as the G7, NATO,
Commonwealth and United Nations have provided Canada with a strong international
voice despite its middle-power size and wealth. The cultural particularities of
bilingualism have aided a Canadian presence in the diplomatic world. Membership in La
Francophonie, stemming from middle power diplomacy attempted by former prime
minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, also allows Quebec an opportunity to participate more
than other provinces (Axworthy and Trudeau 1990).23 The cultural particularity of
Quebec thus grants Canada a role in institutions in which it would not otherwise be
involved, such as La Francophonie, but also affects the pattern of interaction between
Canada and other states or international bodies (Latouche 1998).24 The bilingual nature
of Canada, thanks to Quebec, has increased the country's stature in the international
arena. Although both Canada and the UK are participating in similar institutions, for
Canada this has heralded a rising stature within international politics. For the former
imperial power, it signifies both a changing world and a transitory position within the
international power structure. In short, the increasing influence of international
collaboration provides new opportunities for regional or national groups to exercise a
voice beyond the Nation-State. The lack of a written constitution in Britain has allowed
Scotland to establish a presence in Europe beyond other devolved regions let alone
participating units of unitary States like France (Keating 1999). International context
also affects the degree of regional, or continental, integration.
Despite the absence of full-scale supra-national or continental political institutions,
Canada is much more a North American country, integrated into more than its continental
economy, in a way that Britain has yet to achieve in Europe (Lipset 1990, Nevitte 1996).
3 The relationship between British Columbia and the Asian economies and the experiences of Alberta
trade teams highlight how the characteristics of other provinces affect their participation in other
international fora.
22
Ailsa Henderson, PhD Thesis, Chapter 1
Despite the formal economic and political ties binding Britain to Europe, the country has
yet to assimilate its political views, its consumer and cultural habits to the Continent.25
This is not to suggest that economic integration naturally precedes cultural integration or
vice versa. Whether this stems from the integrative effects of a common language
receives attention in chapters three and four. The economic ties between Canada and the
United States account for much of the integration. The two countries participate in the
largest bilateral trading relationship in the world. Canadian trade with the United States
accounts for 80% of all exports and three quarters of imports.26 Even British Columbia,
with its emphasis on Asia-Pacific economic activity, trades twice as much with the US as
with Asia. Forty percent of BC imports and exports stem from American trade while
20% stem from trade with Asia.
The previous two sections highlight that despite the similar political institutions, the
division of power and process of supra-national integration distinguishes the Canadian
and British experiences. The following four sections explore the demographic, economic,
cultural and social aspects ofQuebec and Scotland's positions within their respective host
States.
24 Latouche also notes "Even though the US continues to profess in every forum that it prefers to deal
with a united Canada, it has taken full advantage of Quebec's activism in its own negotiations with
Canada" (Latouche 1998)
25 Public opinion polls from Angus Reid Group Inc and Europinion "Continuous Tracking" Surveys
illustrate this point. In March 2000, Angus Reid gauged perceptions of economic indicators in seventeen
countries. UK results distinguish themselves from data gathered in France, Germany, the Netherlands,
Spain and Sweden. When asked about taxes, 51% of UK respondents indicated they felt tax levels were
too high. The average for the other countries was 70%. Similarly, support for public spending was 25%
higher in the UK (Angus Reid 2000). In its analysis of attitudes towards the EU, Europinion determined
that UK residents are the least interested in Europe about their rights as EU citizens, the least interested
in discovering new things about themselves (Europinion 1997) the least convinced their country has
benefited from the EU (Europinion 1995), the least convinced the country should integrate more into the
EU, the least likely to accept unrestricted immigration from south of the Mediterranean, the most
convinced those suffering human rights abuses should be admitted and the most convinced the EU should
set education and training as a main objective (Europinion 1996).
2h
Exports to the US total $181 049.3 million while American imports total $144 661.3 million (Statistics
Canada 2000)
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Demographic Aspects: Quebec and Scotland
Notwithstanding their similar historical importance, demographically Scotland and
Quebec occupy different positions within the UK and Canada. At roughly twenty-five
percent of the total Canadian population and as home to over 80 percent of the Canada's
francophones, Quebec claims that it exercises a voice as one of the two founding nations.
27 The political and linguistic necessities of bilingual representatives and public servants
have, since the late 1960s, ensured the dominant presence of Quebecers in key
government roles. With brief exceptions Canada has been governed since 1968 by a
succession of Prime Ministers from Quebec.28 The presence of Quebecers extends to 10
of 37 current cabinet ministers29, three of the nine supreme court justices, one quarter of
the seats in the House ofCommons and in the Senate, the head of the army, and fifty
percent of the governors general since the first Canadian held the post in 1952. Until the
departure of Jean Charest as leader of the Progressive Conservative party in 1998, three
of the five official parties were led by MPs representing Quebec seats. For extended
periods of time, both the leader of the opposition and the Prime Minister have been
representing Quebec seats. 20 This dominance is not an unchanging characteristic of the
Canadian political system. Francophones were under-represented in the federal civil
service and federal Cabinet until the arrival ofPrime Minister Trudeau. Paradoxically,
this rise in political weight coincides with the demographic decline of Quebecers within
2 The compact theory, much disputed within academic circles, still accords tremendous weight in the
practical functioning of constitutional negotiations (Bouchard 1990, Bouchard 1993, Bouchard 1996,
Bouchard 1998, Bouchard 1999a, Bouchard 1999b. Bouchard 1999c, Chretien 1997, DeVillicrs 1997, S,
Dion 1998a, S. Dion 1998b, Johnson 1996, Johnson 1997, Parizeau 1995b).
28 The exceptions are Joe Clark June 1979-March 1980, John Turner June to Sept 1984. Kim Campbell
June to November 1993. These three prime ministers, who are from Alberta, Ontario and British
Columbia respectively ruled for a total of twenty months in more than thirty years.
29 Fourteen of the 37 ministers are from Ontario. It is worth nothing, however, that the Liberals only
managed to elect 24 MPs from Quebec and 101 from Ontario. As a result, Quebec ministers are over-
represented within the cabinet when their electoral success is taken into account.
30 Most recently this ended with the election of the Reform party as her majesty's loyal opposition in
1997.
24
Ailsa Henderson, PhD Thesis, Chapter 1
the Canadian population. At the time of the Conquest, the French birthrate was 55/1000
(Francis, Smith and Jones 1996). It now stands at 11/1000 (Statistics Canada 1999).
Although exerting a smaller power when compared to the overrepresentation of Quebec
Prime Ministers the presence of Scots within the British cabinet suggest that Scotland is
also adept at securing greater political representation that its proportion of the population
warrants. Scotland boasts five of the twenty-two Cabinet ministers, and two party
leaders, Alex Salmond, leader of the SNP, and Charles Kennedy, leader of the Liberal
Democrats. Although the presence of Scottish MPs in the current Labour cabinet could
have more to do with the strength of the Labour party in Scotland rather than Scottish
political influence within the union, a pattern of anomalous treatment of Scotland
suggests that a culturally distinct nation can exert a greater influence within the wider
State.
Representing one tenth of the population and one of four historic nations in the United
Kingdom Scotland's acknowledged role within its State is more secure than that held by
Quebec. Evidence of the historically-acknowledged difference is found in the anomalies
and assymetries of British governmental institutions. (MacCormick 1998) Canada's
French province must contend with the view that it is one of ten governments, a position
in conflict with the historical vision ofCanada as the product of two founding nations.
That one of ten governments claims to be the modern day representative of a founding
nation is contested both by those who balk at the compact theory of Confederation and
those who prefer to place less emphasis on the Quebec government's current role as
national proxy. What the two case studies do have in common is a historical particularity
and role in the construction of the modern State balanced with the current demographic
confines of a minority population. As John Trent emphasises, minority status brings with
it a sense of frailty and concern for survival that compounds the sense of difference
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(Trent 1997, Trent 1998) .31 In response, constitutional observers in the rest of Canada
assert that English Canada is as distinct from Quebec as the French province is from the
majority. Although seeking to provide a critique of current claims for "distinct society"
status, these statements fail to incorporate the demographic influence of constitutional
demands. Only the minority population worries about its distinctiveness, for the
dominant or majority population, by its very demographic and cultural weight, provides
the context for all political negotiations.12 In sum, in both cases Scotland and Quebec
represent small, culturally distinct nations with a solid presence at the wider State level in
spite of demographic minority status. Status as a cultural minority determines much of
how the nationalist movement constructs the debate, establishes boundaries and markers
of the project and its identity.
Economic Aspects: Quebec and Scotland
On initial examination, the economic fortunes of both case studies appear remarkably
similar. Both exist as periphery to the economic centre of southern England and southern
Ontario respectively. Both areas are rich in natural resources but not particularly well-
off, suffering from above average unemployment, limited foreign investment and
fluctuating consumer confidence.33 Equalisation payments in Canada and the Barnett
formula in Britain ensure that stable funding is guaranteed despite whatever effect such
top-up measures may have on perceptions of national self-sufficiency .34 Economic
critiques of the current situation and future prospects as a sovereign State figure in both
31 The extent to which minority status and cultural particularity affects the collective values and attitudes
of Scotland and Quebec receives attention in chapter four.
32 Additional examples can be found in discourses on race and the dominance of whiteness (Bonnett
2000). Often, it is the 'other' that is examined or analysed. Studies of the 'other' underpin our
understanding of ourselves (Said 1995). Whiteness, much like maleness, and until recently,
Englishness, has escaped similar attention (Bonnett 2000).
33
Quebec's unemployment rate, at 9.8%. is three percent higher than the Canadian rate for March 2000.
The Scottish ILO rate for Dec 1998 was 7.3%, one percent above the British rate of 6.2%.
34 The Barnett formula calculates the block grant given from Westminster to Scotland The formula
functions on a purely proportional scale although a falling population in Scotland has meant that it
traditionally receives more than its strictly proportional share. The SNP argues that because Scotland's
oil revenues are transferred directly to London, it receives a smaller share that it is due given the
contribution of North Sea oil to the British economy.
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nationalist discourses. Whether Scotland gains or loses money receives particular
attention from the SNP and Labour Party who each argue opposing points of view,
Arguments that Quebec may gain money but is generally 'held down' by the
circumstances of Confederation dominate financial debates within the province. Disputes
over natural resources and the receipt of a fair share of public funding provide material
for political parties occupying various points along the nationalist spectrum. The recent
Parliamentary elections in Scotland witnessed a series of reports from business groups
and think tanks assessing various aspects of the economic situation in Scotland. The
most heated debate, and heightened media attention, concerned the predictions of
economic well-being for an independent Scotland (SNP Research Dept 1996, SNP
Parliamentary Group 1998).35 In the last decade, the sovereignty debate has witnessed
the increasing importance of the economic feasibility of independence in Scotland and in
Quebec. Political autonomy predicated in the nineteenth century upon cultural
particularity has given way to arguments about good governance and economic vitality.
Economic disparities within Canada and Britain mirror an equally uneven distribution of
wealth with Quebec and Scotland The economic imbalance between anglophones and
francophones in Quebec presents a microcosm of the larger Canadian, and British,
picture. The falling income gap, much improved since the 1950s, owes much to the
education and bureaucratisation of a technocratic, francophone middle class in the 1960s
(Gagnon 1993, McRoberts 1993). The once dominant anglophone business class has
given way to a bilingual workforce. Economic imbalance within Scotland, bound much
more to public perception, is tied to the felt presence of southern English residents
integrating themselves into rural economies (Jedrej and Nuttall 1995). Frustration with
the pattern of land sales and composition of the rural population has led to the creation of
a small number of nationalist grassroots organisations intent on monitoring the incursion
33
During the 1999 election campaign the Scottish National Party promised to release two manifestos, the
first with costings for a devolved Scotland, and the second with projected costings for an independent
Scotland. In the end, only the one full manifesto was published (SNP 1999), although press releases later
in the campaign covered further economic details.
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ofEnglish landowners and incoming residents into the Scottish countryside (Scottish
Watch 1993, Scottish Watch 1994). The perception of inequality as it relates to
collective groups often banishes discussions of individual economic disparity. These
inequalities, which surface later in examinations of social capital and political
participation, have important ramifications for the social exclusion of citizens. In general,
the constitutional debate has been much kinder to the Scottish economy than to Quebec.
Despite expressions of dissatisfaction from businesses warning that they will relocate
should Scotland become independent, the country as a whole has not witnessed a
deterioration of its economic performance as judged by the outside world. In
comparison, New York bond raters such as Standard and Poor's and Moody's have been
particularly unkind to separatist administrations in Quebec, on occasion ranking the
province's bond rating behind that ofNewfoundland/6
Cultural Aspects: Quebec and Scotland
Cultural markers provide one of the key differences between the relative situations in
Scotland and Quebec. The French language, and its role in the historical development of
Canada and the nationalist movement of Quebec provides a clear, unquestionable sense of
cultural distance from the rest of Canada. Language, and more specifically its protection,
fuels the search for greater autonomy and, it is argued, future cultural security. Whether
the movement still emphasises linguistic particularity receives attention in chapter four.
What Scotland lacks in linguistic difference (despite the debate concerning the status of
Gaelic" and the Scots language) it gains in a full complement of easily identifiable
cultural markers, some invented, some authentic, supplementing a sense of history that
predates European contact with North America (Broun, Finlay and Lynch 1998, Trevor
Roper 1983). For Seton Watson, each decade of a nation's history lends additional
36 Above average growth in the province of Newfoundland for 1998 and 1999, in particular could be
credited with such results. Current ratings from Dominion Bond Rating Services indicate that both
short-term and long-term bonds for Quebec arc recorded as A(low) and stable (DBRS 1999)
3
According to the 1991 Census there arc 69, 510 individuals who are able to either speak, read or write
Gaelic. This represents just under two percent of the population (Scottish Office 1998).
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weight to its sense of consciousness and justification for self-determination (Seton
Watson 1977). Both nations easily identify their markers of difference, one grounded in
language and culture, the other in former independence and a history of treatment as a
recognised nation, to further the nationalist cause. For autonomist parties like the SNP,
the PQ and the BQ, these markers of difference lend credence to calls for greater self-
determination. For broadly defined 'nationalist' parties and movements, they lend added
strength to the need for domestically-created solutions to national issues. The strength of
the nationalist movements in Scotland and Quebec have been little affected by the
differing constitutional fortunes of the two nations, more specifically, by whether the
separate political consciousness existed in an autonomous nation or fledgling colony.
A longer history allows, however, for increased confidence in the survival of the nation.
It is much easier to predict the continued existence of a nation if it has already existed for
hundreds of years. This increased confidence manifests itself in a decreased vigilance in
patrolling the boundaries of national membership. Language charters and school boards
alike are designed to ensure the survival of French Quebec, a cultural promotion which
sits uneasily with some anglophones in Quebec.
The linguistic difference of Quebec also affects the circumstances in which the nationalist
debate takes place. Language in Quebec acts as a barrier to global communication
networks operating in English. This degree of what Raymond Breton once defined as
institutional completeness insulates Quebec from the cultural influence of the United
States in a way that English Canada does not enjoy (Breton 1964). The integrative pull
of the European continent exerts a much weaker influence on the United Kingdom.
Different European languages, cultures, institutions and histories ensure that the United
Kingdom is relatively protected from cultural and political trends in continental Europe
(Bulmer, George and Scott 1992, George 1998). These differing international aspects
affect the tactics and emphases of nationalists in each case study. Quebec exists as an
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isolated culture within the integrated cultural sphere ofNorth America while Scotland,
although part of the British cultural sphere within Europe, finds itself equally embedded
in British cultural markers. This has significant implications for a sense of cultural
ownership and an awareness of the "other" in Quebec (Leger and Leger 1990). This
element of the nationalist debate, particularly as it relates to cultural survival, is largely
lacking in Scotland, where national culture is seen as distinct within Britain.38
Social Aspects: Quebec and Scotland
Just as the economic situations of the two case studies appear remarkably similar, so too
do the social influences on the nationalist movements have much in common. The social
structures of life in Scotland and Quebec appear, by many indicators, as little more than
variants ofWestern trends. Urban development, communications networks, print
capitalism, trade patterns and distance to international markets affect the level of
cosmopolitanism and global contact of the society in which nationalism asserts itself.
Higher immigration levels in Quebec and a resulting multicultural society have forced an
ongoing debate about cultural accessibility and national membership that have served to,
at least highlight and at most dampen, the parochial tendencies typified by many
nationalist movements. In Scotland, the relative lack of a substantial ethnic minority
population reduces the total amount of racism in society although sectarianism in
Scotland's West coast detracts from whatever intolerance-free image Scotland might
desire (McCrone 1992, Harvie 1998). Politicians on either side of the partisan divide in
both Scotland and Quebec strive to portray the nation as resolutely outward-looking, and
integrated into a global economy.
The previously highlighted aspects of the Nation-State relationship in Scotland and
Quebec receive additional treatment throughout the following chapters of this thesis.
Each of the social, cultural and political contexts has important implications for wider
38 In contrast. Callum Brown argues that social characteristics such as gender, age and class have
prevented the emergence of a unified mass culture in Scotland (Brown 1996).
30
Ailsa Henderson, PhD Thesis, Chapter 1
issues of elections and representation, the relationship between elites and general
population, the socialisation of political values and attitudes, understandings of the
interaction between citizens and the State, the relations among citizens, and the modern
civic needs fulfilled by national identity. Before turning to an examination of the
theoretical and methodological framework for the thesis, this chapter first outlines the
different approaches to political authority exhibited by nationalist movements in Scotland
and Quebec.
DIFFERENCES IN MOVEMENTS
As implied in the previous section, in historical development and in the current political
situation the two nationalist movements of Scotland and Quebec exist in near parallel
situations. When compared with the existence of nationalist regimes throughout the
world, that the two are liberal democracies alone dictates much ofwhat can be
considered a limited comparative analysis. Where the two differ, however, are in the
emphases and tendencies within the nationalist movements, the use and construction of
identity, and the resulting differences within and between the nation and the larger State.
As stated earlier, in both cases eighteenth-century constitutional settlements protected
institutions of civil society integral to the survival and development of a distinct identity
and political society. The value of the comparison, however, lies as much in the
differences between the context and tactics of each nationalist programme. Attempts to
categorise nationalist movements into civic or ethnic approaches often place Quebec and
Scotland on opposite sides of the divide (Ignatiefif 1993). If ethnic nationalism is seen as
backward-looking, based on blood ties and generally exclusive, civic nationalism is
portrayed as its inclusive and forward-looking counterfoil (Brubaker 1996, Hobsbawm
1990, Ignatieff 1993, Ignatiefif 1996, Kohn 1967, Plamenatz 1976). The dominant
nationalist parties in both locations admit to these differences. The Scottish National
Party emphasises its civic nationalist goals while at least one of the sovereignist parties in
Quebec, the Bloc Quebecois (BQ), admits that nationalism in Quebec is not entirely civic.
The BQ argument, is that civic movements are post-national forces. Because the push
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towards greater autonomy hinges upon the existence of a distinct nation, separatism in
Quebec cannot be post-national, and thus, not entirely civic (Bloc Quebecois 1999). 39
Opposition to Scottish devolution has been both a minority view and strongly aligned
with supporters of the Conservative party. Whether the party has attracted a wider array
of unionists from across the political spectrum or whether party affiliation has coloured
perceptions of constitutional settlement remains outwith the scope of this thesis. Few
challenge the inclusiveness of the Scottish settlement although the exceptions to this
statement will be examined in chapter four. In Quebec however, opposition to greater
autonomy divides neatly along linguistic, and often ethnic, lines. Critics of the nationalist
movements from within and outwith Quebec, have sought to undermine the political
programme with charges of exclusion. (Alliance Quebec nd.a Alliance Quebec nd.b,
Alliance Quebec nd.c, Alliance Quebec nd.d, Alliance Quebec nd.e, Henderson 1997,
Johnson 1994, Tetley 1982) Thus, while nationalists in Scotland and Quebec operate
within the context of a Western, liberal-democratic parliamentary system, each group
uses different justifications for greater autonomy and creates different interpretations of
national identity and membership. Here, relevant distinctions present themselves between
nationalism and separatism, autonomy and independence, partisan and social movements.
In Quebec, both provincial parties, the Parti Quebecois and the Quebec Liberal Party
(QLP), can be considered nationalist parties. Whatever the constitutional policies of
these parties, both support degrees of autonomy for Quebec than are greater than the
federal government and other provinces are willing to accede. Both believe that the
French language and a unique culture make Quebec a distinct society. Where the two
differ is in their support for sovereignty. Recently, the Parti Quebecois has been
consistent in its support for independence providing the Quebec electorate votes for such
a package and negotiations with the federal government for a renewed federalism fail. At
its most sovereignist, the Quebec Liberal Party backed a measure of sovereignty
association between Quebec and Canada that is consistent with the soft-end of the Parti
39 "L'identite exclusivement civique, voire post-nationale, n'est past adaptee a la situation particuliere du
Quebec. L'identite quebecoise ne doit pas se dissoudre dans une identite civique qui ignore la presence
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Quebecois' proposals. Since the late 1980s, however, the QLP has backed away from
such measures and sits, somewhat uneasily, between the constitutional proposals put
forward by the PQ and those of the federal Liberal Party. In Scotland, the consensus
works from constitutional settlement to nationalism rather than the other way round. In
other words, if Quebec political parties are both nationalist and differ on the issue of the
constitution, the majority of Scottish political parties have agreed on the constitution but
differ on the issue of nationalism. During the devolution referendum, three of the four
main parties in Scotland backed the establishment of a Scottish Parliament but only the
Scottish National Party considers itself a nationalist party. Although Labour, the Liberal
Democrats and the SNP each had different reasons for promoting change, the consensus
around the need for change is noteworthy. This situation stands in contrast to the post-
devolution position of the four main parties, where consensus surrounding the status quo
is less clear. For reasons discussed later in the thesis, what has been seen as the a priori
commitment of parties in Quebec, that they are nationalist, pro-autonomy parties, appears
a more radical position. Despite support for greater political autonomy, the Labour and
Liberal Democrat parties have avoided the nationalist label, fearing that it would suggest
a level of radicalism or xenophobia they appear unprepared to accept. Throughout the
history of the autonomist movements in Scotland and Quebec, political parties seeking
change have co-existed with wider social movements seeking varying levels of
sovereignty. A full examination of these movements, and the changing support for such
programmes of change, appear in chapters three, four and five of the thesis.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Although comparative in nature the thesis aims to provide more than a study of
nationalism in two contexts. Rather, it seeks to provide a sociological understanding of
the political relationships among citizens and between citizens and the State in Scotland
and Quebec. As will be discussed in chapter two, traditional examinations of nationalist
or autonomist movements and national identity have often treated the nation as a
d une majorite nationale de francophones" (Bloc Quebecois 1999).
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homogeneous entity. Such treatments do not acknowledge the variety of goals and aims
held by nationalists nor do they consider the centre-periphery relations that occur within
nations and nationalist political projects. This thesis relies on recent developments in
social identity theory, social psychology and political culture, including growing
literatures on social capital and new social movements, to expand the discussion on
national integration and belonging.
Early works on political culture emphasised its role as a guarantor of democratic stability
(Almond and Verba 1963, Pye and Verba 1965, Bluhm 1974) The proper balance of
efficacy and deference was seen as providing citizens with a sense of security and
politicians with the room to govern. Usually comparative in nature, the studies assigned
countries to categories within a hierarchy of political development. Criticised for lying
somewhere between descriptions of national character and Eurocentric notions of the
"developed polity", political culture research was charged with being vague in its
conclusions and dubious in its methodological reliance on psychological critiques of early
childhood experiences. A full examination of the development of political culture as an
analytical tool is found in chapter two. Survey research, by its very nature, requires at the
very least some expectation of the results in order to frame the questions in such a way as
to elicit the meaningful answers. While this critique of social survey research still holds,
the increased sophistication of opinion-polling techniques, the existence of new datasets,
and international surveys justifies, on a methodological level, a re-examination of political
attitudes and behaviour. The value of linking micro- and macro-level analysis to explain
the socialising influence of civil society and governmental institutions has assumed
increased importance on the eve ofwidespread constitutional change.
The return to political culture analyses has occurred amidst the surging development of
another critical literature on the meaning and construction of social identity. Identity
research in the various fields of social psychology, nationalism studies, and political
science brings a different approach to the examination of self consciousness, group
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attachment, belonging and integration. This thesis relies upon the burgeoning literature
on social and national identity in an effort to determine what light identity theory can shed
on issues of value acquisition and political integration. Although identity receives a full
examination with political culture in chapter two, it is necessary to summarise the theory
of identity and political culture used throughout this thesis. This work claims that the
basis upon which individuals may choose to evaluate their claims to belonging present
varying opportunities for inclusion, for although identity is a self-ascribed tag its validity
may not be acknowledged by other members of society. In the development of a national
political programme, nationalist leaders project and encourage a sense of national identity
in order to sustain the necessity of the project. The political use of pre-existing markers
of cultural identity clarifies the components of that identity, allowing it to be harnessed as
a potent political force. The intentions of leaders and parties are largely irrelevant for it is
the message, as carried by agents of socialisation and construed by citizens that
determines the inclusive nature of the movement. Thus, a national identity that is civic in
its goals and application does not necessarily make the movement inclusive. Likewise, an
inclusive leadership dealing with a population in which hostility and suspicion are
common, will have little hope of ensuring a consistently inclusive notion of national
membership. The values and attitudes held by the population will undermine the efforts
of political elites to forge a united identity. Similarly, an exclusive view of national
membership in a society where both national membership and autonomy enjoy low
political saliency will wreak little damage on the alienated individual psyche. Chapter
three deals with the nationalist messages as promoted by agents of socialisation, while
chapters four and five analyse how the population understands these messages.
METHODOLOGY
This thesis presents a comparative analysis of the relationship between national identity
and political culture in Scotland and Quebec. The benefits of a comparative analysis
include the ability to generalise about political activity, to improve the classification of
politics or political systems, and to develop models that enhance the predictability of
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political action (Hague, Harrop and Breslin 1998, Dalton 1996, Daalder 1997) The
formulation of generalisations necessitates the easy identification of exceptions, an
exercise made difficult by the existence of two comparative examples. The list of
countries or regions hosting nationalist independence parties that rely on identity as a
pillar of secession extends beyond Scotland and Quebec. Catalonia and the Basque
region in Spain, Padania in Italy, and Flanders and Wallonia in Belgium each highlight the
diversity of experiences that exist within the limited confines ofWestern Europe. The
choice of Scotland and Quebec for this thesis depended in part on timing, in part on the
availability of literature, and in part on personal circumstance. Both nations held
referenda seeking greater political autonomy within two years. A developed literature on
nationalism frequently makes references to Scotland and Quebec as examples of peaceful,
political, democratic and thus comparable nationalist movements. As highlighted in the
previous examination of the ways in which Canada and Britain offer relatively similar
institutional and democratic contexts, the nationalist movements of Scotland and Quebec
allows for a fruitful comparison of political attitudes in each case.
This thesis supplements statistical analyses of elections studies and opinion polls with
content analyses of political statements and interview material from political activists in
the Scotland and Quebec. Data analysis, as driven by a reading of political culture and
social and national identity theory, looks for evidence of a developed theory rather than
presenting a series of tabular data on various aspects of political and social life in
Scotland and Quebec. In most cases, the quantitative data used has received an initial
examination by the primary investigators of the electoral studies. Owing to the
limitations of space and time, most of the data analysis stems from election studies, voting
behaviour and opinion polls in the 1990s. It is worth noting that data collected in
Scotland and Quebec was performed using difference sampling methods, different
interview techniques and different questions. Data gathered during an election campaign
will capture different moods than data gathered in the middle of a legislative term. Data
gathered by the government cannot be equated with data gathered by a private opinion
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polling firm or a newspaper. Even when data is collected using similar methods and at
similar times, the questions themselves may capture different attitudes. This is
highlighted in chapter four with an analysis of the different identity questions used in each
election study. Because of this disparity, it would be irresponsible to provide a direct
comparison between data in each case study. As a result, sections dealing with
quantitative data are separated so that the results for Quebec and Scotland are discussed
in isolation. Once the analysis of data has been performed, the two case studies are
compared.
Additional qualitative evidence, gathered through content analyses and discourse
analyses, accompanies the attitudinal and behavioural data. This triangulation of
resources seeks to provide a sense of accuracy and depth to the analysis while minimising
the negative aspects of each investigative method. An analysis of the potential pitfalls
associated with each approach emphasises the benefits of combing qualitative and
quantitative research techniques.
The questionable centrality of political beliefs, the relationship between attitudes, values
and behaviour, the doubtful comparability of cross-national data using a variety of
questions with nuanced meanings, sampling issues, interview techniques and the
treatment of incomplete data plague any researcher seeking to apply quantitative
techniques in an effort to probe the hearts and minds of human subjects. Political culture
has been criticised for being too positivist (Pateman 1989) ignoring economic factors
(Jackman and Miller 1996a, Jackman and Miller 1996b) or behavioural factors (Reisinger
1995) and being methodologically slippery (Whitefield and Evans 1999) in addition to
receiving the usual charges that it has been applied incorrectly (Inglehart 1988) The
appeal of political culture, however, has led to a small resurgence of analyses (Welch
1993, Lane 1992). Literatures such as social capital, which attempt to link the level of
citizen interaction with the stability of society or democracy, still rely on examinations of
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political culture to provide a sense of context to the work (Putnam 1993). For these
researchers, the methodological issues involved are outweighed by the supposed benefits
of the cultural approach.
Most works using national identity as an independent variable exerting influence over
partisan preference or voter turnout rely on a variation ofLuis Moreno's five-point
identity scale. (Moreno 1988) Developed while comparing national identity in Scotland
and Catalonia, Moreno's scale requires respondents to describe their sense of allegiance
given the following options: Scottish not British, More Scottish than British, Equally
Scottish and British, More British than Scottish, British not Scottish.40 Such a
categorisation lends itself to straightforward quantification and cross-national
comparison. Despite the importance of creating data to test relationships between
variables, what Moreno's scale gains in applicability it lacks in description. The scale fails
to identify the strength with which national feelings are held, what such self-identification
actually means to the individual, and leaves hidden the components of identity itself.
What, for instance, are the distinguishing characteristics of the Scottish or Quebecois
national identity? How is the identity of an individual who self-identifies as solely
Scottish different from the identity of an individual whose self-definition allows for a
minimal sense of Britishness? If used in isolation, Moreno's categories, while valuable in
their ability to demonstrate the effect of national identity on political behaviour, fail to
provide a sense of context to national identity, what it is about national identity that
affects subsequent behaviour. Although Canadian newspapers have been quick to
commission opinion polls using the Moreno identity scales, the election surveys in
Canada rely on a different instrument to measure the varying levels of identity within the
country. Asking respondents to indicate their level of attachment to their province and
40 Used in the 1997 British Election Survey and Scottish Election booster survey, the results from
similar questions have been used in several papers presented at a fall 1997 conference for the Centre for
Research on Elections and Social Trends (CREST) (Scottish Affairs Special Issue, 1998). Similar
examinations of recent election survey material may be found in Evans and Norris 1999, Taylor and
Thomson 1999.
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country on two scales of 1 to 100, while avoiding the binary opposition of the British
scale, provides little insight into the motivations of belonging. As will be argued in
chapter two, identity is not a thing and should not be treated as such. That said, in
attempts to mobilise identity behind a political project, nationalist parties encourage the
creation and acquisition of a definable identity package that provides citizens with the
tools to interpret their past, present and future. For those who exclude themselves from
national identity a reluctance to align oneself with the associated values and
characteristics of the nation matters as much as the notion ofbelonging itself. Although
both scales provide an accurate reflection of belonging or attachment, their continued use
in isolation inhibits a solid understanding of identity in Scotland and Quebec.
Part of the problem of previous statistical examinations of political culture is that they are
looking for relationships between variables that exert a cursory influence on the
development of political attitudes. Although the influence of social class and trust and
efficacy levels form the backbone of a system's political culture, equally important is the
perception of boundaries around these cultures. That a population feels itself different,
even in the face of evidence to the contrary, speaks volumes about the relationships
between citizens and the State. The perception of boundaries is often ignored in favour of
the observed objective absence ofboundaries. This thesis argues that, for example, the
fact that Scots consider themselves to be more communitarian than their English
counterparts influences political behaviour even though by most objective measures,
Scottish political attitudes closely resemble those in the rest of the UK.
The second methodological technique involves a content analysis of the political
manifestos of the political parties, government constitutional documents and final reports
of royal commissions and consultative fora. The analysis has sought to highlight the
identification of certain pillars of identity, the assumed tenets of nationalist discourse and
the grounds for collective inclusion and exclusion in the nation. Initially, the research
process encompassed an analysis of documents from school curricula boards, the Church
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of Scotland Church and Nation Committee and the Quebec Order of Catholic Bishops.
In the interests of space, a full analysis of these documents has not been included in the
thesis. Chapter three contains references to particular documents, where they highlight
similar or noticeably different themes. In addition, the research process involved the
content analysis of ten newspapers over a four month period in 1998 and 1999. In the
interests of space this analysis does not appear in the thesis.41
In dealing with the qualitative aspects of the thesis efforts were made to ensure that in the
identification of individuals to interview, access to decision makers, the selection and
interpretation of interview questions remained justifiable. Based on a theoretical
understanding of the construction of national identity, Scottish and Quebecois
nationalism, and a preliminary round of interviews with various political actors and
academics, fieldwork interviews emphasised the views of some 65 individuals across the
spectrum of national membership, as determined by the majority view. A complete
analysis of the selection of these individuals appears in Appendix D. Thus, the thesis
sought to represent the views of unity groups, separatist groups, immigrants, and non-
Francophones in Quebec, along with Scottish-born residents, and those born outside
Scotland in order to provide a range of experiences from those at the nucleus of political
nationalism to those occupying the margins of national belonging. It was intended that
this selection of individuals would allow for an analysis of the way in which the
construction of national identity by various agents of socialisation and political actors
affects different individuals and groups throughout society
In sum, this thesis seeks to test a developing theory of integration and belonging through
a variety of primary data sources. Party platforms, constitutional documents and
submissions to governmental commissions allow for a reconstruction of the perceived
development of each nation's history and identity. Opinion polls and election studies test
the acceptance of these constructions within the population. Used to provide a sense of
11 It is expected that academic articles based on this analysis will follow the completion of the PhD
40
Ailsa Henderson, PhD 'Diesis, Chapter 1
context, primary interviews add depth to the wealth of statistical information available on
identity and political attitudes. This hybrid collection of primary sources allows for a
greater understanding of the role key agents of socialisation play in the construction of
dominant political behaviours. Each chapter places varying emphasis on the available
data according to the role of the chapter within the thesis.
THESIS OUTLINE
Perceptions of inclusion and exclusion, as they stem from claims to belonging in the
nation, provide the dominant tool for examining political culture in Scotland and Quebec.
A secondary level of analysis details how this dynamic affects participation, satisfaction
and the distribution of political attitudes within society. Chapter two establishes a
theoretical framework for further analysis of national identity and political culture.
Generated by such agents of socialisation as the family, education system, and the
Church, political culture establishes the parameters for political attitudes on which all
further variants are based. Considered as tools of integration, national identity and
political culture share a common purpose and stem from similar civil institutions. Any
examination of political culture thus takes its place between the fields of social
psychology, political sociology and social anthropology. Methodological and definitional
difficulties have plagued political culture as a concept and undermined its potential
usefulness as an analytical tool. This thesis establishes and operationalises key definitions
to examine how the interaction and negotiation affecting national identity influences the
political dispositions of citizens. In so doing it examines the potentially integrative role of
the polity as a corrective for national exclusion. With this in mind, chapter two argues
that nationalist programmes construct identity in such a way as to provide identifiable
characteristics to mark the boundaries of the nation. The implications of this definition of
identity allow individuals to make conclusions about their own sense of belonging within
the nation.
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Civic values promoted through the historical development of the nation in Scotland and
Quebec appear remarkably similar. In both case studies, the survival of institutions
following the loss of political independence allowed for the maintenance of a civil society
that served as the guardian of identity.42 Much as the 1707 Treaty of Union allowed for
the survival of the distinct Scottish education system, legal system and Presbyterian
Church of Scotland, the 1774 Quebec Act preserved the role of the Catholic Church, civil
code and French language in Britain's colony. Current nationalist parties rely on these
institutions, and use them to foster a sense of collectivism and civic duty, proudly
democratic and egalitarian. These parties also refer to values and descriptors of the
nation's population that extend beyond these basic founding values. The pre-eminence of
culture and language in political constructions of Quebec identity, in addition to recurrent
references to the Quebecois people, link the individual to the process of national building.
The result is a defined collective in search of self-determination fuelled by feelings of its
distinctiveness. Different approaches in Scotland, in particular attention to the state of
democracy in the current system, suggest that the emphasis is portrayed as one of an
unjust situation that must be rectified rather than a people experiencing an injustice.
Chapter three examines how these parties have aligned certain values and institutions
with a politicised national identity. In so doing, the chapter chronicles the promotion of a
common understanding of national development in Scotland and Quebec. History, both
as it has promoted a particular understanding of the relationship between the individual
and the State and how it is constructed within the nation, receives particular attention in
the analysis of primary interview data. Party programmes and constitutional documents
also provide their own potted histories of national development as a means of establishing
the context that justifies the particular document. Platforms from all post 1979 British
general elections and Quebec provincial elections since 1980, in addition to the various
constitutional reports distributed in the push towards devolution and sovereignty since
42 National identity in both case studies obviously have roots extending beyond the eighteenth century
For the purposes of this chapter, the timing of the two events, and the similarities in their influence on
civil society, provide a convenient starting point. For an analysis of identity prior to 1707 see, for
example, Broun, Finlay and Lynch 1998.
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1979, are subject to a content analysis to test for understandings of history, identity and
political society. Any evidence of difference from the larger political unit is tested against
socio-economic variables which could account for a variation in attitudes and behaviour,
An analysis of recent opinion polls, national election studies and interview material forms
the basis for an examination of national identity in chapter four. Relying on key literature
to establish a sense of context, the chapter analyses data from the last two federal
elections studies in Canada and Britain. Through a comparison with interview material,
the chapter seeks to determine how the need for belonging, highlighted by the nationalist
programme, affects perceptions of inclusion and exclusion that might alter the
prioritisation of political values in society. In its concentration on recent data it also
seeks to determine how potentially divisive referenda and elections affect the trust and
efficacy of those on the losing side. With greater attention to definitions of the self, and
the alignment of self-identification with distinct political options, the potential for
alienation within the nation and political society, insofar as the two are not coterminous,
rises. In short, the chapter seeks to establish the extent to which institutional structures or
traumatic events, as affected by national identity, have the potential to create new
political cultures or cause fissures in the old culture.
Chapter five returns to traditional measures of political culture. The 1997 election
studies for Scotland and Quebec are analysed to determine whether attitudes to identity
and attitudes such as efficacy, deference, satisfaction and confidence may be considered
distinct. The chapter then relies on the identity groups created by the various identity
questions in each dataset to determine whether national identity plays a role in the values
and attitudes held by individuals. The statistical analysis reveals that although identity
groups share views of politicians, their views of society and social inclusion differ. The
quantitative data is supplemented by qualitative information from the interviews, which
shows that individuals across the identity spectrum tend to share views of politicians but
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differ on the issue of national belonging. The thesis ends with a conclusion that examines
the main lines of argument and suggests possible directions for future research.
This thesis does not chronicle a litany of oppressive acts inflicted by nationalists on those
who do not possess the proper pedigree, nor does it attempt to answer who, ultimately, is
responsible for correcting the perceptions of alienation. It does not accuse nationalists in
general or separatist parties in Scotland or Quebec ofbuilding nationalist programmes on
the basis of ethnic divisions within the population. In recent years these groups, who are
not exclusionist in their motives, have done much to foster a sense of civic nationalism
inclusive of all within its borders. Rather the thesis recognises that it is the very nature of
collective identity, that is shared by some and shunned by others, that this brings with it
an inevitable sense of separateness. Identity, however, cannot be equated neatly with a
sense of inclusion. Identity, as viewed by various disciplines in the social sciences, is a
self-directed process of identification. In the articulation of a national identity a sense of
self is attached to a collective sense of difference. Reasons for holding an identity, and
the markers by which it can be identified, change in function and meaning over time. The
collective ascription of a sense of self-consciousness, self-esteem and self-respect affects
the self-location of the individual in the civic polity. This interaction, between national
identity and political culture, forms the basis of this thesis.
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National Identity and Political Culture:
Political Integration, Negotiated Identities
and Contested Belonging
Integration into any national culture brings with it a sense of belonging that affects
political and social attitudes in both a cognitive and unconscious way. An emerging
dynamic between those who feel well-integrated into dominant society and those who
feel they occupy a more marginal position mirrors any other situation in which there is
an imbalance of power. And yet, an individual objectively occupying the margins of
national culture may not exhibit the personal identity crises or tensions that an
individual much closer to the majority view might experience. Despite the difference
between-"comfort levels" and location in the dominant culture, a lack of integration
can affect the political perceptions of acceptable access and voice within the nation,
State or society. This chapter charts the navigation of collective political identity by
individuals through an examination of cultural approaches to political relationships.
Shifting ways of viewing the world, crediting as causing a rise in cultural approaches
(Melucci 1995, Habermas 1987), receive similar treatment in the analysis of political
values and attitudes. In his examination of comparative political culture Inglehart, in
particular, highlights the effects of changing economic and social structures on the
cultural parameters of political systems (Inglehart 1977, 1990). By providing a field
of analysis in which political values and national identity can be examined as mutually
reinforcing interactive processes, this chapter owes much to the composite aspects of
culture in society: namely, the processes of socialisation, interaction, and integration.
The chapter argues that despite the obvious collective processes at work within
nationalist movements, national identity also exerts an excluding or categorising
influence. Calls for concerted and collective action, as reinforced by images and icons
of national history and promises of a brighter independent future, ignore the
negotiated aspects of belonging. Even imagined communities such as nations possess
a nucleus and a periphery between which individuals negotiate their placement
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Efforts by nationalist parties, civil institutions and the media to highlight the
inclusiveness of the nation tend not to question the effect this has on the individuals
who either do not feel included or, for whatever reason, wish not to be included in the
popularly received notions of national membership. This process of inclusion or
exclusion takes on new meaning when the nation exists within or across State
boundaries. Official State inclusion, as determined objectively by citizenship
legislation and subjectively by the activities of dominant agents of socialisation,
conflict with the efforts of nations to graft their own sense of belonging, one often
driven by political intentions, onto the civic polity. The goals and benefits of national
membership, as determined by the State and by the nation often, but not always,
coincide. For Van der Veer "citizenship is enough for political membership in the
State, it is not for cultural membership in the nation" (Van der Veer 1998). The first
few terms of the Scottish Parliament will determine whether the Scottish nation
emerges.as an entity separate from the Scottish polity in a way that the Quebecois
nation can be distinguished from Quebec the province. In other words, whereas the
national boundaries and political-regional boundaries have hitherto been coterminous,
the presence of stronger political boundaries, and thus a territorial notion of Scots,
may encourage the creation of national boundaries that include a smaller population
within the region. When the interests or markers of belonging of each of these units
diverge there is room for a conflict of belonging. Depictions of the interaction
between notions of identity, political integration, power, and a resulting theory of
negotiated belonging and contested identities seek to explain the way identity affects
political culture in Scotland and Quebec.
The plethora of definitions, methods and theoretical approaches to political culture
provide evidence of its widespread appeal and potential for confusion. Continued
support for the political culture approach stems in part from a general belief that
otherwise successful economic models, such as rational choice theories, underestimate
the importance of cultural factors as determinants of political activity. Research
touting the explanatory power of a shared values approach co-exists with a
burgeoning literature decrying the lack of coherence in the application of political
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culture research practices (Lane 1992, Reisinger 1995). Since it first gained
prominence as the analytical tool of choice in several examinations of political
attitudes and behaviour in the early 1960s, political culture approaches have suffered
varying degrees of attention and success. Likewise, national identity literature has
contained much controversy although here the issue of definitions reveals a debate
about the origins and purposes of collective identities and nations (Anderson 1992,
Brass 1991, Breuilly 1993, Connor 1990, Deutsch 1966, Gellner 1983, Hobsbawm
1990, Kedourie 1994, Smith 1986, Taylor 1997). Treating nations as homogenous
collectives this literature emphasises the reasonsfor inter-personal ties rather than the
effect such relationships have on the social and civic attitudes of individuals Even
those works highlighting the exclusionary aspects of nationalism prefer to label all
nationalism as rooted in the 'narcissism ofminor difference' rather than examining the
different ways that nationalist-induced inclusion and exclusion can affect the polity
(Ignatieff 1993, Seton Watson 1997, Gellner 1964, Gellner 1996). The following
examination details the main critiques of political culture and national identity
literature before proceeding to an analysis of the interaction between the two research
traditions in relation to socialisation, integration and difference in interaction.
POLITICAL CULTURE
In her 1992 work Ruth Lane criticises the "fundamental failure to settle on an
operational definition of the internal structure of political culture, that is, the variables
ofwhich it is composed" (Lane 1992). Although challenged and nuanced definitions
form the mainstay ofmuch theoretical political work, scientific approaches to politics
have rarely witnessed a phrase that has been so universally employed and customarily
derided as political or civic culture.1 Used by some as a residual character to explain
whatever rational choice theory omitted, and by others as the bedrock of a nation's
political system2, political culture suffers from the problem of being overused with a
lack of precision The muddy approach to political culture has not escaped notice
from its own practitioners (Kavanagh 1972, Gibbins 1989, Lane 1992, Welch 1993,
1 Even essentially contested notions such as power, and the oft-misused democracy have not been
subject to an almost continuous rc-definition with each new work.
2 Franklin and Braun. for example, equate political culture with Zeitgeist (Franklin and Braun 1995)
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Reisinger 1995). Much of the problem, it would appear, stems from the basic appeal
of the concept. Referring broadly to the shared and divergent values related to a
political system, the concept can bend forgivingly around most theoretical approaches
or methodological preferences. In his 1976 article Patrick reported the use of 30
different definitions in post-1963 works, all claiming to provide analyses of political
culture (Patrick 1976 quoted in Rosamund 1997). It has been used, at times, as an
independent, interdependent or dependent variable. It is not so much that academics
disagree with the plethora of definitions offered over the last thirty years, but rather
that each project seeking to employ the concept redefines it in profitable ways.
Topics enjoying easy access to behavioural data tend to include such indicators iri
definitions. Projects lacking large databases of attitudinal or behavioural data might
include institutional approaches within the definition.
A survey of the related literature highlights three sources of disagreement: goals of
research, theoretical scope of concept, and methods employed. Each of these three
aspects highlights key debates within the field of political culture. Goal most often
refers to whether research aims to uncover an ideal, or stable form of political culture.
Scope of concept determines the components for analysis included within the
definition of political culture. Two particular debates concern the treatment of
national identity and the inclusion of political behaviour in measures of political
culture. Methods refer not only to the statistical or data gathering techniques but to
larger questions of comparative versus sociological examinations (Welch 1993) and
the location of culture within society (Lane 1992, Reisinger 1995) In particular,
methodological practices must address whether culture resides within individuals or
exists as group property. Clearly, divisions within goals, concepts, and methods are
cross-cutting. Research divided on the basis of goals may employ similar methods to
measure relevant variables while approaches using different data-gathering techniques
may seek to explain diverse visions of political culture. With these potential divisions
in mind the following examination of political culture provides for a greater
understanding of the key debates affecting the application of political culture
approaches. An acknowledgement of these divisions, and a clear statement of the
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resultant definitions used throughout the thesis must precede any work promising to
analyse the causes and effects of political culture.
Goals
Earliest approaches to political culture, as found in Plato, Aristotle, de Tocqueville,
Weber and Bagehot, attempted to provide comprehensive examinations of the
political characteristics held by populations. In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of
Capitalism, for example, Weber sought to link the ideological foundations ofWestern
"Puritan worldly asceticism" with the accumulationist pursuit of wealth and
productive spirit required by any good capitalist (Weber 1968). In other works, the
goal was not to uncover the reasons for attitudinal or behaviour preferences, but
rather to describe a national character in an accurate manner. De Tocqueville, for
example,^chronicled the individualism and frontier spirit of American political culture
(de Tocqueville 1945). These qualitative sociological efforts retreated with the
behavioural revolution of the late 1950s and early 1960s. Researchers operating after
this watershed have, not surprisingly, criticised these works as subjective character
studies providing little more than cursory insights into the political habits of a nation
(Kavanagh 1972, Lane 1992, Welch 1993). Improved statistical techniques and
greater access to subjects prompted more scientific approaches to political activities
and a renewed vigour to political culture. The wave of interest in political culture
research was further motivated by two politically relevant circumstances: the failure of
otherwise successful constitutions grafted onto Third World polities (Brown 1979)
and the German experience with Nazism (Almond 1993, Eatwell 1997)7 Political
culture specialists sought to explain the subjective orientations to the political system
that inhibited the acceptance of constitutions and allowed for the rise ofNazism.
Thus in an effort to prevent other failed democratic experiments, the modern
treatment of normative political culture sought to explain why some polities allowed
3
Although originally devoted to explaining the collapse of democratic institutions in Germany while
detailing the robustness of democracy in Great Britain and the United States, Almond has since
moved on to ground the explosive growth of certain Asian-Pacific economies as products of
particular national political cultures (Almond 1993).
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democracy to flourish while others proved less fertile. In this context Gabriel Almond
and Sidney Verba collected attitudinal survey data in five countries in an attempt to
uncover the political characteristics most supportive of the democratic system
(Almond and Verba 1963). Later criticised for being inaccurate in its analysis
(Kavanagh 1989, Topf and Heath 1987) and tied to ideal-type visions of democratic
systems and ethnocentric visions of political development (Pateman 1989) the theme
of political progress and development, despite its dubious connotations when used in
a comparative context, has provided a tempting benchmark to be used by future
political analysts. Almost immediately, research attempts offered variations on the
theme of political progress and successful democratic integration (Pye and Verba
1965).
Just as initial optimism surrounding the Civic Culture approach later gave way to a
spate of research on the decline of civic culture in the five original case studies, so too
have recent approaches from slightly different literatures chronicled the decline of
social capital in Great Britain and the United States4 (Bennett 1998, Putnam 1993,
Putnam 1995a, Putnam 1995b, Putnam 1996). Social capital research, and more
particularly its links to political involvement, receives attention later in this chapter.
In these, and earlier, works, the weakened social bonds between citizens, declining
trust and confidence, and rising social anomie, wreak havoc on the carefully balanced
social relations required in a functioning democracy (Putnam 1993). Despite insistent
criticism that ideal political cultures provide unreasonable - and disconcertingly
American - benchmarks of regime success, much recent literature has followed in the
normative tradition established by Almond and Verba The rising proportion of
negative political traits, such as political cynicism and social exclusion, and
diminishing signs of positive social and political interaction, still occupy much political
analysis (Bennett 1998). In these more recent works, however, the influences of
post-modernity, post-industrialisation or post-Fordist economic models assume equal
responsibility for weakened political culture or social capital (Gibbins 1989).
4 A particularly useful collection of articles can be found in issue 40(5) of the, Imencan Behavioral
Scientist. The entire issue examines social capital in the United States.
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The second use ofpolitical culture deals with value change in society. Although
linked, in part, to works aligned with the Almond and Verba approach, these analyses
avoid explicit judgement on the ideal complement ofpolitical attitudes and
behaviours. Instead, they emphasise the interaction between social, economic and
political context and individual reaction to a changing world order. Probably best
known among the value change specialists, Ron Inglehart has argued in several recent
books and articles that unprecedented political security and economic prosperity has
changed the way individuals interact with each other, and how they view the quality
of their own lives (Inglehart, 1977, Inglehart 1988, Inglehart 1990, Inglehart 1995).
Not as State-oriented as the first use ofpolitical culture, these works emphasise how a
shifting cultural order has changed the very way that political stability and ideal-types
can be identified. In short, while Almond and Verba and their antecedents attempted
to measure the changing political stability of democratic systems, Inglehart and others
used changing value structures to challenge the traditionally held normative
constructions of the political good life (Nevitte 1996, Halman and Nevitte 1996,
Nevitte and Gibbins 1991).Avoiding analyses that rely on an over-burdened left-right
spectrum ofpolitical values, these studies often use Inglehart's 13-item index of
materialism-post-materialism. The scale asks respondents to indicate their support for
a series ofpolitical issues ranging from law and order to environmental policies and
self-actualisation. Specific data from this scale appears in chapter three. Additional
works rely on three different spectrums measuring in turn, liberal-authoritarian,
socialist-laissez-faire and nationalist-cosmopolitan (Brown, McCrone, Paterson and
Surridge 1999). In so doing, they claim that current notions of personal and systemic
success are more closely aligned with seemingly esoteric notions ofwell-being and
fulfilment. The pursuit of higher quality of life, broadly conceived, has overtaken
political stability as the focus ofboth individuals, and political culture research.
Traditional measures ofpolitical culture are as distinct from modern interpretations,
as materialism is from post-materialism.
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Much as a critique ofpower is implied within examinations of stability, a third
separate literature tends to use political culture as a tool for critiquing the
dissemination ofpower and ideas throughout society. Particularly popular among
Communist studies specialists, here, political culture features as the dependent
variable in a political system dominated by economic and political power relations.
This Marxist approach to political culture expresses a more sympathetic view of
State-constructed - and manipulated - political culture. The attempts of various
communist states to undertake this very project received attention in a series of
articles in the 1970s and 1980s (White 1979, Almond 1992, Almond 1993, Welch
1993, Brown and Gray 1979). Although credited by Brown for marginalising political
culture as an analytic approach, studies in this field have contributed to culture viewed
as subservient to "material forces and systemic requirements" (Brown 1979, Street
1994). A heightened attention to the power of socialisation, and attempts to
consciously alter a malleable political culture dominate works of this approach. In
Compliance Ideologies, Wilson examines the ways regimes legitimate themselves and
the way political culture reinforces the maintenance of power within the political
system. In the main, research in this area highlights the persistent nature of political
culture. Cultural and religious identities display a resilience in the face of State
attempts to weaken their importance (White 1979, Almond 1993, Brown and Gray
1979).
As stated at the outset, the lines between these three goals remain blurred. Political
culture viewed as a transmitter of dominant ideas shares much with State-led political
socialisation processes as examined in Communist political culture. The assiduous
use of political socialisation in an effort to create supportive political cultures also
links to ideal political cultures examined by those following the Civic Culture model
The relationships between these works also crosscut other areas of division, The
goals of research colour the conceptual definitions used to construct observable,
measurable and analysable political culture. Again, works divide according to three
clusters: those defining political culture according to its components, those describing
political culture in terms of its function and, not surprisingly given recent attention,
52
Ailsa Henderson, PhD Thesis, Chapter 2
works avoiding explicit definition. A brief examination of each cluster in turn will
provide some depth to understandings of how political culture has been used in the
social sciences.
Scope/Definitions
Current critiques of political culture as a method of analysis often expose the
seemingly random selection of definitions as a means of undermining cultural
explanations of political orientations. Doubtless, the variety of definitions proves
distracting for any student seeking to apply a cultural approach and presents an easy
target for those who remain sceptical of the concept's explanatory power. Definition
by relevant components provides a first example of the diverse uses of political
culture. For Almond and Verba, political culture refers to "attitudes towards the
political system [and] toward the role of the self in the system" (Almond and Verba
1963). And yet, as Reisinger notes, Verba later expanded this definition in another
work to include "the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which
define the situation in which political actions take place" (Reisinger 1995, Verba
1965). Lane notes that the wrongly assumed singularity of vision between the two
grandfather works in political culture, namely Almond and Verba's Civic Culture and
Pye and Verba's Political Culture andPolitical Development, accounts for much of
the confused application of political culture approaches (Lane 1992). The expanded
definition is but one example of the different methods employed in the later work.
More recent approaches, no doubt mistaking the two definitions for a unity of
purpose, have amended Almond's definition, with the substitution of values,
expectations, orientations, norms, beliefs, feelings or knowledge, for attitudes
(Dickson 1996). The extent to which any of these items are interchangeable remains
debatable.
Two significant amendments to the original definition include the much debated
addition of political behaviour, and the use of structures and institutions. The
inclusion of national identity creates a third debate which receives greater treatment at
the end of the chapter The argument employed by those who would expand the
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definition to include one or both of these measures hinges on the mutual
reinforcement of attitudes, behaviours and structures in which political culture
operates. Thus Pammett and Whittington claim political culture touches all aspects of
a political system, its structures and institutions, citizen behaviour and attitudes
(Pammett and Whittington 1976). While such a definition eliminates, to a certain
degree, the arbitrary determinism raised by rational choice proponents, it opens the
gates for tautological explanations of culture (Barry 1970, Pateman 1989). If values
are used to explain behaviours, and behaviours are used to highlight the existence of
certain values, the inclusion of one to better explain the other ends without having
expanded an understanding of political culture in operation. Rather, it just gathers
more data. Such problems have prompted recent critics to draw parallels between
contemporary analyses of political culture and the very national character studies so
once derided (Reisinger 1995). Nonetheless, the inclusion of political behaviour
remains1 a hotly contested debate. In their original study Almond and Verba excluded
political activity, whereas recent analyses by Inglehart and others have included
measures of social and political interaction (Inglehart 1990). As a rule, research
within the field ofCommunist studies excludes political behaviour from definitions of
political culture. Notable exceptions, however, do exist (Tucker 1973, Fagen 1969,
White 1979, 1984). Further debate concerns the inclusion of social activity measures
at the expense ofmore explicitly political behaviour. Those arguing for an inclusion
of structures and institutions distinguish between those who prioritise the influence of
economic and social factors, and those who value the role of constitutions and rules
(Kavanagh 1972, Pammett and Whittington 1976).5
Such diversity in the items for measurement, and the various ways in which one
constructs the components of political culture, create a daunting myriad of options If
that were not enough, upon construction, the components of political culture must fit
1
Attitudes themselves are broken down into forensic and latent (Bluhm 1974) or cognitive, affective
and evaluative (Pammett and Whittington 1976). The selection of particular attitudes as more
central to self conception further divides works (Pammett and Whittington 1976, Almond and Verba
1963) Lastly, authors separate the systemic components to which these political orientations can be
directed, namely, the political community, regime and authority (Easton 1990) or political system,
political process, policy outputs (Almond, Powell and Mundt 1993).
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together convincingly as a cohesive whole. Given that the field of social psychology
is devoted to the complex interaction between beliefs and values, the centrality of
attitudes, and the links between beliefs and behaviour, political culture has faced
criticism in the way it integrates the disparate components to create a meaningful
aggregate. Most often, a vision of the way these aspects hang together surfaces upon
statistical analysis, thus varying greatly from study to study. That such measures
depend entirely on the data collected, poses a potential problem for those hoping to
uncover general patterns of relationships within political culture.
Other definitions move beyond the requisite components to explain how political
culture functions. The distinction between definition by function and definition by
component benefits from an example. Although discussed later in this chapter,
definitions of nations abound. Often, efforts to determine whether a collective is a
nation or not rely on a checklist of components. Thus, as Stalin argues, "a nation is a
historically constituted stable community of people formed on the basis of a common
language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a
common culture" (Stalin in Hutchinson and Smith 1994) Alternative definitions
attempt to describe how a nation functions. Thus, Benedict Anderson claims a nation
is an "imagined community" (Anderson 1992) One century earlier, Renan described
the nation as "a daily plebiscite" (Renan 1882) For these two authors, a continued
belief that the nation exists, and that as individuals we are part of that nation, is all
that is needed to keep the nation alive. Several definitions of political culture also
emphasis the functional relationship between variables. Archie Brown defines political
culture as the "subjective perception of history and politics, the fundamental beliefs
and values, the foci of identification and loyalty, and the political knowledge and
expectations" held by citizens in a polity (Brown 1979) Other definitions include both
a list of components and a functional element Kavanagh, defines political culture as
the orientations and values of a polity, whether shared or not, as determined by the
traditions, norms and symbols of a political system (Kavanagh 1972). This definition
raises two questions about the way political culture functions: first, the extent to
which values must be shared throughout society - is political culture homogeneous;
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and second, the relationship between factors influencing political culture. For the
purposes of this thesis, the first question warrants an explanation.
Political culture relies on cultural integration, how individuals integrate themselves
into the political system using the cultural tool-kit provided in early and adult
socialisation. Variations in educational practices, government institutions or regional
economic performance can create self-perpetuating sub-cultures or variants within any
political culture. The extent to which values are shared within a political culture or,
rather, the proportion of individuals who must share certain pre-dispositions, remains
a hotly contested topic in understandings of political culture. Disparate notions of
political culture thus employ different approaches and possess varying tolerance for
difference and heterogeneity within culture. The distribution of values throughout a
polity raises issues about the boundaries of a political culture and the varying
importance of sub-cultures (Foster 1982, Savage 1981). Traditionally, Nation-State
boundaries divide political cultures, even cultures possessing similar traits. Often, this
has led to a false comparison of cultures. Lipset, for instances, warns of the dangers
of comparing Canada and the United States in isolation (Lipset 1968, Lipset 1990).
Viewed in light of the United States, Canada once appeared as a deferential society, a
view recently challenged by Neil Nevitte in The Decline ofDeference (Nevitte 1996).
Lipset has argued, however, that viewed in light of Continental political cultures,
Canadian value dispositions share more with American values that a dual comparison
might suggest. Thus, the distribution of values throughout society raises issues of
borders and highlights the importance of prudent comparisons. Second, the existence
of sub-groups warrants attention Those who argue that political culture is created in
the interaction between sub-groups in any given polity emphasise functional
definitions of political culture (Wildavsky 1987) Such definitions highlight the
importance of value clusters and the differential importance of elite culture in driving
mass political attitudes. Greater attention to integration, and the various aspects of
functioning political culture appear in the section on identity and political culture
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Methods
Similarly linked to both definitions and theoretical approaches, the methods employed
by political culture researchers vary, in the first instance, with the anticipated, or
theorised, locus of culture in a system. Whether culture resides in the minds and
behaviours of individuals, as Coleman suggests (Coleman 1988), or whether it exists
outwith seemingly-independent political and social actors6, as Durkheim argues
(Durkheim 1964), affects the selection of political culture measurement approaches, in
particular, the operationalisation of constituent variables.
Both Kavanagh, and Pammett and Whittington highlight the difference approaches
employed by works relying on political culture. From opinion polls and surveys to
content analyses, the eclectic use of sources inhibits the potential comparability of
many examinations. Whether driven by theoretical preferences or the availability of
data, thetliverse list of methods employed to analyse political culture does not
operate in a vacuum. If content analyses are used to uncover well-hidden biases in
political attitudes, the approach has probably been predicated on a particular view of
where culture is located. Similarly, the dedicated use of survey data, gleaned from
thousands of questionnaires and opinion poll data, betrays a belief that individual-level
rather than aggregate indicators can provide for a more accurate assessment of
political culture. For this reason, Elkins and Simeon expressed reservations about the
traditional survey methods of political culture researchers. "Individuals," they note,
"have beliefs, values and attitudes but they do not have cultures" (Elkins and Simeon
1979), Thus, researchers must pay heed that they are measuring aspects of a culture,
rather than culture itself. Reisinger similarly warns that political culture research has
been unable to systematically integrate individual-level measurements into coherent
unified understandings of culture (Reisinger 1995). If micro- and macro-data present
incompatible findings, researchers may lack confidence in presenting this data Those
researchers including political behaviour in their definition of political culture would
f'
Such a view is consistent with John Stuart Mill's articulation of liberalism In the search for a
universal vision of the Good, cultures entertain competing notions of the good life. The particular
blend of disparate definitions, present in the final definition, forms the total societal culture (Mill
1992)
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be sure to include appropriate measures with which to gauge civic engagement,
whether individual voting data, party membership statistics or protest rally attendance
figures. These two distinctions, between individual level data and aggregate
measures, and the location of culture within or outwith the individual, provide the two
poles ofmethodological analysis in political culture research.7
Main Critiques of Political Culture
Although treated above, an additional word about the way in which different
literatures challenge the usefulness of political culture research warrants attention. As
described by Eatwell, rational choice can be either thick or thin. Thick notions of
rational choice claim that political values and behaviours are motivated by utility.
Thin notions claim that such dependent variables are motivated by economic gain
(Eatwell 1997). For the most part, practitioners of thin notions of rational choice
have displayed the greatest antipathy for political culture approaches (Whitefield and
Evans 1999)8 . Such critiques stem from rational choice theorists who feel that a
stronger emphasis on economic models of political attitudes and behaviour provides
for a greater accuracy in determining the causality between variables. This charge is a
fair one and addressed in most political culture works as a point of legitimate
criticism. Where such debates run into difficulty concerns the intentions of each
literature In the main, political culture research seeks to understand the conditions
which best account for regime stability or value change. Works within the tradition
have rarely promised to provide accurate models of voting behaviour. Rather than
address the micro processes of political activities the research seeks to establish the
broad conditions in which individual choices, including voting choices, are made
(Barry 1970, Wildavsky 1987). Rational choice literature, for its part, has provided
Further measurement issues concern the comparability of cross-national data. The selection and
operationalisation of variables affects the extent to which questions and data are meaningful in cross-
national circumstances. The increasing use of international survey programmes and standardised
question working has mitigated this effect.
8 Other critiques stem from those who prefer an institutionalist approach (Jackman and Miller
1996a. Jackman and Miller 1996b)
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accurate assessments of the conditions affecting voter choice and partisan support ,9
Part of the problem stems from the translation of goals from one literature to another.
In particular, several critiques of political culture establish the conditions, influenced
as they are by the goals of rational choice literature, by which political culture can
succeed. In his 1995 article, for example, Reisinger sets out seven tasks that the field
of political culture must fulfil in order to succeed (Reisinger 1995) One of these tasks
involves the establishment of an explicit link between political attitudes and political
behaviour, If, however, within political culture the inclusion of political behaviour
remains a contested subject, the establishment of an explicit link appears unlikely.
Other critiques question the danger of shifting conceptual definitions, As stated
earlier, this had accompanied the proliferation of political culture research. The lack
of a definition does not seem to be an insurmountable problem, nor one that detracts
from the usefulness of political culture as a concept, but rather, raises serious
questions about the usefulness of some political culture research. Thus, a healthy
number of critiques deal with the application of political culture as a concept rather
than irresolvable problems of the concept itself.
From within the field of political culture, critiques have tended to emphasis the
improper selection of variables. For such practitioners, much of the success of
political culture as a concept depends upon its ability to explain the political world. In
turn, the variables chosen to exert an influence over political attitudes and behaviour
provide varying success rates for practitioners. In response to claims that rational
choice theory provided a predictive element to political behaviour that political culture
lacked, Ron inglehart was able to prove that cultural factors such as religion
outweighed social class in its influence over voting (Inglehart 1977). In his 1988
article heralding a return to political culture approaches Inglehart also pointed to
several deficiencies of Almond and Verba's Civic Culture. Although supportive of
the idea that the democratic system is based on certain supportive habits, Inglehart
claimed that Almond and Verba's exclusive attention to trust, over such variables as
9
Exceptions to this claim, in particular in the case of recent Scottish voting trends, suggest that
economic factors provide less accurate predictors of voting behaviour than factors such as identity
(Brown, McCrone, Paterson and Surridge 1999).
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general life and political satisfaction limits the original analysis. He notes that while
political satisfaction tends to vary as an indicator of government personality, the more
reliable measure of life satisfaction and trust provide a clearer understanding of
support for democratic systems (Inglehart 1988)
Development ofWestern Political Culture
Political culture specialists, faced with a plethora of options both theoretical and
practical have thus attempted to shed some light on the development of the polity and
interactive relationships within the political system. A fascination with historical
justifications for current political dilemmas or preferences dominated earlier
theoretical works and case study examinations alike. For example, relying on Louis
Hartz's view of fragment cultures and their influence on the political development of
he colonial world, Gad Horowitz, Kenneth McRae and David Bell each sought to
attributeCanada's political biases to the arrival of diverse populations throughout its
colonial period (Hartz 1964, Horowitz 1966, McRae 1978, Bell and Tepperman
1987) A brief examination of how political scientists account for the current 'state of
things' in political sociology sheds light on the fundamental shifts in the creation of a
modern political community, and the preferences and biases of the political culture
approach.
Research seeking to chart the development ofWestern, liberal political culture often
stresses the importance of dual tensions during two periods of history: a tension
between the Church and limited government during medieval times; and a tension
between the primacy of the autonomous individual and popular sovereignty post-
Reformation (Bluhm 1974).10 The passive obedience of the medieval world, in which
a subject culture ensured individuals obeyed their rulers, juxtaposed the dominance of
the Church with a limited and vague notion of political community The religious,
social and political upheaval of the Reformation emphasised the individual as the new
10 In contrast. Gray claims the Reformation, by rendering religion a matter of personal rather than
State significance, the advent of popular sovereignty and the conquest of populations exerted a
profound influence over the development of political culture in Western liberal democracies (Gray
1979).
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foundation of the political order. Charged with extending individual freedom,
governmental responsibility protected an individual's right to private property and
enhanced a Protestant Work Ethic devoted to political action and reform (Weber
1968). Notwithstanding the variation among Protestant countries, and the
exaggerated distance between the work ethics of Protestant and Catholic countries,
the founding myths of liberalism and individual rights anchor most ofWestern political
culture.11 The search for new values and experiments in living, typified in the writings
of JS Mill, can claim responsibility for modern civic nationalist movements relying on
the rhetoric of political progress in the search for greater self-determination (Mill
1992). In the face of the autonomous individual-government relationship sprang the
rival notion of "The People", a vision of popular sovereignty invoked in the name of
egalitarianism. Seen as a limit on the role of political authority, popular sovereignty
attempted to encourage policy in the name of the people, emphasising the values of
the group over the individual. The French Revolution, with its notions of Liberte,
Egalite, Fraternite expressed not only a sense of popular sovereignty but through an
emphasis on fraternity highlighted a sense of belonging and collective inter¬
dependence driving much of the current nationalist debate Through such events "the
people" of popular sovereignty became "the nation" (Baycroft 1998)12 A series of
conflicts between revolutionary France and other European nations reinforced the
importance of national borders and the emotional link between a people and the
nation, characterised in Robespierre's 'On property' speech in 1793. Just as the
eighteenth century witnessed the composition of the Marseillaise, it also witnessed the
writing of the first national hymn ofNorway, the first Finnish national poem
(Hobsbawm 1990), the partition of Poland, the revolt of the American colonies, and
demand for parliamentary independence in Ireland Welfare liberalism, in its efforts
to deliver classical liberalism in an era of universal suffrage, merely de-emphasises
11 Research identifying collectivist strains (Grant 1965, Horowitz 1966, Trudeau 1956) within
political culture receive greater attention that those emphasising the importance of individual rights,
largely because of the unquestioned dominance of liberalism in Western political culture. To possess
a collectivist culture is noteworthy, largely because it contradicts the general trend of liberalism
That said, even those works identifying strains of collectivism must acknowledge that such
tendencies operate within a larger liberal framework.
12 Marxist analyses of nationalist development point out that the French Revolution was a victory of
one class over another rather than a nation against a tyrannical king. (Gellner 1964, Nairn 1977)
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some of the notions of private property in favour of economic equality of opportunity.
These broad trends blended with original cultures to produce the diverse range of
liberal political cultures. The gradual dismantling of the British empire in particular,
allowed for a diversity of cultures to develop from what had once been united origins.
Chapter three examines the particular development of political attitudes in Britain and
Canada as host cultures for Scotland and Quebec.
IDENTITY
The increased use of the concept of identity, evident in the expanded number of
articles and books, betrays the changing way that such works theorise identity.
Identity in quantitative political science extends beyond normative theory and assumes
a role as an independent variable capable of exerting observable influence on other
political values. When used as a method of understanding constitutional change,
identity encourages political scientists to delve into the neighbouring disciplines of
psychology and sociology. Explaining the link between political science and social
psychology Rosamund states, "Everybody is a somebody ... How they become who
they are and what happens when they realise who they are and what they should do
accordingly are really what the study of politics is about ." (Rosamund 1997). In
addition, the adoption of the concept and term by the popular press provides an
example of academic debate brought out of the ivory tower by its very relevance.
And yet, just as with political culture, the appeal and consequent use of the concept
has done much violence to the theorised importance of identity, both how it functions
and what it implies. Identity, as used in quantitative examinations and popular
histories alike, spans a litany of diverse uses, meaning anything from self-esteem to
personal label to belonging. National identity literature, grounded as it is in
examinations of nationalism and collective processes, has done little to embrace the
burgeoning literature on social identity currently exerting so much influence in the rest
of the humanities. This section examines identity as it is theorised and used within the
social sciences before evaluating how national identity studies might take advantage
of a more interactive approach
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Not surprisingly, within the social sciences differing approaches to identity, from
social psychology to nationalism studies, provide a gamut of often-contradictory
definitions and approaches to a seemingly unified topic. Treated as both a reified
thing and an on-going process identity surfaces in political science literature as self-
ascribed independent and variable tag (woman, Reform voter, member of British
ethnic group) and as a subjective, context-dependent sense of self The resultant
confusion, particularly between identity as a labelled vision of self and identity as a
sense of belonging, proves a familiar stumbling block for theorists and scientists alike.
Recent attempts to provide some clarity to the use of the term express frustration with
its current haphazard use (Mendelsohn 1999). The following examination emphasises
the differing approaches to identity before turning to an analysis of national identity.
Also, much as with political culture, literature on identity enjoys the benefits of two
diverse approaches, one theoretical, one data-driven, that each seek to extend the
boundaries of knowledge of a rather murky topic. All disciplinary efforts to examine
political culture and identity, whether anthropological, sociological, psychological or
political, approach the topic from a theory-driven or data-driven perspective.
Throughout this section these two types ofworks are considered in tandem,
quantitative case studies with abstract theory, in order to point to the use made of
identity in current academic work, how it has been constructed by different
disciplines, and how this concerted use has led to a cross-fertilisation of identity-
centred ideas.
Identity as a Process
The thesis relies on a particular understanding of national identity and how it affects
the formation of political attitudes, a sense of political community and patterns of
political participation in Scotland and Quebec. The treatment of national identity
within nationalism studies and some sociological literature relies on visions of identity
as influenced by the demand ofmeasurement techniques and the conflation of national
identity labels and citizenship. This section proves that part of the inconsistent
treatment of national identity stems from a schism within the wider literature on
identity and, more importantly, the dual nature of identity: the tension between a
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dynamic process of collective self-identification and a static need for self-definition
according to meaningful categories. These two tensions, between identity as a
process and identity as a label inform the following examination of identity in a wider
humanities literature and its application to analyses of nationalism and nationalist
movements in Scotland and Quebec.
The fundamental search for belonging, as highlighted by earlier psychologists, unlocks
much of the mysteries of human behaviour. The need for individuals to feel that they
belong to a wider collective group, whether defined as a family, social group or
nation, forms one of the tenets of social psychology exerting a renewed influence on
studies of social relations (Kristeva 1993, Craib 1998). Freud's efforts to identify the
attributes of the self - super ego, ego and id - suggest that through a continuous
process of identification with objects individuals develop an ego, or sense of self
(Freud 1922). The interaction between individuals in the processes of group
formation suggest that the search for social membership and integration stems from
psychological dictates of social behaviour that, in Freud's view, reduce all sociology
to a study of psychology. As later argued by attachment theorists, from the earliest-
formed intimate relationships individuals acquire the social and emotional coping skills
to ensure survival in the social world. Children with secure attachments are better
able to deal with uncertainty that those less possessive of strong social links. Or, in
Erikson's view, identity crises must be resolved if children are to development into
mature and stable adults (Erikson 1974). Membership in a social community is thus
seen as a necessity of human nature (Shils 1982), and the primary good distributed by
society (Walzer 1992)1' Recent investigations of modernity and the resultant social
forces affecting self-conception reinforce the importance of stable social membership.
In their collection on attachment theory, Roberts and Kramer claim that the absence
of political and economic certainties in the post-war period encourage individuals to
reflect "To whom do we belong? With whom or what do we identify?" (Kramer and
Roberts 1996). For them, as for others working within the diverse fields of sociology,
psychology and cultural studies, the benefits of belonging present themselves
13
For an analysis of the integrating aspects of culture see Schudson 1994
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forcefully to individuals in search of reassurance. The goal of integration, as sought
after as it is unquestionable, motivates examinations of identity. In their ability to
provide psychological and pragmatic support social communities ensure both sanity
and sustenance (Pahl 1996). The well-worn links between personal identity and social
cohesion received initial examination by Marx and Durkheim, and later by social
anthropologists (Mead 1964, Cohen 1996). In this sense, self identity refers to the
process of social identification with a collective group, as motivated by the benefits of
belonging perceived to accrue from social attachment. Because face-to-face contact
with every member of the social group was impossible in all but the smallest societies,
identification was essentially a voluntary act of faith, expressed through shared
symbols and beliefs (Durkheim 1964). This analogy, of an imagined link between
group members, was transferred to an analysis of nations by Benedict Anderson.
Anderson's nation as an imagined community holds resonance as much because it is
vague as because it accurately describes the patterns of interaction (Anderson 1992).
Two corollary debates highlight the changing influences on and of identity theory: the
influence ofmodernity on social identification, and the development of theories of
social categorisation. An examination of each in turn extends the analysis of identity
for it highlights two important aspects of the identity debate: how it functions, and
why it is salient.
Social Identity Theory (how identity functions)
How individuals navigate the search for belonging has received much treatment in
post-war social psychology. If political sociology focuses on the collective processes
of social integration (Parsons 1969), social psychology examines the individual level
processes with particular attention to the interpersonal aspects of social integration
(Weatherell 1996)14 Social identity theorists assert that self-perception and belonging
stem from the interactive processes involved in self-alignment and self-identification
with social groups (Tajfel 1982, Turner 1982, Oakes 1996). In the search for
14
Examined through yet another lens, integration into the polity has received treatment from
Lijphart. For Lijphart, the democratic stability of antagonistic multinational stales depends upon the
elite accommodation of different groups - as defined by mutually exclusiv e characteristics - and the
physical separation of the divided population. (Lijphart 1977)
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belonging, individuals attach themselves to groups, or acknowledge their pre-existing
membership in groups, by a cataloguing of group characteristics. In their efforts to
define the group in positive terms, individuals search for characteristics that best
portray the group or ensure that existing traits are defined in a positive light. The
identity process, which stems from Freud's definition of a need for belonging,
continues as a pattern of social categorisation. Henri Tajfel viewed the identity
process as a cyclical pattern of creating an identity, determining its membership, and
making the identity salient to members.15 Thus, membership rests on the definition of
markers by which group members can distinguish their own crowd from others.
Individuals internalise the social identity and use it to determine their place in society.
Most importantly, the interaction occurs not among individuals as differentiated
persons (interpersonal behaviour), but rather among individuals as group members,
defined by their collective characteristics (intergroup behaviour) (Tajfel and Turner
1979). The adage that knowing what one is not is half of knowing what one is,
receives further treatment in examinations of group definition Thus for Edward Said,
the West knows what it is only in comparison to the East, the Occident as opposed to
the Orient (Said, 1995).
This understanding of identity highlights the tendency to heighten the perceived
differences between two groups and reinforce the perceived homogeneity within
groups. This socially constructed identity also has psychological ramifications for
individuals as they take on the goals, needs and successes of a collective or group. In
so doing, individuals cede some of their ability for self-definition. The group identifies
how individuals can determine whether they are group members, and, consequently,
what it means for admitted individuals to be considered group members. The
categorisation is not only a clarifying tool but makes the identity meaningful. Social
identity is the self-selection or self-alignment with a community which best ensures a
personal sense of security. In MacCormick's view, the formation of a 'we' nullifies
all previous personal alienation (MacCormick 1998). That said, once an individual
15 For a collection of essays honouring Tajfel's work on social identity sec Peter W Robinson (Ed)
(1996) Social Groups and Identities: Developing the Legacy ofHenri Tajfel Oxford: Bulterworth
Heinemann.
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joins a community, how one defines security may change as the group member takes
on collective security as an aim rather than personal security. And yet, as Mowlam
has argued, strong communities can lead to a sense of personal exclusion, the
repression of minority views and identities (Mowlam 1996). The group to which an
individual seeks to belong, whether based on occupation or a "community of
association" (Pahl 1996) can be grounded in either voluntary or automatic
relationships. Membership in social groups mirrors, as will be seen later, the
discourse surrounding the increased saliency of nations and national identity. As
Gellner notes, circumstances such as the uneven distribution of resources can make
relevant previously benign social characteristics (Gellner 1983). The adage that
blondes have more fun is meaningless for a number of reasons, not least because it is
impossible to prove. If hair colour correlated with increased income, however, what
it means to have red or brown hair would take on more meaning. In sum, identity is
not only a socially-constructed product of interaction but also an expression of social
location. The impact of collective association on individual self-perception, however,
raises further issues of consistency.
The internalisation of collective characteristics by diverse individuals raises serious
questions about the perceived consistency of the term and the level of agreement
about the constituent parts of the associated identity. For some, this lack of
consistency ensures the salience and inclusiveness of the identity. The personal
process of internalisation guarantees that an identity can be for individuals whatever
they want (Cohen 1994). That said, the level of coherence in understood notions of
what it means to be Spanish, conservative, or feminist depend on popularly recognised
notions of group characteristics. The room for self-definition within these
characteristics depends on the extent to which the label or group is a 'given1 or
'more-determined1 group, proscribed by race, sex or size, or whether it is a purely
social group, dependent on values or voluntary associations. Some identifications
seem almost too natural to ignore. For many, sex, race, residency and citizenship are
routes of identity determined by the genetic and geographical dictates of birth Social
groupings such as class, or ideological groups , along with those experiencing tension
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within their 'natural' identification routes - provide room for a more laboured,
deliberate, reflexive and conscious identification. What happens, for instance, when
the composite package, what it means to identify as Quebecois, lies outwith the
control of the individual seeking, or questioning, identification? Obviously, the
majority of groups exist within the nebulous middle ground between entirely pre¬
determined and entirely self-selected membership. The room for human agency over
social traits such as social class, age or political beliefs allows for a greater agency in
self-definition.
At first glance, national identity would appear to be one of the collective groupings
usually recognised as predetermined (or 'more determined'). The tendency to collate
nationality with citizenship lends one to believe that the rules and regulations of
immigration, naturalisation and citizenship exert a total influence on self perception.
Notwithstanding the added weight to claims of belonging that pieces of paper
provide, significant differences between being and feeling dictate the usefulness of
these helpful guides to membership. As the section on national identity explains,
nations are not the same as States, gender is not the same as sex, and race does not
always correlate perfectly with skin colour.
Modernity and Post Modernity (why identity is salient)
The influence of the processes ofmodernity, and the state of post-modernity, on
identity and belonging form a large part of identity literature The visible influence of
modernity stems from the vision of the Enlightenment individual as a rational and self-
determining actor slowly undermined by the threats to economic and social security
witnessed in the process of industrialisation and urbanisation (Rustin 1996, Nairn
1977). The industrial revolution, and its corollary process of urbanisation forced
individuals into more crowded, more mechanised, more regulated environments. A
progressive limiting of individual freedom was the result (Rocher and Salee 1997)16,
even as the anonymity of the city loosened the moral and social bonds that
16 Rocher and Salce go so far as to claim "lc dcsir dc reconnaissance, d'aulonomic el llidcc
conconntantc de souvcraincte sonl lcs principcs moteurs dcs communautcs politiqucs modemc"
(Rochcr and Salce 1997).
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characterised life in the countryside (Gellner 1983). Global conflict further detracted
from personal autonomy. Modern economic and political processes have slowly worn
away the isolation of individuals from local and global society. The growth of the
welfare state in the post-war period was seen as an effort to ensure a measure of self-
determination for individuals. Processes of post-modernity, in addition to the
dismantling of the social safety net, have forced individuals to re-engage questions of
self-determination and social solidarity. For Pahl, "The mood of the late 1990s is
surely that people are engaged in a struggle to find an identity for themselves which is
sensitive to them as the individuals they see themselves to be" (Pahl 1996). For Hall,
and Laclau, personal identities are fractured, pulling individuals in different directions
according to the varying definitions, goals and priorities of identities in conflict (Hall
1992, Hall 1996, Laclau 1994). The multi-layered individual has replaced the
integrative society.
In response to these changes, patterns of political participation emphasised the need
for integration and social belonging. Collective action of social actors in the 1960s
and 1970s highlighted the importance of group membership by "providing the
impetus for a politicization of identity by challenging the white, male heterosexual,
and middle-class dominated hierarchies of modern Western society" (Dunn 1998).
Dunn continues, "mass culture motivates a search for personal moorings through an
attachment to diverse groups, communities, value systems, and cultural traditions."
(Dunn 1998). Just as such changes have affected the nature of social identity so too
have they affected understandings of national identity.
NATIONAL IDENTITY
Clearly, the desire for national membership stems from the similar social and
psychological processes that motivate collective social adhesion. Anderson's
imagined community sits well with other sociological visions of the nation Here, a
nation exists as more than a composite of necessarily characteristics, a common
people, a common language, a common history, a common territory. Nations as the
result of interactive processes involve all who feel a sense of community, and express
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it on a regular basis. The psychological bond, whether described as a 'sense of
belonging' (Connor 1978) or fellow feeling (Geertz 1963) is reinforced by seemingly
banal national discourses or symbols (Billig 1995). Or, as Holmes claims, "[t]he
nation is as fictional and as necessary a notion as the self' (Holmes 1996). The
process of national identification thus operates within the same system, and is subject
to the same changing conditions, as other processes of social identification. Both
nation and self are composite entities in which diversity is repressed for the sake of
survival. The additional power of nations stem not from their difference to other
communities or social groups, but rather that they have been able to assert
themselves, at times, as the preferred community of association and self-definition.
Likely by sheer size, influence of institutions and, most importantly, because the
national membership is vague enough that it can become whatever people want it to
be, nations and nationalisms locate individuals within a people (Greefeld 1992). And
yet, as Pahl notes, "simply because people may use collective forms to assert their
identities it would be a great mistake to assume that this implies uniformities of
identity" (Pahl 1996). The less-restrictive conditions of national membership increase
the likelihood of saliency. National identity as a malleable construct both increases
the opportunities for self-identification and pitches it into a debate on manipulation
and misinterpretation.
Not surprisingly, the treatment of national identity finds greatest attention from
writers already dealing with issues of nationhood and nationalism For the most part,
such literature chronicles the efforts of recognised nationalist actors such as political
parties and the media to package identity as a political project The incursion of a
nationalist discourse into seemingly banal aspects of collective interaction (Billig
1995a) receives attention alongside debates concerning the inclusive or exclusive
nature of national identity (Geertz 1963, Greenfeld 1992). In this latter debate much
attention surrounds the division between civic and ethnic, modern or primordial,
national identities. Nationalist interpretations of identity as undeniable good co-exist
with equally vociferous claims that national identity can introduce nothing positive to
political debate.
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Nationalism the doctrine that makes the nation the object of every political
endeavour and national identity the measure of every human value, has since
the French Revolution challenged the whole idea of a single humanity, of a
world community and its moral unity. Instead nationalism offers a narrow,
conflict-laden legitimation for political community, which inevitably pits
culture-communities against each other and, given the sheer number and
variety of cultural differences, can only drag humanity into a political
Charybdis (Smith 1991)
Often, this negative view of national identity is tied to the two-fold classification of
nationalist movements as either civic or ethnic. Movements are divided according to
their relative levels of inclusiveness. If civic nationalism is seen as forward-looking,
progressive, tied to institutions, inclusive and associated with Western nationalisms
(Hobsbawm 1990), ethnic nationalism is seen as grounded in blood and belonging
(lgnatieff 1993, Ignatieff 1996). That said, the characteristics of nationalist
movements stubbornly resist clustering around the 'good' and 'bad' poles. The result is
an increasing amount of confusion in the analysis of national identity. For some, the
problem stems from the under-theorised relationship between the individual and the
nation (Fossum 1999). Other research focuses on the damage that an inconsistent
application of identity has inflicted on the concept as an analytical tool (McCrone,
Stewart, Kiely and Bechhofer 1998, Mendelsohn 1999). An analysis of the way in
which national identity surrounds issues of belonging, collective recognition and
rights, and claims to membership precedes the following section on political
participation.
Belonging
For Ian Taylor, the rebirth of nationalist movements, the rise of particularist politics
and a resurgent attention to self-identity stem from the perceived loss of control over
economic destinies, the subversion of national and local identities to larger entities and
the rising power of trans-national consumption industries, of which the electronic
media reigns supreme (Taylor 1996). In their efforts to cope with this social
bou/eversement, people are organising themselves in a Hobbesian struggle for
survival This pattern of self-selection into inclusionary and exclusionary groups has
been described by some as the advent of a neo-medievalism. Others, sticking to this
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primordial theme, have called upon a decidedly anthropological language, Walzer
speaks of a return of the tribes while Melucci refers to Nomads of the Present (Walzer
1992, Melucci 1989), In his examination of the way in which individuals incorporate
themselves into national societies, Schudson points to concerted efforts by political
parties, the media and the education system to reinforce a common language,
common symbols and common rituals (Schudson 1994)17. The increasing salience of
identity has been accepted by theorists and practitioners alike.
In "Nationalism and the Historians" Anthony Smith notes that the nation serves
"individual and collective needs for warmth, strength and stability which assume much
greater importance once the ties of family and neighbourhood are loosened" (Smith
1992). Freud's self in search of belonging has manifested itself in a post-modern age
as a search of national belonging. Furthermore, the individual need for national
membership co-exists with a nation's need for recognition, individuals seek
recognition of their social and national acceptance just as nations aspire to recognition
through a transfer of autonomy and increase self-determination. Micro and macro
processes associated with the search for security, recognition, and development, act in
tandem. In accordance with the increased saliency of national belonging, political
systems have responded with packages of rights and benefits for certain national
members.
Collective recognition of groups
The collective recognition of groups has received much attention within the
communitarian field of political science. Such recognition could arrive as
constitutional protection, or through institutional design. Most importantly, the
explicit recognition of collective groups affects the importance of group membership
in the nation. It is one thing to belong to a nation, another to belong to one denied
recognition by the State. Membership in a such a nation can have a profound effect
on personal and social identity. In the presence of differentiated rights or privileges,
17 While chroncling the increasing salience of national identity Schudson quotes the 1978 mandate
review of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, in which the body emphasised its role in the
"creation of a national consciousness" (Schudson 1994)
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however, national belonging assumes a much greater importance. An examination of
the diverse ways in which national groups may be recognised will make possible a
proper examination of the nation and political State in the subsequent chapters.
For Lijphart, national minorities must be accommodated in the institutional design of a
political system (Lijphart 1977). Populations possessing distinct characteristics may
be integrated into the system through an system of elite accommodation. In
Switzerland, for example, the six-member Cabinet ensures representation for the
regional, partisan, and linguistic divisions within the population. This form of
consociational democracy divides the populations at the mass level but brings together
national representatives within the political system. The power-sharing executive in
the devolved assembly ofNorthern Ireland provides an additional example of efforts
made to ensure that different collective groups assert their political voice. An
additional method of collective recognition occurs in the distribution of political
jurisdiction. Those states possessing distinct populations within their borders, notably
Canada, Spain and, increasingly, the United Kingdom, have established variations of
asymmetrical federalism in recognition of the distinct needs and wishes of the minority
population. The particular solution selected depends in part on the status of the
national minority. The member nations of the UK have received explicit recognition
as such while in Spain, despite recognition of different languages, there is no formal
recognition of, for example, the nation of Catalonia. In Canada, nationhood in
Quebec remains a matter ofmuch dispute. Other forms of recognition ensure
exception to the 'distinct' population. In its negotiations with the United States,
Canada managed to secure a cultural exemption in the Free Trade Agreement, and
subsequent North American Free Trade Agreement, because of its particular cultural
needs.
In still other cases, individual members of distinct populations are granted different
rights than non-members. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, for
example, entrenches the rights ofwomen, Aboriginal peoples, the aged and the
disabled While there is not explicit recognition of the Quebecois as a people, despite
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several failed attempts to rectify this, the issue of national rights and national
membership enjoys a heightened importance in Canada as a result. Thus, in all these
cases, recognition for the minority collective group ensures access to different rights
and privileges. Recognition as an individual member of the nation, however,
functions somewhat differently. In particular, national membership is tied to authority
and authenticity.
Membership claims
The transformation of a previously innocuous label into a passport to attendant rights
and entitlements, whether actual or perceived, raises the appeal of national
membership. Corresponding efforts to align with national groups present the issue of
identity claims, who can consider themselves a member of the group, and who cannot.
Whether on the basis of gender, profession or social class each identity comes with
relevant rules governing self-placement within a group and recognition as a group
member. Citizenship legislation and census regulations, for example, provide
objective rules with which the individual can evaluate his or her identity. Citizenship in
the United Kingdom normally requires a parent to have been born in the United
Kingdom for non-residents to be considered citizens. The rights of citizenship,
however, can be extended to other individuals. Citizenship of Commonwealth
countries provides individuals with the right to vote in British elections. Non¬
residents with a British grandparent can gain the right to work in Britain without
applying for a visa. Other citizenship regulations employ different measures of
acceptance German citizenship has been grounded in notions of ethnic purity18 while
Switzerland requires a ten year residency in the country before the rights of
citizenship can be attained. The association of identity and recognition affects an
individual's sense of inclusion because of the rights associated with membership. The
denial of these rights can prove a stumbling block to an integrated, participative
society.
lx As of January 1. 2000 German citizenship requires an eight-year period of residency in Germany,
a knowledge of the German language and the surrendering of former passports not subject to
exemption. Children born in Germany automatically receive a German passport providing one of the
parents fulfils citizenship requirements.
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The rights associated with identity imply a uniformity and equality not throughout
humanity but rather among those with the same identity. As Hill states, "Citizenship
is the participation in the national community of all members on an equal basis and as
an absolute right" (Hill 1990). Canadians have different rights from Americans, for
example This extends to individuals possessing differentiated identities within the
Nation-State The recognition of specific collective groups in the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms implies that formalised rights for identified group members are
different from those of other groups. Aboriginal peoples, the aged, and women, for
example, receive formal protection within the Charter. The inevitability of an unequal
distribution of rights has proved a stumbling block to constitutional settlements in
Canada since the early 1980s.
The ability to point to an identity tag, suggestive as it is of the acquisition of rights, is
important for the perception of personal inclusion or sense of belonging. For Shafir
and Peled, the competing claims to belonging and the attendant benefits of national
membership mirror a debate about citizenship and entitlement (Shafir and Peled
1998). For them, all claims stem from the same need, and the same social
transformations, from modernity to post-modernity. And yet, according to Melucci,
the collective actor cannot construct an identity independent of its recognition. The
resulting expectation of acceptance affects the context in which an identity claim is
made. As highlighted earlier, the objective rules in which claims to some identity
labels such as citizenship provide useful gauges for the likelihood of acceptance.
National identity operates in a more subjective sphere. Claims for recognition may be
met by attempts to incorporate collective groups into the State while individual claims
are perceived to be judged by other members of the national group Thus, in a
negotiation of markers of identity individuals are won over to various conceptions of
themselves and society (Hall 1992, Hall 1996). Although Wood claims that such a
situation rarely accommodates the competing claims of State and civil society (Wood
1998), competing definitions of the collective determine whether individuals may feel
that their claim to belonging may be made.
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Recognised membership in a community is noticeably different in the absence of
political jurisdiction. The need for belonging within the nation does not follow
accepted rules ofmembership but rather depends on the level of acceptance of
existing national members. The difficulties associated with the measurement and
analysis of national identity are grounded in the absence of appropriate guidelines for
the application of a identity tag or label. Who is a Scot? Must a Scot be born in
Scotland7 Educated in Scotland? Is there a minimum period of residency? Potential
members see their inclusion as meaningful, treated as a claim of credibility. Thus the
recent selection of Labour candidates for the North-East Scotland European by-
election witnessed competing attempts to establish a claim to Scottishness. When one
candidate, claiming to have been born in Scotland, was challenged, her response was
that she had been conceived in Scotland. National membership was seen as important
for credibility. Similar debates surface in Quebec, where singer Celine Dion was
accused of not being a real Quebecer because she sings in English and lives in the
United States (Wells 1999). Unlike with citizenship, where the use of a label signifies
access to rights and entitlements, the self-ascription of a national identity label affects
sense of authority and authenticity. The ability to speak as part of a group, to speak
'as a Scot', can occur only if one is considered to be a Scot by others.
Thus, the sense of national belonging, rooted as it is in the notion of identity labels
and recognition, depends on the acceptance of national members. The ways in which
individuals assess their likely acceptance highlights the interactive process of identity.
The projection of possible markers of identity provide guidelines for the self-
evaluation of belonging. As a result, individuals may construct their own personal
notions of national identity (Cohen 1994). What it means to be Scottish for someone
living in the Central Belt, and what it means for someone living in the Highlands, or
abroad, might not necessarily include the same symbols, myths, common
understandings or values.
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Just as the acquisition of political power highlights the absence of economic power
(Hill 1990) objective State inclusion highlights the absence of subjective, or national
inclusion. The extent to which this matters depends in part on the construction of
identity - whether it is relatively inclusive or exclusive - and in part on the salience of
identity to the political society. Kavanagh argues that even in societies not
experiencing calls for constitutional change on the basis of national difference,
national identity remains one of the most important cleavages in a political culture
"The development of a clear and unambiguous sense of identity is more than a
facilitating factor in the creation of a nation; it may be then in some sense the major
constituting factor of a new nation" (Kavanagh 1972). Kavanagh relies on Lucien
Pye's vision of national identity as a unifying or divisive force.
POLITICAL CULTURE AND NATIONAL IDENTITY
The previous two sections examined the use of political culture and national identity
in recent literatures. This section does not repeat these findings but rather raises
themes and issues that develop out of the combined use of political culture and
national identity. It begins first with an examination of the role of national identity in
political culture literature to determine whether dominant studies in political culture
have included identity and, whether identity has been used as a label, tag, or as a
negotiated process. Next it examines the implications involved in any analysis of
political culture and national identity. Third, the issue of socialisation, integration and
community each receive treatment before the fourth and final section argues for a
concerted theory of identity and political culture.
The development of political culture and national identity literatures owe similar debts
to various associated disciplines which have affected the way in which both concepts
have been theorised, measured and researched In his examination of political culture
and political behaviour, Pye records a debt to Erikson while anthropologist Margaret
Mead clarified the importance of the individual search for identity when examining
culture. That the two processes share often similar processes of socialisation has
bound them, not only in a tandem process of development, but made them subject to
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similar social, economic and political changes. Perhaps it is this cross-fertilisation that
led the early works of political culture to consider identity. Furthermore, these works
all referred to identity in a similar manner. The integrative benefits of national identity
were often seen as a precursor to a stable and inclusive political culture. Individuals
who did not feel themselves part of the nation, could not be expected to exhibit the
political values and behaviours expressed by other integrated members. In this case,
national identity was equated with a sense of belonging within the State. For its part,
the State was considered to have one integrating culture that would bring individuals
into a homogeneous whole. Thus, for Bluhm, a sense of nationalism "is the most
universally shared aspect ofmodern political culture" (Bluhm 1974). The presence
of rival cultures received attention only as obstacles to national integration. In short,
identity was equated with identification to a larger national group (thus Pye's debt to
Erikson). In these works, the concept of identity is not presented as a vision of ego
identity or a fluid sense of self but rather an alignment of selfwith others in a larger,
bounded, homogenous polity. For Pye, "Beliefs relevant to national identity, for
instance, may have a heavy expressive loading in which the major satisfactions derive
from the identification itself' He continues, "The question of national identity is the
political culture version of the basic personal problem of self identity" (Pye 1965).
While this statement establishes a link between the two notions of identity, it
precludes the possibility that personal identity and national identity are linked; that
national identity can influence self-perception The paramount importance of stability
evident in earlier works found a parallel treatment of integration as not only beneficial
but necessary. Recent treatment of both national identity and political culture treat
the processes of post-materialism not as a new 'ideal-type' political culture but as a
variable exerting influence on the sense of integration exhibited by individuals. Post-
materialist, post-modern (and post-Fordist) society breaks the social bonds between
individuals challenging the sense of social capital, common social trust and satisfaction
(Inglehart 1977, 1990, 1995) but also encouraging individuals to revert to a society
where primordial kinship ties, or smaller units of identification, form the bedrock of
society This theme of integration as highlighted in all of the literature incorporating
national identity within political culture, warrants further attention
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The most explicit reference to the inclusion of national identity in political culture is
found in Verba's conclusion in Pye and Verba's Political Culture andPolitical
Development. As will be examined later, the definition preferred by Verba, of nations
as "foci of identification and loyalty", has been used by subsequent political culture
researchers (Brown 1979, Westle 1993). For these works, nation and State are seen
as two sides of the same coin. As Deutsch explains, national integration is seen as the
way to overcome attachment to smaller, ethnic, cultural or linguistic groups (Deutsch
1966). State loyalty and national identification were seen as expressions of the same
disposition. Slightly more nuanced understandings of the relationship between State
and nation surface in later works. Badie and Birnbaum argue, for example, that as the
State separates politics from social relations, the nation came to be seen as the locus
of social relations (Badie and Birnbaum 1994). The conflation of social relations and
political demands in the post-war period has changed the role of the nation as a
conduit between people and the State. In his return to the dominant ideology Hill
claims that nationalism acts as a 'counter-ideology' within political culture (Hill
1990). Relying on Nairn's argument in The Enchanted Glass (Nairn 1988) Hill
demonstrates how the monarchy in Britain transcends a national identity that could be
divided by class and regional loyalties. The top-down nationalism counters the
potentially destructive force of bottom-up national identity. And yet few of these
works addressed the notion of competing bottom-up nationalisms within the State.
Not surprisingly, the Canadian contribution to political culture research raised the
possibility of rival notions of national identity. According to Pammett and
Whittington,, the focal point of loyalty, whether city, province, region or country, will
be determined by the way key agents of socialisation seek to transmit a sense of
history (Pammett and Whittington 1976) Efforts to physically re-construct the past -
whether through buildings or monuments - can influence the location of loyalty
Thus, the potential existence of multiple provincial political cultures in Canada
depends upon the ability of, for example, newspapers and education systems to
reinforce a sense of provincial loyalty. The option of differential or mutually
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antagonistic loyalties receives treatment only as barrier to national inclusion. The
existence of antagonistic political cultures, however, receives much less attention
Attention to hierarchical loyalties, to town, province or country, and the influence
they have on national integration, differs from a concerted examination of competing
sub-State and State political cultures. Furthermore, the socialisation processes that
reinforce a sense of national cohesion are also the processes reinforcing a particular
view of authority, sense of political trust, efficacy and, perhaps most relevant, political
community.
In sum, most examinations of political culture have paid little attention to the
sociological debates concerning identity. Those works including identity tend to
define it as national identity qua State loyalty or integration. This thesis goes beyond
these previous treatments to question how national identity functions within political
culture. Before elaborating an integrated theory of identity and political culture the
following section examines related issues affecting a concerted analysis of the two
concepts. In particular, it questions whether the two undergo separate processes of
socialisation, how notions of integration and alienation affect the nation and the State,
and lastly, how membership is acquired. The following exposition argues that it is
possible to dis-aggregate the two notions of nation and State to separate national and
political belonging.
Socialisation
Agents of socialisation provide individuals with the cultural tools to integrate
themselves into society. Under the influence of social institutions such as the family,
school or Church, young children, and later adults, acquire a knowledge of social
norms. Research on socialisation distinguishes several different approaches to norm
dissemination. When absorbing social rules individuals may be privy to political or
national socialisation, formal or informal socialisation, implicit or explicit socialisation
For the purposes of this thesis, only socialisation aimed at constnicting a vision of
national and political integration proves relevant. To this end, the thesis examines
agents involved in overtly political socialisation rather than cultural or social
80
Ailsa Henderson, PhD Thesis, Chapter 2
development. Disentangled notions of apolitical and political socialisation
notwithstanding, the thesis argues that political parties exert an influence distinct from
that exercised by Church or home.
In their examination of socialisation processes Pammett and Whittington highlight the
different approaches throughout the social sciences. Anthropology tends to view
socialisation as a transmission of culture, psychology views it as the creation of a
social defence mechanism, while sociology sees it as the acquisition of social norms,
integrating the individual into society. Political science, for its part, tends to rely on
the sociological perspective, viewing socialisation as the acquisition of a subset of
social roles relating to the political system (Pammett and Whittington 1976) As
mentioned earlier in the chapter, agents of socialisation are divided between public
(school, media) and private (parents, peers) agents of socialisation. Kavanagh also
distinguishes between latent, or non-political agents and purposive or overtly political
agents. Agents with which individuals come in contact for extended periods of time
at an early age, most noticeably the family, are seen as most important in forming
social roles. Almond and Verba, and Hahn stress the importance of education in
forming early social values (Almond and Verba 1963, Hahn 1998), while the media,
family or Church may each engender a sense of empathy within the wider political
community (Wood 1997). Overtly political views such as national identity and party
identification, come later in life (Hahn 1998).
The thesis argues that although national identity and State political identity share a
socialisation process, the patterns of identification function differently. The potential
for challenging the national identity claims of individuals is not present in the political
system, where objective markers testify to inclusion Feelings of doubt and the
resulting negotiation of identity functioning at the national level can exert an influence
on political attitudes such as personal trust and efficacy. Thus, interaction as it relates
to national identity can have an effect on attitudes already formed by the socialisation
process. For, as Pammett and Whittington argue, "non-political attitudes may
precede and in fact even have causal impacts on political attitudes and behaviour"
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(Pammett and Whittington 1976) The two also point to the problem caused by those
individuals who would consider themselves legally members of a political culture,
while not necessarily psychologically members (Pammett and Whittington 1976). The
following section determines whether just as one can speak of a separation of
attitudes, one can speak of two processes of integration.
Integration
A perfectly valid question, what power has to do with examinations of identity and
political culture, depends on the apriori acceptance that exclusion from the dominant
collective identity is meaningful to individuals. The weight and resonance associated
with a state of un-belonging stem from the benefits of national membership both as
articulated in a specific circumstance and as they relate to Western patterns of social
interaction. A loss of belonging is meaningful because it is associated with a distance
from power, broadly conceived, or tangible rights. Thus, a lack of identity or sense
of belonging potentially alienates the individual in two ways. First, in a Marxist sense,
the inability to negotiate identity and join groups at will is alienating because it implies
a loss of capacity, autonomy or ability to self-ascribe the identity label or group
membership (Nairn 1977). Second, in a communitarian sense, a loss of group
membership brings an alienation in and of itself (Taylor 1993). The relative weight of
each depends on the role of identity and benefits of belonging in society. It is worth
asking whether a multicultural society in which identity is not questioned will cause
less alienation than a relatively homogenous society in search of its identity? Chapters
four and five pay greater attention to each type of alienation and the nature of power
in relation to identity and political integration.
Political culture research approaches integration from an anthropological view of
culture. Defined as that which allows individuals to identify with wider society,
communicate effectively and understand the 'rules of the game', culture helps to
integrate the individual into the social world. Political culture catalogues the process
of political integration, the incorporation of individuals into the civic polity.
Methodological approaches aside, most research in this area describes the
socialisation of individuals and their resulting values and behaviour to determine what
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level of political integration exists within a nation State. What researchers then do
with this information, whether it is used to describe ideal-type cultures, decry current
political practices, lament or praise the state of the political activity, matters less than
the over-riding and under-explored goal of political culture research: charting
integration.
For Almond and Verba, the key to a successful and stable democracy was a balanced
political culture, one that provided the necessary deference and participation to both
allow a system to work, and question it when it did not. The issue of consensus, was,
however, left outside their analysis, as political culture was taken to mean the
aggregate of political attitudes and behaviours. This view is shared by others, who
claim that a nation's political culture is the result of an amalgam of the various
subcultures as created by different cleavages within the State (religious, regional,
social class, occupational and role cultures, elite versus mass) (Kavanagh 1972,
Pammett and Whittington 1976,) Lane and Wildavsky likewise claim that political
culture is created in the interactive process between subcultures (Lane 1992,
Wildavsky 1987) In Lane's words, "[t]he peculiarities of a nation's politics will vary
according to the type of political culture held by those in the government; by the elite
groups outside the government, acting as opposition, and by the several competitor
groups seeking access to elite positions" (Lane 1992) Thus, cultures are shared and
produced by groups, rather than nations, the interaction ofwhich produces as nexus
of political attitudes and beliefs that characterise, influence, and are influenced by, the
State's political system. Or, in Bluhm's view, political culture developed as a concept
to explain what men have in common. The common culture exists not as a
homogenous whole but rather as an amalgam of diverse parts (Bluhm 1974)
For Lucien Pye and Sidney Verba particularly, the level of integration within a polity
determined much of its future success:
The development of a clear and unambiguous sense of identity is more than
a facilitating factor in the creation of a nation, it may be in some sense the
major constituting factor of the new nation . The creation of a national
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identity among the members of a nation is the cultural equivalent of the
drawing of the boundaries of the nation (Verba, 1965)
According to Wildavsky, political culture provides the coherent rationale to the
political system, structuring decision-making processes and reinforcing power
relationships (Wildavsky 1987). Based on these bonds of interaction, social capital
literature emphasises the integrating value of identity and political culture. Although
"it is currently fashionable to bemoan the loss of social glue" (Pahl 1996), emphasis
on the optimal bonds of social interaction explain how an otherwise divided society
might withstand hardship and difference if alienation is minimised.
In their examination of identity and political culture in Israel, Shafir and Peled argue
that the best method of State integration comes from the extension of citizenship and
entitlement, (Shafir and Peled 1998) The 1950 Law ofReturn granted automatic
citizenship to any Jewish immigrant to Israel, an offer that, according to Shafir and
Peled, secured secondary citizenship status of Israel's non-Jewish citizens Under the
revised 1970 Law ofReturn, one Jewish grandparent was needed for citizenship. "The
political culture that emerged from the intersection of these social processes may be
analysed as a pattern of interaction between the exclusionary dimensions of Israel's
colonizing and nation building practises and the inclusionary aspects of its democratic
state institutions" (Shafir and Peled 1998). Thus, State inclusion is grounded in
national membership, for membership in the nation guarantees State inclusion.
Community Membership
Most political culture literature explicitly including national identity within measures
of political attitudes and values points to the integrative role of national identity.
Membership in the nation is seen as a necessary step to full participation in the
political system Often, membership in the nation is equated with membership in the
polity. As Neil MacCormick would have it, a member of'us' in the political sense is
member of'us' in personal sense (MacCormick 1998) In the case of Scotland and
Quebec, this is not necessarily so. Thus, while most examinations would indicate that
the modernising forces exert an obvious effect on perceptions of national cum political
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integration, a view that these two collectives exist within separate spheres requires
separate treatment. Any distinction between national and political communities hinges
on the ability to prove that the two possess different agents of socialisation, different
definitions ofmembership, different patterns of integration and encourage different
political values and attitudes. This thesis argues that the same way in which one is
taught to be a political citizen, one is also taught to be a member of a nation; or
rather, one is provided with the tools to acquire national membership, or distinguish
national members from non-members. The dominant view, that national integration
fosters a healthy political culture depends upon the view of State as binding agent.
This cannot be the case when the State reinforces a sense of distance between
members and non-members of the nation.
The previous discussion illustrates the way in which political culture literature has
been used, how national identity is perceived as similar or distinct from social identity,
and how political culture literature has traditionally integrated these issues within its
attempts to depict and explain state cultures. The various definitions of political
culture cannot but affect the way in which identity is seen to exert an influence.
Although the lack of theorised contact between national identity literature and studies
of political culture has not exhausted the link between the two, the thesis argues that
an additional gap stems from the tendency of such works to avoid political behaviour.
This is not to say that political culture analyses do not include measures of political
behaviour, but rather, that national identity as it is used and understood by political
culture specialists usually relies on attitudinal measures, whereas political behaviour
specialists almost exclusively treat identity as a quantifiable independent variable
exerting an influence over voting patterns. In its efforts to develop a theory of
identity, belonging and inclusion this thesis not only seeks to integrate the diverse
theoretical underpinnings and methods of identity and political culture research, but
aims to capitalise on theorised understandings of political behaviour Recent research
examining social capital and new social movements, in particular, adopt a less
quantitative view of behavioural studies. A review of such works must precede any
advances in political culture theory.
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THEORIES OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
If political culture began as an analysis of the health of democratic systems, the
participation of individuals in political life seems an appropriate measure with which
to analyse civic health. At first glance, a polity in which citizens participate regularly
in the political process appears to be in better health than a political system in which
citizens rarely vote much less seek to influence political affairs. Participation theorists
have long warned that low levels of participation provide an inadequate check on the
political system. Often, to ensure that politicians receive proper scrutiny from a
sufficiently large and representative population, this has led to general support for
obligatory voting (Lijphart 1997, Verba 1996). Furthermore, inadequate levels of
participation are symptomatic of low levels of trust, seen as both a reflection and
source of dissatisfaction with the political system (M. Hetherington 1998). Others
claim, however, that a lack of activity is not necessarily linked to an excluded and
alienated electorate, and furthermore, that exclusion from the political system is not
necessarily a bad thing. Just as inclusion can imply active membership and
participation, so too can it imply a co-option into the dominant agenda that proves as
dangerous for critical evaluation of political activities as does a lack of participation
(Dryzek 1996). And yet, notwithstanding this seeming importance, a summary of
traditional measures of political culture betrays the disputed inclusion of political
behaviour The argument for excluding such indicators stems from the potential
influence of intervening variables which might detract from the ability to judge the
influence of political culture.
Notions of civic engagement occupy classical normative political theory, liberal rights
discourse, and theories of new social movements, identity politics, and social capital
The study of political participation is inextricably linked with normative visions of the
Good Citizen Lack of participation is seen as negative because it appears indicative
of a lack of trust. Consequently, lack of trust is seen as both a reflection and source
of dissatisfaction with the political system (M Hetherington 1998) Low levels of
participation provide an opportunity to critique theories of democratic involvement
Thus, throughout the literature, attention to the motivations and benefits of
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participation co-exist with normative evaluations of participation as a guarantor of
regime stability.
Much of the political behaviour literature uses participation as a dependent variable,
influenced by the value predispositions and socio-economic status of potentially active
individuals. Competing explanations of participation, most notably the socio¬
economic model versus the resource model, are both tied to the notion of equality
(Brady, Verba and Schlozman 1995). If the notion of equal rights is to be assured,
citizens must possess actual access to their political representatives and equal
opportunities to influence government decisions. As Verba states, ".. .in the
democratic ideal, elected officials should give equal consideration to the needs and
preferences of all citizens" (Verba 1996). Normally, the striking contrast between
formal equality and inequality of influence is ignored as an unavoidable side-effect of
both the modern polity and the capitalist system. Since the 1960s, literature
addressing these issues has advocated that despite whatever formal equality may exist
among citizens, the influence of socio-economic factors, in particular education,
serves to distort the socio-economic profile of those who participate in politics and
those who do not (Almond and Verba 1963, Barnes and Kaase 1979, Verba and Nie
1972). More recent explanations suggest that just as variables such as social class and
education have witnessed a declining ability to explain voting behaviour, so too have
such variables ceased to provide adequate interpretations of political activity levels.
Rather, as Sidney Verba has argued in two publications, resources, in particular time,
money and civic skills, exert a greater influence on political participation (Brady,
Verba and Schlozman 1995, Verba, Nie and Kim 19781'') Only in their influence on
the development of civic skills do education and occupation retain their explanatory
power over political engagement. In the face of research highlighting the uneven
distribution of participation throughout society, political scholars have supported
compulsory voting as the only means to redress this inequality of voice (Lijphart
1997)
19 The resource model, suggested in the 1978 work, receives full treatment in the 1995 article.
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The principle of equal access implies a concomitant equality of opportunity both to
participate and to be a representative. Thus, because voting is a free and equally
available activity for all citizens, those who choose to exercise this voice and those
who do not should not be distinguishable on the basis of class, income, age, gender or
race. The obviously unequal patterns of participation in all developed polities sit
uneasily with participation theorists. Efforts to mitigate, or explain, this inequality,
form the mainstay of related literature. Particularly vibrant debates within American
political science are dominated by calls for compulsory voting. For Kennedy,
... active citizenship only flourishes where there is trust in the political
system: the ideal civic culture would be one in which the political ideas and
values of the citizens fostered political equality and participation and where
government was seen as trustworthy and acting in the public interest
(Kennedy 1996)
Political participation, as defined by classical behaviour specialists such as Milbrath,
Verba, Dahl, and more recent authors such as Woshinksy, involves any behaviour
intended to affect the outcomes of government (Dahl 1963, Milbrath 1965, Pye and
Verba 1965 Woshinsky 1995) Among the more recent treatments of the topic some
argue that participation in social or civic life, due to traditional divisions between
private and public life, should be included in any measures of political activity (Abu
Laban 1997). The civic voluntarism ofmany women, for example, has long been
excluded from traditional government-oriented measures of participation.
For these authors, uneven or low rates of political participation are almost universally
seen as a negative influence on the stability of the political system. Unwillingness to
participate suggests a low sense of trust, efficacy and satisfaction in the system and is
inextricably linked to low levels of inclusion or integration. For Pye and Verba,
participation in the political sphere engenders a sense of civic responsibility (Pye and
Verba 1965). Inactive citizens are painted as more detrimental to the health of the
polity than active citizens intent on radically changing the political course of the State.
In his article "Political Inclusion and the Dynamics of Democratization" John Dryzek
argues that political inclusion, in the sense that it implies a co-option into the State
agenda, should not be considered a laudable goal. Rather, active, seemingly
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"alienated" citizens will exert more beneficial pressure on the State (Dryzek 1996) A
strong "oppositional force", as Habermas would describe it, ensures a vibrant
democracy more than uniformly active and integrated citizens (Habermas 1987), Or,
in Robert Putnam's words "Tocqueville was right ... Democratic government is
strengthened, not weakened, when it faces a vigorous civil society" (Putnam 1993).
When a vigorous civil society depends on alienated, if organised, individuals, remains
outwith the scope of this thesis.
Early studies argue, and authors of early examinations continue to claim, that political
participation in a given polity is uneven. The gap between active and inactive citizens
allows for differential influence within the political system. Unequal influence is seen,
by most researchers on political behaviour, to undermine the stability of the political
system (Lijphart 1997, Verba 1996). For these authors compulsory voting corrects
the imbalance, low voter turnout under-represents the partisan wishes of those on the
lower end of the economic spectrum, reinforcing an elite or dominant ideological
preference that will not be corrected without the concerted involvement of those
whom the system does not serve (Lipset 1960, Key 1948, Hirschman 1970, Kaase
1996). In his 1997 presidential address to the American Political Science Association,
Arend Lijphart also argued that user-friendly voter registration, proportional election
formulas, infrequent elections and weekend voting would stimulate voter turnout. By
concentrating on voting, and by treating the symptoms of the problem, these works
provide a limited analysis of political participation and a limited solution to a serious
problem Recognised as stemming from low trust and efficacy, low rates of
participation are effectively ruled illegal. While this would artificially raise the level of
activity, high turnout levels could mask serious problems within the polity. Although
it is argued that compulsory voting could 'kick start' interest in political life, one must
recognise that healthy democratic systems and high levels of political activity do not
always co-exist.
Factors influencing participation receive attention in a series of articles linked to the
major studies in political participation. Early models attributed fluctuating
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participation levels to differences in socio-economic status (Brady, Verba and
Schlozman 1995). Individuals possessing above average levels of education,
professional employment and middle-class incomes were more likely to participate in
all aspects of political life. In their review of political behaviour studies Verba, Nie,
Kim and others expand this analysis to include the notion of political resources
(Verba, Nie and Kim 1978, Brade, Verba and Scholozman 1995). Individuals
possessing civic skills, gleaned throughout childhood and adult socialisation in the
family, school and work environment, are more likely to participate in politics
regardless of socio-economic background (see also Kavanagh 1972). An availability
of both time and money exerts positive influences on participation. Unlike money,
time is in no way attached to traditional indicators of participatory zeal. Educational
qualifications and job status correlate poorly with time available for political activity.
In addition, political influence outwith traditional notions of participation escapes
assessment in many of these works.
Other, more psychological explanations of participation rely on two main theories:
mobilisation and decline of community. These explanations of participation stem from
two main camps: those arguing for the mobilisation thesis and those citing a decline of
community as the main motivating factor. Within the general view that individuals are
mobilised to participate one can distinguish between the influence of socio-economic
status and political resources on the one hand, and the influence of social capital
theories on the other. According to the first explanation, individuals possessing
higher levels of education, social wealth, political interest, time and money are more
likely to participate in politics. For social capital theorists, the expected benefits of
positive social interaction among citizens encourage individuals to participate in the
civic and political spheres. Theorists advocating a decline of community theory claim
that modernisation has stripped social communities of the links previously maintained
among citizens. As a result, individuals tend to feel disassociated from their fellow
citizens and feel less encouraged to participate in civic or political activities. For
theorists of the new social movement view, modernisation, and even a resulting
decline of community, can have an opposite effect By filling the gap left by modern
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society in which kinship ties or strong social bonds are absent, new social movements
bind citizens together in common political projects, often, but not exclusively, tied to
collective identity.
The seemingly incompatible conclusions of the mobilisation theory and decline of
community theory mask the similarities in the propositions. There is, in fact, a false
opposition between these two views. Both theories are reacting to the
peripheralisation of the actor. In one case, the creation of a centre and periphery
encourages reactive participation whereas in other circumstances, activity is
dampened by the loss of interest or sense of efficacy/agency. A brief examination of
two recent theoretical developments, those affecting social capital and new social
movements research, will better explain how political circumstances in Scotland and
Quebec affect and react to the changing nature of political participation.
Social Capital
A growing attention to the relations between citizens, and the possible relationships
between social relations and political involvement, forms the basis of a growing
literature on social capital. If political culture began as an attempt to uncover the
conditions that best guarantee the continued stability of political systems, social
capital concerns itself with the continued health of societies. Grounded in a belief that
culture refers to the entire pattern of behaviour in a society, both political culture and
social capital works investigate the web of inter-related phenomenon, of institutions,
attitudes and behaviour (Calvert 1993). Before Robert Putnam'sMaking Democracy
Work, a work which popularised the concept and approach for students of social
interaction, social capital was viewed as that benefit which accrued to people whose
membership in diverse social organisations (Bourdieu 1985) or reliance on social ties
(Coleman 1988) ensured healthy level of participation (Portes and Landolt 1996). In
his research into political attitudes and behaviour in Italy Putnam uses both qualitative
and quantitative analysis in a normative examination reminiscent of The Civic Culture
(Putnam 1993). Despite debate that his work contributes to the field of political
culture (Tarrow 1996, Wood 1997) Putnam's book bridges the gap between attitudes
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to democracy and public participation. Putnam asks, in Tarrow's estimation "How do
traditions of association and civic engagement affect political behaviour " (Tarrow
1996). The main argument of the book claims that societies rich in social capital will
provide positive contexts in which democracy can flourish. Putnam's stretching of the
term, from an benefit enjoyed by individuals to a characteristic held by societies has
muddied slightly understandings if not applications of the concept (Portes and Landolt
1996). Just as early political culture gave way to a growing literature with disputed
definitions, so too does general confusion surround the creation of social capital.
Jeremy Weinstein asks, how to societies acquire social capital: "Is [social capital]
good or bad? Can we invest in 'it' or are we stuck with what we have? What is 'it'
good for?" (Weinstein, 1999). The resulting index of civic participation used by
Putnam seeks to account for the differences between the democratically developed
North and underdeveloped Southern political dispositions in Italy. In his critique of
Putnam's work, Sidney Tarrow questions both the claimed visible links between social
interaction and democratic stability and the use of institutional performance as a proxy
for democratic development (Tarrow 1996). Boix and Posner likewise subject the
link between social capital and government success to close scrutiny (Boix and Posner
1995)
Not surprisingly, the concept of social capital, both lauded and derided by political
analysts, escapes clear definition. As with political culture, it is the loose and ill-
defined nature of social capital that bestows upon it an explanatory power greater
than rational action theory (Goldthorpe 1998, Coleman 1990). For some, social
capital is enjoyed by individuals (Coleman 1988) for others, it is the co-operative
capacity of a community (Putnam 1993, Putnam 1995a, Putnam 1995b, Putnam 1996,
Boix and Posner 1995). Others employ more general definitions. Whether referred to
as social glue (Marquand 1998), trust relations (Coleman 1990), or simply, as a
resource (Wood 1997), social capital enables a society to overcome social and
political inequality or other potentially divisive phenomena. Such a definition renders
social capital particularly useful in examinations of polities enduring collective tension
as a result of nationalist aspirations. That said, the theory presents an
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uncharacteristically optimistic view of human nature given the prevalence in the
discipline of self-interest driven rational choice theories. The glaring inconsistency in
the evaluation of human behaviour, motivated by short-term gain when it comes to
partisan preference, and long-term expected benefit when it comes to social
interaction, suggests that dominant theories in political science sit uneasily with
researchers.20
For the purposes of this thesis, the under-theorised aspect of social capital most of
interest is the influence of strong social ties, and the benefits that accrue from them,
on those who stand outside the web of activity. The mutual dependence of one group
within society, whether encouraged by the social conditions of immigration, or the
perception of discrimination, reinforce a border around those within the web of
interaction. No doubt Putnam would argue that social capital, because of its role as a
societal good, is not in evidence in such situations. And yet other theorists who rely
on such notions of social interaction and public participation would point out that the
social capital stems from the act of participation, and thus is enjoyed by those who
participate, not by society as a whole. Notions of social capital are particularly
relevant to studies of nations and nationalism because of the overlapping circles of
inclusion and perceived exclusion. If one of the factors feeding the development of
nationalism, and thus the increased salience of national identity, is a sense of
exclusion, disadvantage or even social dislocation, (Gellner 1983, Hall 1992, Nairn
1977, Pahl 1996, Rustin 1996) then an absence of participation can encourage a
reactive tightening of the social web of interaction. As theorists note, the drawing of
a boundary around the nation, which follows from such a perception of exclusion, in
turn excludes all those who are not members of the nation, thus, the ebb and flow of
social capital. Any effort to examine how national identity affects political attitudes
and behaviour must examine how co-operation and participation are distributed and
perceived within the polity.
20
Responding to anticipated criticism Wood notes social capital "can be used as an explanatory
theoretical framework in ways that do not necessarily lead to the 'pollyantnsh' reduction of political
life to a 'nicer' civil society." (Wood 1997)
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New Social Movements
Just as social capital literature provides an alternative interpretation of functioning
political culture, new social movements analyses examine political behaviour from the
view of collective mobilisation. New social movements distinguish themselves from
older movements like the workers' movement in their goals, patterns of mobilisation
and intra-group relations (Scott 1990). The study of new social movements was
credited with rejuvenating sociology as a discipline by focusing on the social actor at
the expense of social structures or institutions. While earlier examinations viewed
new social movements as any organised collective seeking to effect change from the
social or political system, more recent evaluations claim that these groups can
consistently defend the status quo. An enhanced positive for the collective, however
achieved, forms the basis of campaigning (Scott 1990). For some groups, the status
quo may present a better situation than proposed change. New social movements
distinguish themselves from older campaigns by their reliance on social identities, and
their reaction to changing social conditions. Emphasis on such psychological benefits
as consciousness raising, sense of personal and collective autonomy take precedence
over more concrete demands for freedom or material security. This unambiguous
distinction between old and new movements has, however, drawn criticism from some
who see more fuzzy boundaries between the social and the political Scott criticises
this false distinction, claiming that the political sphere transcends many social
campaigns (Scott 1990). Efforts to reinforce a clear and dichotomous view of new
social movements stem from the justifications for their rise in popularity. For some,
new social movements can be seen as a response to changing social forces, whether
caused by post-industrial society (Touraine 1995) or a historical progress of
rationalisation (Habermas 1990). For others, new social movements are proof of
failed social democratic parties who, in their efforts to appeal to the mass or average
citizen, have pushed some groups or individuals to the margins of the political debate.
It is in their integrative function that new social movements become relevant in
examinations of identity and political culture. In particular, the proliferation of unity
groups throughout Quebec suggests that those who consider themselves alienated
within the dominant political discourse are searching for an outlet for their
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participation. The role of these groups is much clearer than that of existing political
parties.
Can political parties be considered new social movements? The wealth of social
movement literature on Green Parties suggests that they can, providing the asserted
goals defend the interests of collective groups, whether nations, women, or in this
case, humanity (Diani and Lodi 1988). Problems arise, however, when these groups
form governments. Just as opposition parties must change their goals when
confronted with the cruel realities of government, new social party governments must
move away from issues of collective autonomy to the more mundane issues of
balanced budgets and resource management. Given that much of the literature
maintains that new social movements prefer issues of personal enlightenment over the
attainment of power, it would appear that nationalist parties cease to be new social
movements when they bid for power rather than influence. With these restrictions in
mind, the literature on new social movements is relevant to a discussion on national
identity and political culture only insofar as it is tied to identity, or symptomatic of a
greater shift towards identity politics and the goals of political autonomy. Rigid
definitions ofwhat a social movement is and is not are less helpful.
A THEORY OF NEGOTIATED IDENTITY, CONTESTED BELONGING AND
POLITICAL INTEGRATION
The thesis attempts to provide a sociological understanding of interactive processes
affecting subjective understandings of the political system. In so doing, it relies on a
definition of political culture that includes both attitudes to, and patterns of interaction
with, the State and other members of the polity. Chapter three relies upon a case
study approach to highlight the divergent forces exerting an influence in each case
study. In particular, it examines traditional perceptions of the state in Scotland and
Quebec, before turning to the way in which political parties, government commissions
and government documents have emphasised certain markers of national identity
Thus, the chapter focuses on the efforts of groups and institutions to engender a sense
of identity and political cohesion while tracing the macro trends within national
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identity and political culture. Chapters four and five focus on the individual-level
reactions to such messages, on the negotiation of identity and the interaction between
variables and groups within the political cultures of Scotland and Quebec, In so
doing, it relies upon a particular pattern of negotiation between national identity and
political culture 21 It is this attempt to deal with institutional symbols, individual
reactions, and attitudes and behaviour as they relate to the State and other citizens,
that forms the focus of this thesis. The resulting theory of negotiated identity,
contested belonging and political integration serves as an analytical tool throughout
the thesis.
In particular, the thesis seeks to determine how the identification process of an
individual is affected by the markers of an entirely collective identity. In particular,
whether a loss of control over self-conception creates a sense of dissonance within the
political culture. The thesis sees the interaction between notions of power, difference
and integration as they affect individuals as a microcosm of a larger negotiation at the
national level. It argues that difference, in Canada and in Britain, has been
accommodated, to a certain degree, within the current political arrangement, dividing
power equitably among constituent groups and evenly among citizens. An increasing
sense of difference has fostered an interest in a redistribution of power. This rising
sense of difference accompanies a perception of reduced integration within the State
Whether the weakened bonds of integration brought with them a sense of distinctness,
or whether the process works the other way, doesn't matter for the purposes of this
thesis. The acknowledgement of difference precedes any redistribution of power or
autonomy. Groups, feeling somehow dis-integrated from the whole, are moved to
seek greater power, often in the form of greater political autonomy. The effect on
individuals is fairly simple. An increased sense of collective dis-integration reinforces
membership in the collective. Attention to the distance between collective members
and non-members forms the basis for the resulting theory of integration
21 This division, between individual understandings of identity and political culture, and institutional
efforts to create markers of identity, focuses on what Robert Wood has referred to as the two faces of
political culture: the first examines the way political culture and specifically social capital, structure
people's lives, and how they interact with one another, while the second, deals with the 'shared
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This theory attempts to chronicle what happens within polities where national
difference has reached a sufficient salience to occupy public debate, media, political
parties, and affect electoral behaviour. Chapter three begins with an analysis of the
importance of national identity to the populations in Scotland and Quebec, before
continuing to an analysis of the way identity is constructed by political actors. As a
result, the theory accepts that the search for national belonging exists, to a greater or
lesser degree, in Scotland and Quebec. It also presumes the existence of competing
social identities, some ofwhich may conflict, competing and different national
identities and competing notions of the name identity. In other words, for any
individual, his or her social identity, as it relates to occupation, gender, age, place of
residence, social class or linguistic group co-exists with national identity. The salience
and composition of each of these identities changes over time (Hall 1992, Hall 1996,
Laclau 1.994, McCrone 1998). In addition, there may be different national identities
competing either for primacy or co-existence. Thus, claims to be Canadian or
Quebecois, British or Scottish, may affect the decisions made by individuals. For
some, being both Canadian and Quebecois may not present a conflict, for others, it
may seem anathema. Lastly, there may be different understandings ofwhat it means
to be Scottish or Quebecois. Part of how these issues are resolved affects the way
that individuals will think and act within the political culture. The way in which these
divergent negotiation processes are handled, forms the focus of the theory.
Figure 2.1 Identity as a Politicised Social Construct
'Givens'
1. The search of national belonging - importance of
identity in post modern age, individual need for
belonging, national imagined community
2. The coexistence of other identities/allegiances -
both tags and processes
cultural elements' which determine why individuals structure their ties the way they do (Wood
1997)
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3. Existence of a coherent identity package put
forward by agents/arbiters, consisting of markers of
identity
4. Existence of a hierarchy of national identity
markers
Process'
5. Self-examination of own 'fit' with package - taking
markers and perceptions of others into
consideration
6. Negotiation with others of 'fit' based on perceptions
of acceptance and own possession of objective
markers
7. Potential alienation from nation or from State or
both or neither (alienation from nation can prevent
integration at the State level)
8. level of belonging, or lack thereof determines
political attitudes and behaviour (influence of lack
of belonging depends on a) the construction of
identity - whether it subscribes to an exclusive
notion of membership b) salience of identity to
nationalist debate
The thesis concerns itselfwith numbers three through eight, having accepted that
numbers one and two occur within both Scotland and Quebec. That said, chapter
three examines the extent to which the search for national belonging occupies the
hearts and minds of individuals in both case studies. The following section describes
the rest of the theory.
As part of its 'givens', the theory argues that even though the process of selecting or
acquiring a national identity, is, as with other social identities, a self-directed process,
it is nonetheless influenced by popular conceptions of that identity Thus, the
acquisition and maintenance depends on an act of negotiation between two
participants: those who will possess the identity, and those who facilitate its popular
understanding. What it means to be Scottish is determined by more than statements in
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party manifestos and curriculum authorities. It is also affected by the perceptions of
that identity by members and non-members, hence Anderson's imagined community.
This thesis argues that despite the power of arguments for a personal nationalism
(Cohen 1994) - that identity ultimately exists in the minds of individuals, there is an
identifiable identity package existing if not as a checklist of characteristics that one
must possess, then certainly as a general consensus on who is a Scot, or who is
Quebecois. Or, as Gosling notes, communities are defined by an amalgam of
"individual prejudices and shared social constructs" (Gosling 1996). Equally
important, are corollary notions of what it means to be Quebecois or Scottish This
thesis highlights the promotion of certain pillars of identity, whether objective markers
ofbelonging such as place of birth, residency or ancestry, or subjective notions of
integration tied to common values and shared beliefs. The thesis argues that the
accuracy of these pillars is less important than their general acceptance. For example,
if a significant proportion believes that part ofwhat it means to be Scottish is tied to
notions of Celtic ancestry, then future archaeological studies proving no such link
exists will have little effect. Furthermore, one of the central tenets of'Scottishness', a
belief in the common weel, need not bear out in the actual behaviour of Scots. As
Finlay states, "the factual invalidation ofmyths in weighty academic tomes does not
and never has invalidated them as complex icons of cultural, social and political
belief." (Finlay 1997) The historical accuracy of the pillar matters less than its public
perception Whether such messages are a plea for membership, in the case of a
reflexive civic movement, or an attempt to mobilise ethnic, latent characteristics,
depends on the construction of identity and type of nationalism.
The process of negotiation, between those who wear the identity and those who
promote its pillars, occupies a shifting group of individuals. Those who question or
analyse their identity are considered part of the group who promote it by other self-
evaluating individuals This is tied to the notion of national identity as an inherently
vague and malleable entity. The presence of national culture and history may serve as
pillars of identity but it is rare that the specifics of such are enunciated in more than a
scattered form. Universal values of democracy and liberalism often receive promotion
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as pillars of identity but in Western political cultures these are hardly distinguishing
characteristics.22 To this extent, Cohen's notion of personal nationalism holds true,
for in the face of a general identity package individuals are left to elaborate how
national pillars fit with visions of the self. What the thesis investigates, is whether in
certain situations individuals are more likely to accept their inclusion and bend notions
of national identity in ways that suit them, or whether they are more likely to doubt
their inclusion, citing an exclusive concept of identity. The thesis argues that the
extent to which individuals act in different ways lies in part in the particular promotion
of identity - whether in the vague notion muted there is room for obvious inclusion
and exclusion - and whether it is salient to daily life. Both factors, promotion and
salience, are affected by the politicisation of identity. If cultural national identity
exists as a fuzzy aggregate of values then a politicised national identity emerges as a
consensual package ofmarkers by which individuals can evaluate their membership
and position within the nation.23 If cultural identity represents the vague, inclusive
aspect of national allegiance, politicised national identity is the more exclusive,
enunciated force. The potency of cultural identity lies in its ability to appeal to a wide
variety of people, whereas the power of political identity hinges on the potential for
mobilisation in the name of a political project. In their efforts to advance the
nationalist cause political parties in Scotland and Quebec have manipulated cultural
identity into a political tool, articulating a framework of civic values and national
characteristics that, often, justify greater political autonomy. In so doing, they have
created a more exclusive, and admittedly powerful identity.
The thesis argues that the power of this politicised identity, more than the pillars
themselves, raise the potential for exclusion. In a departure from the oft-employed
categories of civic and ethnic nationalism, this examination of national identity claims
that inclusion and exclusion operate within all national discourses. The extent of this
22 One Quebec Liberal Party policy paper on identity, for example, makes reference to the shared
Quebec values of individual freedom, pluralism and a willingness to decrease social inequalities.
Quebec Liberal Party (1997) Recognition and interdependence. Montreal: Quebec Liberal Party. In
its recent election manifesto the Scottish National Party best represented Scots as the party of
"Democracy, Compassion and Enterprise"
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exclusion, whether it is based on inherited characteristics or selected values, or felt by
individuals who exclude themselves in the face of publicly-inclusive notions of
belonging, varies according to the treatment of national identity by nationalist actors.
Item four in the theory of inclusion argues that markers and pillars of identity exist in
a hierarchical order. This is not to say that governments or political actors enunciate
the specific characteristics of national membership and order them in a meaningful
way, but rather, given the vague consensus ofmarkers by which individuals may
evaluate their membership, there is a perceived ranking. The hierarchy that exists in
the minds ofmembers and non-members depends on the pillars available, and the
particular national history. In other words, for any given nation, some individuals may
consider themselves automatic members, and some may not. Those born into a
society are generally seen to have a greater - often unquestioned - justification for
belonging than temporary visitors. Location depends on whether these individuals
can make a reasonable claim to belong. Whether objective markers such as family
background or citizenship, or subjective factors such as values or cultural habits
guarantee acceptance, depends, again, on the particular construction of identity
promoted and accepted by the polity.
Somewhere along the hierarchy there is a spot where some people feel they belong
but others will not agree, some people feel they do not belong but others would see
them as members, there is a gap in understanding between the label we would ascribe
to ourselves and the label we think others would ascribe to us. These are negotiated
or contested identities. In other words, although identity is a self-ascribed tag,
willingness to profess a sense of belonging depends on the acknowledgement of its
validity by other members of society . 24 The content and myths of any particular
23 For Laclau, the politicisation of cultural identity is part and parcel of the polilicisation of social
life, accompanied by the proliferation of particularist groups (Laclau 1994).
24 Our willingness to accept the position of others as arbiters of our identity is another issue. A brief
example, however, illustrates the point. In its file of newspaper articles on Scottish-English relations
the Council for Racial Equality includes over 100 articles on the presence of anti-English sentiment
in Scotland Of those articles, over 70% present the view of politically active members of society Of
those mentioning a party by name, all but one mention the SNP exclusively, while the remaining
article reports a view from the Scottish Conservative Party. In each case, the view of the SNP was
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identity exert their influence in the construction of a scale of belonging rather than as
determinants of political attitudes in themselves. The thesis departs from previous
examinations of national identity and political culture by arguing that the position on
the identity hierarchy, rather than the components that determine the position, affects
political attitudes and behaviour. Those who feel that their identity is under challenge
may not exhibit the same behaviour as others expressing similar attachment. The
examination of political behaviour must acknowledge that although identity may be a
primary determinant, the conditions under which the identity is claimed, the
demographic characteristics of the individual, exert an equally important influence.
Item five deals with the way in which individuals assess their position within the
identity hierarchy. Subscribing to social identity theory's vision that a detailing of
identity characteristics precedes the creation of a meaningful identity, item five argues
that individuals accept the hierarchy and self-evaluate their own levels ofbelonging on
the basis of the accepted pillars. The thesis relies on statistical data from recent
election studies and opinion polls, and interview material, to determine the extent to
which individuals evaluate their level of belonging based on certain characteristics.
According to item six, following this evaluation process, individuals seek to negotiate
their 'owed' level of belonging with the degree of acceptance within society. The
thesis argues that part of the negotiation process relies on assumed notions of
belonging and acceptance in the host society, some ofwhich may not accurately
reflect the majority opinion within Scotland or Quebec. The thesis argues that
individuals question their own level of belonging, conforming to expected notions of
acceptance rather than their own 'owed' level of belonging. In particular, item six
concerns itself with the expected acceptance of claims to belonging, and the way that
individuals negotiate these claims. As a result, it deals with exclusion, not because
exclusion and alienation are rampant in either society, nor because nationalism is an
ethnically-driven power struggle that divides populations, but because in the face of
generally positive and inclusive messages, some individuals or groups of individuals,
treated as synonymous with the views of Scottish nationalism in general. This conflating of party
and public views, while understandable, elevates the SNP to a position of arbitration on the
characteristics of Scottish nationalism.
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feel their sense of identity is questioned, or questionable. The thesis argues that part
of the reason for presumed exclusion lies in the collective ascription of pillars and
characteristics ofmembership that do not always incorporate the diverse blend of
competing identities within individuals (Shafir and Peled 1998). Part of the reason
this occurs lies in the stateless aspect of both Scotland and Quebec. In the presence
of citizenship requirements, individuals are provided with objective measures for the
formal acceptance into the State, a preliminary level of inclusion which may lead to a
more comprehensive sense of belonging. The thesis thus draws a distinction between
being included - that which is conferred by others - and belonging as a self-directed
process. The absence of such formal requirements in Scotland and Quebec, allows
group members to determine the pillars by which individuals evaluate their level of
belonging.
The following table summarises the distinction between different claims to belonging.














Item seven argues that there is a difference between inclusion and belonging within
the State and inclusion and belonging within the nation The thesis examines the way
that presumed exclusion within the nation affects the level and form of participation
within the formal political sphere. It argues the conditions under which some
individuals mediate their national exclusion by increased political participation
depends on the self-evaluation of the identity position. Often, those lacking the
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objective markers of belonging will participate more in non-partisan political activities
than those possessing greater 'claims' to belonging.
The resulting political attitudes and behaviour of those within these contested
categories produce two drastically different reactions from similarly excluded
individuals. This has less to do with the importance of identity in Quebec and
Scotland than with the resources available to different groups. The range of
participation - from greater political involvement to total exit - is larger because other
similarly alienated groups - those suffering from poverty or other forms of social
exclusion - do not have the resources, support, or clout to mount a political plea for
attention or to pick up and move.
The more the perceived sense of alienation depends on subjective characteristics, the
more radical the response. For example, the increased alienation of some
anglophones and allophones since the Quebec referendum has created a rise in vigilant
rights-oriented community and non-partisan political organisations, for others it has
led to an exit from the political system. The difference, between objective and
subjective markers affects the reaction to perceived exclusion. Those possessing
objective markers of belonging but feel that they do not belong tend to take-up more
radical options, whether as exit from the system or as advocates of non-mainstream
political ideas, while those possessing only subjective markers of belonging opt for
more mainstream political activities.
In short, this thesis seeks to examine the negotiation between the objective label -
identity as a census characteristic, the subjective label - an entirely self-directed sense
of attachment, and the resulting sense of belonging - the negotiated identity. The
thesis treats identity as a reference group, distinguishing itself from other works which
distinguish between collective, national identity, reference groups and demographic
groups (Martin 1998) Rather, it claims that identity functions as any other reference
group asserting its dominance, policing its boundaries in a variety of contexts with
varying levels of assertiveness. Sociologist Stuart Hall argues that identity is a
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negotiated process in which the multiple identities possessed by any individual assert
their dominance in negotiation with the other possible self-definitions (Hall 1992, Hall
1996), It is possible to see this negotiation process, not just between competing
notions of personal identity, but as a compromise between self-definition in a vacuum
and the perception we think others have of us. The resultant identity lies somewhere
in between this view of the self, and self as seen through the eyes of others. In a twist
on the concept of street credibility, this paper examines the influence of identity
credibility. Furthermore, if, as Bauman suggests, the search for identity represents an
attempted escape from uncertainty, any loss of identity, or denial of identity by others
within society, plunges the unaligned or unattached individual into uncertainty,
disorienting the values and attitudes that might otherwise be shared with other
members of society (Bauman 1996). Any questioned or contested identity assumes
greater importance in the absence of a formalised notion ofmembership When
citizenship, as signified by a passport, is not congruent with membership in the nation,
claims to belonging assume a heightened sense of importance.
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National Identity and Political Culture in Scotland and Quebec
An understanding of the interaction between national identity and political culture
stems from the construction and perception of difference created in the social and
political sphere. The cohesive identity and political community bind themselves in
opposition to other dissimilar cultures. This chapter chronicles the construction of
both concepts by examining perceptions of difference in Scotland. When answering
the question "Are Scotland and Quebec different?" one must first determine, different
from what? And different how? For the purposes of this chapter the object of
comparison is not just the other case study but the wider Nation-State as well. In so
doing the chapter proves that the comparison in chapters four and five relates to
nation differences between Scotland and Quebec rather than State differences between
Britain and Canada. Thus, is Scotland different from the rest ofBritain? Is Quebec
different from the rest of Canada? Second, one must distinguish between institutional
difference and sociological difference. Daily life in Scotland and Quebec may be
objectively different, operating under different laws and dependent on different
institutions, but unless the distinction is meaningful it is not very useful for the
purposes of this investigation For example, it does not matter if the tax laws are
different in two countries (for those studying political culture) unless the higher or
lower rates affect the attitudes of citizens. If the tax rates are high, and reinforce a
sense of alienation from the State on the part of resentful ratepayers, or if high rates
encourage a sense of dependency on the State, then these are two cases where
institutional, or quantitative difference, can become sociologically meaningful. Thus,
the first question asked in this chapter "Are Scotland and Quebec different?" is
examined in light of these two parameters first by relying on the general consensus in
the literature and second on the perceptions of citizens. In the third section, data from
opinion polls, voting records and electoral studies are examined to provide a more
detailed reflection of political attitudes in Scotland and Quebec. As chapter two
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argues, this thesis seeks to extend beyond traditional quantitative treatments of
election studies to determine how national identity interacts with political culture. In
so doing it examines previous treatments of political culture in both cases and
provides complementary statistical data, highlighting areas where it differs from
traditional analyses. Having established how this data fits in with previous
investigations, the chapter then turns to political records in Scotland and Quebec, to
determine how and in what way political parties, constitutional commissions and
governments construct visions of national identity and political inclusion. In
particular, the chapter argues that in the construction of a political identity and in the
nationalist debate, a political culture and national identity have been constructed in
which the treatment of history, the placement of other and the question of authenticity
determine accepted notions of difference.
Rising nationalist sentiment in post-war Scotland has received attention from a variety
of sources, each seeking to explain how goals of political autonomy have replaced
expressions ofBritishness. Greater political self-determination has witnessed an
increased interest in Scottish identity, how it is defined, what it represents and how, if
at all, it affects peoples' lives (Macmillan 1999, Royle 1999, Wilson 1999). Whether
the increased attention to identity led to strengthened calls for constitutional change,
or whether the introduction of devolution sparked an increased level of introspection
is, for our purposes, irrelevant. Post-devolution, the tenor of self-examination has
changed, lingering over the pillars of Scottish identity, whether it is more or less
possible to be both British and Scottish and, further south, what it means to be
English.1 Both the political and sociological repercussions of the devolution
settlement depend on the perception of difference. Cultural depiction of national life
depends on a sense of separate existence, the presence of easy distinction between
Scotland and the rest of Britain. Variance exists, in the form of economic
performance and social structures, but also receives treatment by diverse institutions
throughout society. These groups identify difference and project it back to society.
1 Two television series by Andrew Marr and Darcus Howe examine the meaning of Britishness as it
relates to nation and race respectively.
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Any examination of national identity and political culture in Quebec finds its roots in
the debated division between the State and the nation, such as it exists. Perceptions
of inclusion or exclusion stemming from nationally-identified markers ofmembership
are affected or corrected by official State regulations. Thus, those who would
consider themselves outside the Quebecois nation may claim an unwavering affinity or
sense of belonging to the province and/or territory of Quebec. Individuals who are
uncertain of their location in the nation are persuaded, by their love of, for example,
Montreal, or their experiences as tax-payers, that they belong in Quebec. Whether
institutionally- or locally-defined this affinity distinguishes itself from a sense of
belonging to the nation. This rather confusing interaction between the nation and the
State is both ignored and accepted by actors on either side of the nationalist divide.
As chapter two explains, this thesis concentrates on the views of those who feel
themselves on the fringes of national membership. As a result, the dominant view of
these individuals, that the construction of a Quebec nation, despite the inclusion
attentions of its participants, at times excludes them from active participation, forms
one of the premises of this chapter. A full understanding of this division depends on a
thorough examination of the demographic and economic trends in Quebec, the
dominant cleavages within the society, the division of power among diverse cultural
and linguistic groups, and the views of institutions concerning the nation and the
State. The chapter provides a picture of the dominant messages of national and
political socialisation before examining in chapters four and five how such messages
are assimilated and acted upon by residents in Quebec.
DEMOGRAPHY AND ECONOMY: ARE SCOTLAND AND QUEBEC
DIFFERENT?
When seeking to determine whether the two nations distinguish themselves from their
larger states on non-cultural indicators, two aspects require attention: first, the extent
to which the demographic and economic trends in each case point to a markedly
different society, and second, regardless of such trends, whether the nations are
perceived as different. Any gap between perception and observable difference will
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exert an influence over the debate as it allows much room for the assumption of
political stances chosen by politically relevant actors in Quebec. An additional layer
of analysis concerns the unit of examination. Both the case study and its regions
require attention in this section. For example, either case study may exhibit similar
levels of immigration or unemployment to other areas in the wider State, but if the
communities influenced by these characteristics are differentially affected throughout
the nation it will negate the effect of such differences on the political culture. The
high levels of immigration to the city of Montreal or the relatively high unemployment
levels in northern Quebec, while obviously influential over the felt environment of
individuals in those areas, might exert less influence over the political attitudes and
behaviours of individuals across the nation.
Economically and socially Scotland distinguishes itself from the rest of Britain. In
part, this stems from the demands of geography. The very location of the nation, at
the northern end of an island in the North Atlantic, dictates much ofwhat is
economically possible. For Scotland, proximity to the sea, a temperate ifwet climate,
large tracts of sparsely populated land, a small population and relatively low
population density determine much of the function of politics and business (Devine
1988, Flarvie 1992, Payne 1996). By comparison, on most social and economic
measures Quebecers do not distinguish themselves from the Canadian average more
than any other province. Quebec as a distinct society refers to language and culture
rather than such markers as income or life expectancy although nationalist
programmes since in the 1960s have made much of the additional economic progress
that could be made given greater future autonomy. On measures of population
density, income distribution and cosmopolitanism, the cities and towns of Quebec
reflect similar demographic trends to those in other parts of the country. By language
and religion alone, Quebec distinguishes itself. These two measures exert a
considerable influence on the perception of difference in Quebec. A community
bounded from the rest of the country by its official language exists within a sphere of
institutional completeness allowing for greater control over self-definition (Breton
1964). That said, significant economic difference, could become the boundary that a
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nation draws around itself (Gellner 1983, Nairn 1977). In this case, language is the
most obvious difference between Quebec and the rest ofCanada, and as a result,
language forms the backbone of contemporary perceptions of difference. Thus, in the
first instance, Quebec occupies a different position within the Canadian federation
than Scotland within Britain if only because of the linguistic boundary that it can draw
around itself. Measures of difference in Scotland are more subject to the pressures of
time and, when present, appear less obvious. The Scottish health record, for example,
although highlighting a significant deviation from British trends, does not occupy
public imagination the way that drastically different economic or religious
circumstances might (Office ofNational Statistics 1999) .2
As the comparative table in Appendix C demonstrates, on such diverse measures of
economic performance, educational attainment, population density, and life
expectancy, the two nations do not distinguish themselves from Canada and the UK
as a whole. The concord between these figures masks differing approaches and
solutions to similar situations in the nations and the wider states. Evaluations of
crises, and the ways in which they are handled, may produce similar results across
borders, but such differences betray different political attitudes and perceptions of
difference. For example, notwithstanding similar levels of educational attainment, the
Scottish attitude to education is perceived to be different from that in England
Similarly, efforts to decrease the operating deficit in Quebec, while similar in the
intended outcome sought by the Canadian federal government, have highlighted
different priorities and tactics. Thus, even considerable objective similarity should not
be equated with a uniformity and homogeneity of society.
Significant deviations also exist Scotland's multicultural population, at
approximately one percent, is much smaller than the English rate of seven percent.
Glasgow holds the highest rate, at a little over three percent, incomparable to rates of
2 The Scottish death rate is the highest in the United Kingdom, at 1, 184 deaths per 100 000
individuals. The UK rate is 1, 029 (Office of National Statistics 1999). Paradoxically. Scots self rate
their level of health higher than other areas in the UK. When asked whether they would report their
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twenty percent in urban centres such as London and Leeds. By comparison, Quebec's
proportion of immigrants mirrors closely Canadian patterns of immigration. Quebec's
proportion of bilingual residents, however, far outdistances the rest of Canada. In the
1996 census more than one third of Quebecers reported they spoke both of Canada's
two official languages. Although Canada's only officially bilingual province recorded
a similar level of bilingualism, at 29 .5, one tenth of the populations in Ontario, PEI
and Manitoba speak both English and French As previously stated, by language and
religion Quebec distinguishes itself from the rest of Canada. Although in 1991 the
country as a whole reported more Catholics than Protestants (12.3 million compared
to 9.8 million) every province except Quebec and neighbouring New Brunswick
reported a greater number of Protestants. In Canada, Catholics account for 46% of
the population while 86% of the Quebec population is Catholic.
Internal Variation
Social characteristics such as age, gender, educational attainment and social class
exert an influence over political attitudes and behaviour in Scotland and Quebec in
much the same way that such factors affect voting and participation in other western
democracies (Halman and Nevitte 1996). While certain characteristics correlate with
levels of participation, they do not represent the main cleavages within political life.
For some, this lack of attention has masked a serious imbalance of power that has yet
to receive its proper attention (Brown, Breitenbach and Myers 1994, Breitenbach
1993, Yuval Davis 1997). Part of the reason for the low salience of these
characteristics could have something to do with difficulties facing the creation of
communities around gender and age that have not been experienced by those creating
communities around region, religion and linguistic background. A brief examination
of three relevant cleavages within Scotland and Quebec emphasises that the two case
studies should not be considered as monolithic entities. The examination also
highlights that despite the underlying diversity within Scotland and Quebec, the size,
pattern and influence of these differences do not provide mirror images of
state of health as good, fairly good or not so good, 57% of Scots indicated that their health was good,
compared to 55% for Great Britain (Office of National Statistics 1999).
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heterogeneity. The level and pattern of homogeneity within each nation must be
taken into account when determining the relationship between national identity and
political culture.
Regionalism
Scottish political research often stresses the importance of regional variation with
respect to political attitudes and behaviour. The distribution of economic resources
and wealth, from the more prosperous central belt and oil-rich Aberdeen to the
economically-depressed highlands and islands, is linked to geography and the related
factor of economic activity. Residents in the low-density highlands and islands, where
the majority of Scotland's Gaelic speakers reside, are harder hit by increases in petrol
prices than those in the urban south. The Shetland Islands are closer to Norway than
they are to Edinburgh, which remains a £250 flight away3. As a result, perceptions of
difference in Scotland are compounded by the geographic and economic dictates of
regional location. For consistently under-performing areas, economic disparity, when
added to geographical distance, adds to perceptions of dislocation. The relationship
between power and economic performance explains, in part, the rivalry between
Edinburgh and Glasgow, Scotland two largest cities. While the rivalry manifests itself
in the form of popular culture competitions between the two cities, from magazine
reports on which city produces a better quality of life to television commercials
advertising the frequent rail-links between the two cities, economic disparity and the
perception that as the seat ofParliament Edinburgh gets a better deal, point to a more
serious perception of dislocation in Glasgow. In 1998 the city was declared a jobless
blackspot worthy of additional funding under new Labour's New Deal (Scotland
Office 2000) Furthermore, despite the two-week relocation of the Parliament allowing
the Church of Scotland to hold its general assembly in its own building, Glasgow has
not met with great success in its efforts to house elements of the political system
within its borders. The presence of the Royal Museum of Scotland, National Gallery,
National Portrait Gallery, to name a few, reinforces Rosie's argument that part of
1
A flight from Lerwick to Edinburgh costs approximately the same as one from Glasgow to Toronto
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London's financial success lies in the capital's ability to house British institutions that
provide only capital residents with jobs (Rosie 2000)4
Within Quebec, a friendly rivalry between Montreal, Canada's second largest city, and
Quebec City, the provincial capital, occupies much less space in the public debate. As
in Scotland, the smaller, and more eastern city is the capital although the population
statistics for the two Canadian cities are approximately double the size of the Scottish
counterparts. Part of this reason stems from the presence of a multicultural and
multilingual population that distinguishes Montreal from the rest of the province. By
measures of ethnicity, mother tongue and language of use, Montreal's heterogeneity
stands in stark contrast to the provincial capital, let alone other smaller cities within
the province (Statistics Canada 1999). Quebec as a province hosts a visible minority
population comparable in proportion to Manitoba - six and seven percent respectively
That said, the proportion ofMontreal residents who were not born in Canada stands
at twenty percent, approximately half the rate in Toronto, Canada's largest city. Of
the other urban centres in Quebec the proportions of immigrants range from 0 4
percent in Chicoutimi-Jonquiere to 2.1 in Sherbrooke (Statistics Canada 1999).
As in Scotland, economic activity ranges throughout the province. The nationalist
Lac Saint-Jean region, which contains Chicoutimi-Jonquiere, records an
unemployment rate for 1999 of 11.3, while the jobless rate in Trois Rivieres stands at
11.2. Both rates are not only higher than the capital's rate of 8.4 but represent
greater rates of joblessness than St John's, the capital of perennially depressed
Newfoundland. Unemployment rates in Montreal and Sherbrooke fall between these
two poles. The cities of Quebec have five of the seven highest urban unemployment
rates in Canada. As in the case of Scotland, the concentrated population in the
southern portion of the nation, in this case, along the St Lawrence River, affects the
location of industry and employment prospects. Almost 80 percent of the population
'1 The capital also contains the Scottish Agricultural Museum. Scottish Mining Museum, Scottish
Museums Council, and the Scottish Vintage Bus Museum in addition to the Scotland Office, Scottish
Arts Council, Scottish Charities Office, Scottish Higher Education Funding, Scottish Law
Commission and various consulates for foreign countries.
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ofQuebec lives in the fertile St Lawrence Lowlands next to the River. Inaugurated in
1959 the Seaway was considered the main entry point to the North American
continent and links the Atlantic Ocean to the Great Lakes The north of the province
is sparsely populated. The northernmost five federal constituencies, for example,
occupy 1 133 243 km2, representing just over ten percent of the total Canadian land
mass, or almost three quarters of Quebec's territory. Approximately 370 000
individuals live in these five constituencies.5 Thus, an area almost five times larger
than the UK and fifteen times larger than Scotland houses the population of
Edinburgh. The concentration of population, economic and political resources
obviously undermines the perceived national homogeneity in Scotland and Quebec.
Religion
While it would be churlish to compare the sectarian violence in Northern Ireland to
the relationship between Protestants and Catholics in Scotland, the west coast of the
nation has witnessed its share of sectarian difficulties (Bennie, Brand and Mitchell
1997, Devine 1998, Devine 2000). A declining church attendance, credited with
removing much of the doctrinal salience of religion, has not vitiated the often fierce
violence erupting at football games in Glasgow and Edinburgh, where each of the two
local teams represent different religious communities. For the most part, however,
the relationship between religious community and political power has determined
voting behaviour rather than inter-personal friendships. As in Scotland, the
proportion of the population belonging to minority communities is concentrated
within Quebec. That almost 90% of the population is Catholic at once exacerbates
the perception ofminority status but minimises the potential for inter-community
conflict given the disproportion size of one vis-a-vis the rest. That said, anti-semitism
experienced by the province's Jewish population in the first half of the twentieth
century points to the link between religious belief and access to political power. Both
anglophones and francophones expressed intolerant views although it is worth noting
that neither fascism nor racial intolerance should be considered to have been dominant
The five constituencies are Abilibi. Charclcvoix, Jonquiere, Manicougan and Roberval
1 14
Ailsa Henderson, PhD Thesis, Chapter 3
and majority views outside certain circles (Chartrand 1997). That said, the existence
of public examples has received continued attention in academic and journalistic
works (Richler 1991). The oft-quoted Abbe Groulx is recorded as stating "il est
impossible de piler, an Allemagne, sur la queue de cette chienne de juiverie, sans
qu'on entende japper au Canada" (Chartrand 1997). The position of Abbe Lionel
Groulx in Quebec society tends to polarise the active religious organisations if not
their members. The campaign by B'nai Brith to remove the name of a man who
openly advocated intolerance, has met with frustration, not least from former Quebec
Liberal leader and Devoir editor Claude Ryan. The nationalist newspaper Le Devoir,
never with a circulation much above 17 000 in the period before WWII provided in
the 1930s and 40s additional examples of anti-semitism (Chartrand 1997). Anti-
semitism within Quebec manifested itself in the early part of the twentieth century as
an opposition to immigration Within the anglophone community, McGill university,
founded in 1821 from the estate of Scottish merchant James McGill, enforced quotas
for Jewish students until the end ofWorld War II (Frost 1984).6 More recently, the
Muslim population, again concentrated in Montreal, has encountered difficulties with
cultural intolerance. Young Muslim girls, for example, have been prevented, on
occasion, from wearing the hijab in school. Thus, while the much greater
homogeneity of religious belief in Quebec mitigates the potential size of any religious
minority, thus minimising potential inter-community conflict, evidence of religious
intolerance, permitted both by the State and by citizens, highlights the significance of
religion as a relevant political cleavage.
Language
In Quebec, the dominance of anglophone merchants within Montreal established an
artificial boundary not only between the city and the rest of the province, but also
physically divided the city. The relationship between the anglophone and francophone
communities in Quebec has received extensive treatment from both anglophone and
6 The Faculty of Arts atMcGill set higher entry standards for Jewish students - 750 instead of 600 on
the entrance requirements, while the Faculties of Law and of Medicine employed quota systems
(Frost 1984).
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francophone academics (Caldwell and Waddell 1982, Legault 1992, Scowen 1991).
The particular reaction of the anglophone community to calls for constitutional
change receives greater treatment in chapters four and five.
Unlike the status of French in Quebec, Gaelic is not an official language in Scotland.
Equivalent to approximately one percent of the population, Scotland's Gaelic
speakers are concentrated on the nation's north-west coast. By comparison, almost
one quarter of the Welsh population speaks Welsh. In addition, the status of Scots
within the English-speaking political system remains a contested issue.
Notwithstanding the cultural contributions of Scots authors, poets and song writers,
the language or dialect shows few signs of gaining official status in the Parliament. A
Spring 2000 Gaelic debate in the Scottish Parliament highlights the efforts of the
newly-elected politicians to embrace the Gaelic community although the small
proportion ofMSPs who could actually participate in the debate underlines the
difficulties that the community faces.7 Scotland lacks the spectrum of inter¬
community antagonism among the linguistic groups in Quebec, in part because of size,
and in part because language has not been considered an important element of
national identity in Scotland.
As this section has emphasised, national boundaries often imply an air of
comparability that is not always present. In both Scotland and Quebec nationalists
and separatists perceive themselves to be cut-off from meaningful influence despite
the proximity of some of their Members of Parliament to positions of power and
authority. This sense of political impoverishment coupled with occasional measures
of slower-than-average economic growth, creates a powerful perception of difference
among sections of the population. In the case of internal diversity and demographic
similarity, it is the sociological importance of the distinction that guarantees its
salience and influence.
Additional research examines the links between regional accents and perceptions of inferiority in
Scotland (Miller 1996).
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POLITICAL CULTURE IN SCOTLAND AND QUEBEC
The development of a Western and liberal political culture8 provides the context for
the Scottish and Quebec debates. Whatever differences do exist with the rest of the
United Kingdom and Canada, the diverse regions of both States possess similar
democratic structures, elect governments on the backs of similar turnout levels, view
politicians, judges, journalists, teachers and other authorities with similar levels of
trust and cynicism (Gwyn 1995). The argument that either Scotland or Quebec
operates within a significantly different political culture must take note that at best,
the difference, while still significant, is one of nuance within a relatively homogenous
debate. Both the size of the difference, and the underlying pattern of difference,
receive treatment in this section. Despite the varying reactions to new-right policies,
or attempts to preserve programmes linked to the post-war social democratic Welfare
State, the room to manoeuvre within the Occidental political culture is not significant.
As Gwyn notes "The British electorate is no better informed, more interested in
politics, or more politically active than most other Western democratic electorates"
(Gwyn 1995). Cross-national studies performed by academics in a variety of
locations produce surprisingly similar results (Inglehart 1977; Inglehart 1990, Nevitte
1996; Halman and Nevitte 1996; Nevitte and Gibbins 1990). Whatever gap existed
among first-world Western nations when Almond and Verba began the fieldwork for
The Civic Culture has been closed by years of unprecedented economic and political
security, an increasingly powerful global communications network, international trade
and political alliances.
Regional differences between Scotland and the rest of Britain are tied to the unitary
parliamentary institutions that have governed politics since the union in 1707. The
Scottish Grand Committee, Scottish Question Time and Scottish Affairs Select
Committee all sought to allow for the expression and debate of a distinctly Scottish
voice within the Westminster system. For English MPs, the standing committee on
8 For the purposes of chapters three and four, political culture refers to subjective orientations to the
political system, both as it affects interaction with the Slate and interaction among citizens.
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regional affairs established under standing order 117 created the same opportunity
although the committee has not been standing since 1978. Despite the presence of a
different local government structure, a Secretary of State to orchestrate matters of
administrative devolution and adapted elements within the Westminster system,
politics in Scotland operated in a similar sphere and manner to other areas in Britain.
A unified civil service served the Scottish Office and Whitehall as one bureaucracy,
further emphasising the links between the Scottish political system and Westminster
(Kellas 1989). Those who argue that a distinctly Scottish system existed before
devolution point to the existence of the adapted parliamentary venues, the separate
Scottish conferences for political parties and, perhaps most importantly, the political
debate the occurred within civil society. Influenced as it was by the surviving
institutions and the 'Scottish values' of both civil society and the public, Scottish
political debate took on a different timbre to that in England. Furthermore, the
relative autonomy of the civil service and indeed local government allowed for the
implementation of distinctly Scottish policies that were not followed south of the
border. As a result, although the uniformity of institutions may have served to focus
public perceptions of trust, efficacy and satisfaction on the behaviour of elected
representatives in London, and although Scottish politicians operated within a unified
British system, Scottish political debate prior to 1999 discussed different issues and
proposed different solutions to that in the rest of the UK.9 Faced with this
combination of separate institutions and unified activity research on Scottish political
culture has sought to determine whether the similarities lead to a homogeneous
political culture within Britain, or whether the consistent efforts to adapt the system
to the Scottish situation have created a distinct political culture in Scotland (KeUas
1989, MacCormick 1998).
9 Since 1999, the existence of a Scottish Parliament has created a distinctly Scottish political system,
operating under different democratic rules and discussing different political issues from Westminster.
Because the data on Scottish political culture deals with the period before 1999, it is essential to
understand how the system then operated, in order to properly examine the research.
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Scottish Political Culture
Within early works, Scottish political culture received little attention perhaps only
because the unit of analysis was always Great Britain (Almond and Verba 1963,
Almond and Verba 1989, Hill 1990, Kavanagh 1972, Kavanagh 1989).10 In part, this
is because some of the statistical data used to measure such attitudes was only
available in aggregate Nation State form, a fact which eases the comparability
between States but does little to aid an understanding of the micro processes at work.
This approach to data collection remains today in such collections as The
Eurobarometer polls, World Values studies and ISSP data, all of which rely on data
measured at the State level, while over-sampling slightly for the regions. In the 1995
ISSP survey on national identity this meant that 96 cases were from Scotland, out of
the almost 1000 used for Great Britain. Of the available British-wide data more
attention has been placed on urban/rural divisions, the influence on social class,
religion and age than on national or regional variations. That this diminishes the
attention to whatever distinctions do and do not exist is usually justified by a) the
small Scottish population within Great Britain as a whole and b) the negligible
distinction between Scottish (as a whole) and British (as a whole) political culture.
Three themes, and one key question, dominate political culture research on Scotland.
Firstly, from the 1960s to the late 1980s, analyses of political attitudes and behaviour
in the Britain attempted to respond to the vision of English political culture promoted
in Almond and Verba's The Civic Culture. A second theme tracks value change in
Britain, particularly the rise of post-materialism at the expense of materialist values.
The third emphasis highlights divisions within British political culture while the fourth
source of debate juxtaposes alternative explanations for Scottish distinctiveness,
emphasising the various influences of economic productivity, institutions and identity
over Scottish political attitudes. An analysis of recent statistics from the 1992 and
1997 election studies and recent opinion poll data supplements the examination of
each debate in turn. The works and data examined below concentrate on traditional
10 Other efforts to examine political culture in Britain restricted themselves to analyses of England
(McKenzie and Silver 1967, Rose 1965).
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measures of political culture such as trust and efficacy, and more recent measures of
post-materialism. If subjective orientations of individuals can be directed at the State
- its structures, policy outputs, symbols - or at fellow citizens, the following section
concentrates on the State-oriented attitudes of citizens in Scotland and the rest of
Britain. In an effort to highlight perceptions of political influence, integration and
inclusion, the section emphasises the changing nature of political and personal trust,
efficacy, satisfaction and confidence. Examinations of voting and referendum
preferences, as influenced by socio-economic characteristics of individuals, policy
preferences and rational choice theories receive attention in chapters four and five.
The relative stability of political attitudes, in the face of changing voter preferences,
(Denver 1994, Rose and McAllister 1990) suggests that such a strategy would be
worthwhile. As such, this chapter limits its examination to attitudes concerning the
State and its institutions within the Britain and Scotland. The following section
excludes policy preferences, support for social democracy or nationalist options in an
attempt to allow for a clear comparison with Quebec.
Several analyses of political culture in Britain have cited working class deference,
homogeneity, and capitalism as central tenets of British political attitudes (Almond
and Verba 1963, Rose 1965). For Rose, the presence of a national identity that
preceded industrialisation bound a public that divided itself solely according to class
(Rose 1965). Thirty years later Eatwell argued the overlapping influences ofAnglo-
Saxon invaders, Norman conquest and the Industrial Revolution have created a
culture characterised by its spirit of 'gentlemanly capitalism' (Eatwell 1997). Hill
concurs in part, arguing that, whether 'gentlemanly' or not, the capitalist system has
dominated British political culture, emphasising the accumulationist tendencies and
individualism in which Thatcherism flourished (Hill 1990). In the first quantitative
examination of political attitudes in Britain, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba
emphasised the ideal-type blend of political deference and activism that existed in
England. With little attention to the possible regional variations within British
political culture, Almond and Verba's original assessment of a homogeneous culture
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typified by its uniform support for authority has formed the basis of future attitude
research (Almond and Verba 1963)
Responses to The Civic Culture were plagued, initially, by a lack of survey data on
British political attitudes. Until the creation of the annual British Social Attitudes
Survey in 1983, political culture research depended on private data collection carried
out by individual academics. Thus, after 1959, when Almond and Verba began their
work, no new data covered similar ground until Alan Marsh's study more than ten
years later (Marsh 1977). Although not directly criticising Almond and Verba for the
conclusions reached in their work, Marsh notes that "[pjolitical trust is at a much
lower ebb than would seem healthy from Almond and Verba's view at least, for a
democratic society" (Marsh 1977), effectively questioning the claim that Britain
closely approximated an ideal-type political culture. Further works suggested
Almond and Verba overestimated the deferential nature of the British population
(Kavanagh 1972, 1980, Topf and Heath 1987, Jowell and Topf 1989; Parry, Moyser
and Day 1992, McKenzie and Silver 1967, Gwyn 1995, Miller, Timpson and Lessnoff
1996). Researchers appear divided on the rate of value change concerning deference.
For some, Britain has always been a less deferential society than Almond and Verba
suggested, (Topf 1989, Heath and Topf 1987, Kavanagh 1980) while for others, the
existing level of deference could merely be the result of changing attitudes to
government (Marsh 1977, Beer 1982). Of the studies noting an absence of deference
and efficacy, most works associated the decline with current decreasing political
satisfaction. Kavanagh and Beer both claimed that the decreased levels of deference
compromised confidence in the system (Kavanagh 1980) thus increasing the
likelihood of a system breakdown (Beer 1982). Gwyn agrees that British levels of
deference appear lower than originally estimated, but adds that this poses no threat to
the stability of the British political system. British levels of deference, confidence,
satisfaction and efficacy approximate European levels, suggesting that realism, rather
than political cynicism, characterises the British electorate (Gwyn 1995).
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The following tables track the changing support for governments and representatives
after Almond and Verba's first study to the recent British Election Study in 1997.
Including data from Marsh's Political Action study, the table includes data from
various years of on-going attitude surveys. Begun in 1983, the British Social
Attitudes tracks the policy preferences and views of the State among the British
electorate. Sample sizes of approximately 3,600 respondents allow for an analysis of
political attitudes according to socio-economic data. Scottish respondents form
approximately ten percent of the overall sample. In comparison, the British Election
Survey began in 1974 and contains a sample size of approximately 5000. Separate
Scottish data, which will be examined later, was collected in 1974, 1979, 1992 and
1997. Fieldwork for both surveys is currently performed by Social and Community
Planning Research in London, now renamed the National Centre for Policy Research.
The Centre for Research into Elections and Social Trends also participates in the
collection of election survey data








People like me have no say in what government
does
Politics and government so complicated that
cannot understand what is going on
MPs lose touch with the people quickly
Parties only interested in votes, not opinions
British government of any party cannot be
trusted to place needs of country above interests

















Sources include Marsh 1977, BSA 1986, BSA 1991, BES 1992, BSA 1994
The statistics show a slight decrease in efficacy and government confidence. Most
strikingly, however, analyses of these numbers illustrate a decreased trust in the
British government regardless of party. An additional example highlights this trend.
A comparison of opinion polls appearing in The Independent points to the low regard
with which individuals now view politicians. In 1973, when respondents were asked
whether they felt "politicians are in politics for what they can get out of it" less than
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half, 39%, agreed. In 1996 the proportion agreeing had risen to two thirds
{Independent 1996).
A related issue concerns the view of public institutions within society. Senses of
confidence, satisfaction and social trust are bound up in attitudes concerning the
functioning of institutions such as schools and hospitals and performance reviews of
elites like the police. Given that most individuals do not possess a drastically different
value set for both social and political activities, a brief analysis of perceptions of
institutional confidence highlights several preferences within British political culture
(Curtice and Jowell 1995).
Table 3.2 Confidence in British Public Institutions
%Think are well run:
1983 1987 1994 % change
'83-'94
Universities N/a 65 73 +8*
Police 72 66 67 -5
Banks 85 91 63 -22
BBC 67 69 62 -5
Manufacturing 40 48 59 +19
State Schools N/a 30 52 +22*
Civil Service 40 46 48 +8
Unions 27 24 48 +21
Press 49 39 47 -2
Local Government 33 29 39 +6
NHS 49 35 33 -16
* change from 1987 to 1994 Source: Curtice and Jowell 1995
The table shows that despite decreased confidence in politicians, political parties and
the political system, individuals possess stable measures of confidence in their social
institutions. Over a ten year period, public confidence in several institutions
increased. Whether the table would have captured increased variance in attitudes if
data was gathered over different governments is unknown. Furthermore, whether the
perceptions of individuals are affected by understandings of the relationship between
the running of, for example, the NHS or BBC and the government, remains beyond
the remit of this study For now, the table highlights that declining confidence and
satisfaction does not apply to all social institutions, but in Britain as a whole, is
reserved for the political system
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Not surprisingly, the increase in cynicism and declining trust in government so
characteristic throughout Western democracies, has asserted itself within Scotland. In
his analysis of opinion polls for Scottish Affairs, McCrone notes that significant
proportions of the electorate believe the standards of public institutions have fallen.
While obviously tracking different elements, public views of institutions, whether
expressing confidence or dissatisfaction, tap similar elements of dissatisfaction. The
monarchy, government and legal system each receive low marks while significant
proportions also believe that moral standards throughout the country, and particularly
for young people, have deteriorated (82% and 83% respectively) (McCrone 1993)11
The trend does not vary significantly from year to year. In 1994, nine out of ten
voters expressed dissatisfaction with the government and almost eight out of ten felt
politicians should observe higher standards of behaviour. The media did not escape
disapproval, as fully 72% expressed dissatisfaction with media interference in the
private lives of politicians. That said, over half the electorate felt politicians should be
dismissed if they have extra-marital affairs (McCrone 1994). The time scale of the
studies analysed by McCrone and presented in Table 3 .3 suggest that it would be
unwise to compare them too closely, the apparently incompatibility between the
general increase in satisfaction among British citizens and the decreased satisfaction in
social institutions in Scotland warrants further attention. Although beyond the remit
of the dissertation, it would be interesting to determine whether the voting patterns of
the Scots so distanced the electorate from the political system that perceptions of
social institutions were affected as a result.
In both Scotland and Britain as a whole, researchers have sought to account for these
political attitudes by correlating preferences with social characteristics such as
partisan support, religion, social class, level of education and home region. The oft-
quoted link between education and political competence, once a staple of political
"Eighty-five percent believe the standards of monarchy have fallen while 76% and 65% express
similar opinions of government and the legal system. The trend is similar across all partisan and
social groups although Conservative supporters express a tendency to defend their government. That
said, even 60% of Conservatives feel the moral standards of government have fallen in last 10 years,
a decade marked by Conservative rule.
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culture studies, has been questioned by Kavanagh (Kavanagh 1989). Likewise, the
importance of social class no longer exerts a powerful influence over political
sympathies. Rather, the subjective perception of class, rather than the objective
markers of class such as income or occupation, exerts a greater role over political
attitudes (Brown, McCrone, Paterson and Surridge 1999). The reasons for the
changing influence of social characteristics receive greater attention in the following
section, which tracks the changing nature of British political attitudes in the post-war
period.
The second theme dominating British political culture research involves the context-
dependent work achieved by Ron Inglehart preceding his 1977 book The Silent
Revolution. As previously stated, Inglehart's thesis linked levels of unprecedented
economic and political stability with an increasingly post-materialist approach to
politics in the West. The second wave of political culture research emphasises the
nature and rate of value change in Britain, with particular emphasis on the differing
levels ofmaterialists and post-materialists.
In their 1987 examination of British political culture Anthony Heath and Richard Topf
examine the series of social changes linking Britain to a Western trend of upward
mobility, increased educational attainment and rising affluence previously cited in
academic literature (Inglehart 1977, Heath and Topf 1987). The authors support the
conclusions reached by Marsh (1977) and Beer (1982) that the British electorate
exhibits patterns of declining political deference, but then, as others have argued, trust
and efficacy levels were never particularly high. The authors do not distinguish
between attitudes to politicians, now marked by an insistent cynicism, and attitudes to
the political system According to their own measures of political behaviour, distrust
in politicians has not acted as a bar to political action. This suggests that although
deference is in decline, confidence levels in the system remain relatively unchanged
In a second layer of analysis, Heath and Topf claim that the social changes
experienced in Britain have increased personal levels of self-confidence and
destabilised traditional patterns of partisan alignment Rising confidence levels, and a
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corollary increase in the demands placed on governments co-exist with a shift in
preferences from material to quality of life issues. Thus, as expectations of
government performance rise, the markers by which government success is measured
shift away from traditional indicators such as job creation and unemployment. The
inability of governments to meet the moving target of demands could explain the
defection of former political activists to alternative forms of political participation.
The conclusions reached by Heath and Topf pose a familiar problem for political
culture analysis. In their work, a false distinction presents itself between political
culture and political behaviour for participation in the political sphere is used
throughout the chapter as a proxy for the stability of political culture. Heath and Topf
claim that "political culture has undergone a transformation similar to that which we
have seen in political behaviour". Throughout, measures of political behaviour are
used to highlight changes in political culture, the two are used interchangeably. As a
result, the observed transformation of political culture does not mirror the change in
political behaviour, but rather, is measured by it.12
In their analysis of the 1992 British Rights Survey, Miller, Timpson and Lessnoff
adapt Ingelehart's 13-point post-materialism scale (Miller, Timpson and Lessnoff
1996).13 Ranging from questions dealing with traditional, or materialist
preoccupations with law, order and stability to questions probing more ephemeral
preferences such as self-actualisation and the physical environment the Inglehart scale
seeks to classify populations as either materialist or post-materialist. The British
Rights Survey, however, concentrates on public support for tolerance and intolerance
of different behaviours and the provision of entrenched protection for collective
groups. The questionnaire also covers traditional measures of political culture such as
trust and efficacy. Based on approximately 2 000 interviews with the electorate and
I
Factor analysis, or principal axis components analysis, poses several challenges to the researcher,
Notwithstanding the importance of gauging inter-relationships among variables, the empirical data
neither replaces solid theory, nor allows for the data collection process, both of which could affect the
results (Davis and Dale 1994, Kritzer 1996, Schmidt and Hunter 1995).
II
According to the scale, support for more say on the job, a less impersonal society, more say in the
government, having ideas county, freedom of speech and support for more beautiful cities count as
post-materialist values. Materialist values include support for strong defence forces, government
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1000 interviews with politicians, the study attempts to determine whether regions or
collective groups within Britain possess coherent political cultures.




respect for authority 8.2 8.2
law and order 8.6 8.8
defence 6.7 6.6
free speech 9.2 9.2
tolerating different lifestyles and 7.2 7.4
beliefs
traditional ideas of right and wrong 8.0 8.1
following God's will 5.7 5.9
ethnic protection 7.3 7.8
gender equality 8.2 8.5
homosexual equality 6.0 6.0
help for the disabled 9.3 9.5
reducing unemployment 8.9 9.3
taking care of the needy 8.7 8.9
self-reliance 7.9 7.6
individual achievements 7.0 6.9
holding down inflation 8.2 8.1
cutting taxes 6.5 7.0
achieving economic growth 8.4 8.5
Rights protected by...
back-bench MPs 5.7 5.4




trade unions 6.0 6.3
churches 5.8 6.2
British courts 6.5 6.5
European courts 6.3 6.4
Miller, Timpson and Lessnoff 1996, Sample size= 2,066
Although the results highlight the congruity between the British and Scottish
electorates on all measures of tolerance, they also reveal a contradictory web of
attitudes among the British electorate. Relatively strong support for tolerating
different lifestyles and beliefs co-exist with strong support for traditional ideas of right
and wrong. The British electorate appears sympathetic to the needs of the disabled.
commitment to fighting rising prices, a stable economy, the fight against crime, economic growth
and maintenance of order (Inglehart 1990)
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unemployed and the needy. In both Scotland and the rest of Britain, there appears
little confidence in the ability of public institutions to protect the rights of individuals.
The dynamics of value change, or in the case of singular studies, the particular
conditions that led to current value compositions remains a key element of analysis.
If, as Inglehart suggests, economic and social prosperity account for a greater level of
post-materialism, the uneven distribution ofwealth throughout Britain warrants close
attention. For while some studies have reinforced the homogenous view of the British
electorate, others have sought to emphasise the existence of distinct and coherent
value clusters within Britain. Thus, a third theme in British political culture seeks to
uncover regional or national differences within patterns of political attitudes. Works
addressing Scottish political culture have, in the main, emphasised the similarities in
political attitudes across Great Britain and argued that if any difference exists it is a)
small and b) a result of socio-economic factors. The third theme within the literature
emphasises the generally uniform distribution of values and attitudes throughout Great
Britain.
Dependent on much larger sample sizes than previously gathered, the comparative
analysis of variant political cultures in Britain began with the onset of the British
Social Attitudes Survey in 1983. The British Social Attitudes Survey, in addition to
Election Surveys and the individual research projects of academics throughout
Britain, have extended the original analysis of British political culture received in
Almond and Verba's 1963 The Civic Culture. Originally praised as a propitious
combination of deferential efficacy and democratic participation, political culture in
Britain has undergone an apparently global transformation characterised by declining
levels of trust, efficacy, satisfaction, confidence and deference.14 Attention to Scottish
political attitudes, the extent to which they differ from the norm and the way in which
they do so, is limited to a single chapter in five of the sixteen annual reports thus
produced. A survey of each of these chapters highlights the general similarity in
political and social attitudes across Britain and demonstrates that Scottish deviation,
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albeit to a limited degree, has consistently pointed to greater support for State-led
social policy. In a series of chapters for the annual British Social Attitudes Survey,
John Curtice tracks the differences between the North and South of Britain. While
these geographical divisions do not correlate with national borders, Curtice argues
that socio-economic conditions in the North ofBritain serve to reinforce whatever
institutional factors might create a distinct Scottish culture.
In his first article examining political attitudes throughout Great Britain, Curtice
emphasises the uneven distribution of partisan support on the mainland (Curtice
1988). The use of voting statistics to measure political culture would likely be
considered an affront to those who claim political attitudes and political behaviours
are subject to different influences. Nevertheless, Curtice claims proof of different
attitude constructs can be found in the diverse voting habits in north and south
Britain. Labour's success in the Northeast of England and in Scotland can be traced
to similar regional variations in economic performance. Curtice claims alternative
explanations of partisan preference, in particular support for a neighbourhood effect
influenced by daily social interaction, prove less useful that its proponents suggest
(Books and Prysby 1991). In particular, Curtice claims that neighbourhoods are often
chosen as sites of residence on the basis of pre-existing attitudes that exert an equal
influence on partisan support He also notes that the differences in economic
optimism survive attempts to control for regional variations in economic prosperity.
For Curtice, the congruity of views with regard to services provided by the State
disappears with the introduction of orientations to market forces. Although those in
the North and South of the country tend to hold similar views of education and health,
differing economic circumstances tend to polarise views of economic expectations.
As in Curtice's 1992 article, most of the indicators included in the analysis deal with
economic expectations and perceptions of economic reality for survey participants.
By measures of unemployment and average income, Scotland is quite different from
England. That said, examinations of national difference disguise the regional
14 A separate survey has been dedicated to the analysis of political attitudes in Northern Ireland since
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variations within England. A prosperous South-East tends to over-emphasise the
economic divergence between the North and South of Britain. Despite these regional,
rather than national, differences, Curtice's analysis seeks to solve this problem by
relying on north and south rather than Scotland and England as units of analysis. By
attempting to compare the economic attitudes of two regions whose primary
difference is one of economic activity, Curtice runs the risk of overemphasising the
lack of coherence within British political culture. In general, the 1992 article paints a
picture of increasing pessimism within the British electorate. Unfortunately, the lack
of attention to such measures as civic interaction, trust, efficacy, satisfaction and
confidence suggests that the article does not provide an accurate measure of political
culture as such but rather chronicles the varied orientations to the economic policy
followed by the government and the extent to which different populations are willing
to tolerate State intrusion in their lives
The most recent analysis of political culture provides a more comprehensive
examination of political orientations within Britain (Curtice and Jowell, 1995). In
particular, the chapter seeks to prove how declining efficacy matters. The authors
link decreased deference and the current government's agenda for constitutional
change. Thus, calls from some organisations such as Charter 88 for a Bill of Rights,
the introduction of various forms of proportional representation and reform of the
House of Lords find their roots in changing levels of public deference. The authors
distinguish between personal and political efficacy so that their examination is not in
direct conflict with conclusions reached by Parry in his 1992 examination of political
participation in Britain (Parry 1992) Although Parry linked low personal efficacy with
unconventional political activity, Curtice and Jowell emphasise the decreased political
efficacy encourages a will to reform the existing system rather than prompting more
radical solutions. Other research has relied on the diverse sources of quantitative data
from which to examine political culture.
1989.
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In his analysis of the 1992 British Rights Study, Malcolm Dickson identified a
significant difference between the attitudes of Scottish and English on eleven out of
eighteen items included in his study (Dickson, 1996). Relying on the same survey
data as Miller, Timpson and Lessnoff (Miller, Timpson and Lessnoff 1996), Dickson
argues Scottish voters hold consistently different policy preferences. The indicators
used by Dickson, chosen as representatives of policy and partisan preferences, were
intended to highlight the existence of a Scottish dimension to politics, media, sports,
arts and civil society. Noting that "the degree of similarity outweighs any small
empirical difference" he identified greater Scottish support (with a 99% confidence
interval) reducing unemployment, providing help for the disabled, protecting ethnic
minorities, strengthening law and order, taking care of the needy, and consistently, a
smaller support for self-reliance. Most measures seem to indicate a greater
willingness among Scottish residents for a pro-active and implicated State . The
heightened belief in governmental responsibility could be linked to a greater sense of
cohesion fostered by a strong civil society, or a reaction to years of perceived
democratic neglect on the part of Westminster. The study excludes measures of
political behaviour from its analysis and presents little explanation for the different
political min-dset in Scotland. The greater willingness to accept state activity does
seem to provide proof that Prime Minister Thatcher's programme of limited
government was anathema to the Scottish political culture. This willingness has
signification implications for the newly established Scottish Parliament. In particular,
the belief that the political system must take a more pro-active role in the social
welfare of the population adds to the expectations surrounding an institution whose
very establishment is already imbued with the correction of past injustices.
Lastly, the issue of variant cultures receives two different treatments at the hands of
Scottish political academics. While a clear division of works into one of two camps
remains impossible, the tendency of works to emphasise cultural and institutional
factors versus economic and structural (ie centre-periphery) factors provides a useful
tool of analysis with which to examine research on Scottish political culture. Here,
one must distinguish between the relative importance of cultural or economic factors
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over the acquisition of political attitudes as can be determined by an analysis of
available statistical data, and the perceptions, held by the population, as to the degree
of influence of one over the other (Blondel 1999). In other words, just because
religious activity does not influence political attitudes does not mean that a separate
Church of Scotland has not reinforced a sense of difference in Scotland. The popular
conception that cultural factors distinguish Scotland from England, even in the face of
economic and statistical evidence to the contrary, matters little in the game of political
capital played by separatist and unionist nationalists.
Those firm believers in the influence of Scottish civil society, its distinct institutions as
protected following the Acts ofUnion, have had two recourses: to lament the lack of
available data and to correct it; or to claim that a level of distinctness such as that
which distinguishes the Scots and the English could never be measured in the first
place. Malcolm Dickson's recent efforts to highlight the varying influence of
institutions and particular socio-economic circumstance is an apt example of the first
while Politics andSociety in Scotland, by Alice Brown, David McCrone and Lindsay
Paterson, is an example of the second. Brown et al argue, for example that people do
not list nationalism and self-determination as important to them and prefer to mention
education and health only because their views of independence and self-determination
are already bound up in their views of education and health. Thus, despite what one
might say, individuals really do find independence and self-determination important to
their daily lives. The difference could be characterised as one of data-driven versus
theory-driven analyses of Scottish political culture.
In The Scottish Electorate, Brown, McCrone, Paterson and Surridge outlined three
possible explanations for voting behaviour in Scotland: rational choice, national
identity and welfare rationality (Brown, McCrone, Paterson and Surridge 1999). In
other words, the personal economic motivations of individuals, their sense of
attachment to the nation or Scottishness, or desired social benefits could each be
responsible for structuring political behaviour in Scotland. The Church of Scotland
and a distinct education system, for example, could create a democratic intellect and
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egalitarian spirit in Scottish society. Despite the minimal effect on partisan preference
and preferred constitutional option, political attitudes show little correlation with
identity. For Glasgow academic James Kellas, despite the importance of these
institutions, identity is seen as a poor predictor of both attitudes and partisan
preference (Kellas 1989). For their part, Brown, McCrone, Paterson and Surridge
argue for a welfare rationality, that in their support for a Scottish Parliament voters
were motivated by the potential benefits to society as a whole (Brown, McCrone,
Paterson and Surridge 1999).
Practitioners of rational choice theories, however, have expended much energy
debunking the idea that socialism and egalitarianism in Scotland stem from institutions
within society. Dickson claims any difference stems from socio-economic
particularities of the region, rather than from identity. Scots are not inherently more
socialist, but rather vote according to their needs. The structure of society, with its
higher dependence on public sector employment, council housing and heavy industry,
creates needs that were traditionally met by the (Old) Labour party (Dickson 1994,
Dickson 1996). Similarly, Curtice argues that the few differences between Scotland
and England can account for a regionalism that has been increasingly salient since
1955. The North-South divide is exacerbated by rising employment and a resultant
pessimism in economic periphery ofBritain, although Curtice points out that the a
psychological divide influences attitudes as much as economic circumstance (Curtice
1988, Curtice 1992, Curtice 1996).15
Works examining political culture in Scotland concentrate on two key issues: the
relative difference between Scottish and English political attitudes, and the effect of
identity on certain attitudes. The treatment of these two themes can be divided into
three key camps: early examinations of civic culture in Scotland, Edinburgh-based
examinations and Strathclyde - British Social Attitudes works. Such a division is
possible because of the small number of academics working in the area and the
tendency of teams of individuals to collaborate on numerous projects.
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All sources agree that identity does not possess unlimited explanatory power in the
construction of values, attitudes and behaviour in Scotland, Research by Kavanagh
and Miller continues in The Civic Culture tradition by highlighting the deferential
nature of the general public (Kavanagh 1972, Kavanagh 1989, Miller, Timpson and
Lessnoff 1996). Working-class Toryism is examined much in the way that Canadian
works have sought to explain the existence of Red Tories in Canadian political
culture. These British-wide examinations form the backdrop against Scottish visions
of political culture.
Sociological examinations of political culture in Scotland have been limited to
overviews of the distribution of values and attitudes in Great Britain and more recent
statistical examinations of survey data. Previously, institutional analyses formed the
bedrock of Scottish political culture research (Kellas 1989). One of the distinguishing
characteristics of the Scottish system is the existence of four main political parties.
The grafting of a social democratic spectrum onto a spectrum of political autonomy
ensures that parties that hold consistent views on one spectrum act as a broad church
for the other spectrum. For example, the Scottish National Party is relatively
consistent in its support for independence, despite recent public disputes about the
best way to attain greater political autonomy. This level of coherence on the national
spectrum co-exists with a range of views within the party along a more traditional
left-right spectrum. The roots of this division may be traced to the creation of the
Scottish National Party in 1934 as an amalgam of nationalists from the left-wing
independence movement. Similarly, Scottish Labour is relatively consistent in its
social-democratic views, although the introduction ofNew Labour may detract from
the former coherence. Despite a unity of purpose with respect to social policy, the
party contains within its ranks members who hold a diverse array of opinions on the
nationalist question ranging from unrepentant unionism to independence within
Europe Only the Conservative party remains internally consistent in its support for
centre-right policies and a preference for unionism. This is not to say that the
Curtice's analysis sits easily with interpretations of nationalism which emphasise the role of
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Conservative party, or indeed any of the four main parties operating within Scotland
have held unchanging and consistent views towards the constitutional position of
Scotland. The differing views of parties with regards to left-right politics and
nationalism extend to views of the State. The influence of identity groups on views of
parties appears in the statistical tables in chapter five.
If, according to original institutional analyses, the measure of Scottish distinctiveness
was the separateness of its political parties, tables highlighting the relative congruity
among party views present a mixed blessing. The absence of a striking difference
between the views of the SNP, which lacks a sister party in England, and the three
other British parties would suggest that Scottish politics holds little claim to
distinguishing characteristics. On the other hand, a unity of views among party
activists in Scotland could signal a coherence and different value set. This would be
true were it not for the similar views among voters in the rest of Britain.
According to Pye and Verba, one of the major determinants of a sense of identity is
historical (Pye and Verba 1965), namely, the way in which history has infused a
people with a sense of common experience and sense of self. For Eatwell, diverse
references to King Arthur and Boadicea, Robin Hood and the Dunkirk spirit, have
coloured British political culture. The absence of such references in Scotland, in
addition to the symbolic difference of national flags, patron saints, bank notes, sports
teams, churches and governmental institutions reinforces a view of separateness in
Scotland that filters through to political culture (Eatwell 1997). In the face ofmuch
evidence to the contrary, Scottish political culture is seen as distinct both because it is
bounded by a sense of history and a set of contemporary institutions that ensure
Scottish political debate occurs in a different forum that the wider British debate. The
parameters of British political culture and identity, liberalism, democracy, presence in
Europe, co-exist with the perception of distinct Scottish political life The
psychological borders erected before devolution have ensured that the population sees
itself as interacting within a distinct political culture
uneven development and internal colonialism. (Hechter 1975. Nairn 1977, Gellner 1964).
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Quebecois Political Culture
Political culture in Quebec depends in part on the cultural factors that distinguish the
province from the rest of the country and in part on the institutions that structure
political life in Quebec. The social context of the province, predominantly French,
predominantly Catholic and, until recently, predominantly working class, has provided
points of difference according to which political parties have defined themselves. The
relative homogeneity of Quebec masks the formation of collective groups aligned with
reinforcing markers of difference. Although current literature de-emphasises the
influence of these divisions on daily social life, the political debates created by
compounding cleavages still exert an influence over political attitudes, political
behaviour and partisan preference. Thus, the relatively small Protestant community
currently differs on the basis of language and, until recently, social class. The more
noticeable presence of a small wealthy, English Protestant community in a working-
class, French, Catholic society had significant ramifications for partisan strategy and
voting behaviour. This cleavage in society, however, should not be confused with the
presence of a subculture within Quebec. If cleavages form around dichotomous
issues (support for language legislative, support for the Liberal Party, or even support
for independence) this does not prove that the collectives possess a cohesive cluster
of attitudes and behaviours that distinguish them from one another. Support for
social initiatives of the government, for municipal politics, and for economic policy,
are much less determined by social characteristics. With these arguments in mind the
following section examines the influence of certain cleavages over political behaviour
in Quebec, before examining the general spread of political orientations in the
province.
As in Britain, research on political culture(s) in Canada first developed as an analysis
of political attitudes and behaviour within the Nation-State. Only later did it provide
in-depth analyses of regional or provincial sub-cultures or variations within that
political culture. An examination of the key trends in Canadian political culture
research highlights the elements which distinguish the research from, and tie it to,
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political culture in the Scotland. As in Britain, three issues dominate Canadian
political culture: the origins and nature of political attitudes in Canada; the increasing
Americanisation of political attitudes throughout the country, and the existence of
regional variants or sub cultures within Canada. Each issue highlights the way in
which political attitudes in Quebec have developed differently, and often
independently, of attitudes in the rest of Canada.
As stated in chapter three, all English-speaking democracies, bilingual Canada
included, are liberal democracies. The basic values of popular sovereignty, political
equality, majority rule, and protection of individual rights can be found in convention
and constitution in Canada (Russell 1993) If, as Whittington and Van Loon argue, it
is the "purity of [Western] commitment to liberalism that ultimately distinguishes their
political cultures one from the other", the Canadian political culture contains some
strikingly illiberal elements (Whittington and Van Loon 1995) The protection of
collective rights for linguistic groups, first in the 1774 Quebec Act and later in the
British North America Act 1867, and the subsequent recognition of collective rights
for, among others, Aboriginal peoples, women, the aged and the disabled, in the
Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms stands as a testament to the Canadian
commitment to an integration of individual and collective rights. The co-existence of
support for these seemingly opposing views dominates much of Canadian political
culture research.
Absent from the initial Civic Culture study of political culture, Canadian examinations
of political attitudes and behaviours escaped the reactive flood of literature based on
Almond and Verba's conclusions. While behaviouralists in Britain, the United States
and Germany absorbed or attacked the view of national culture, Canadian works
developed in reaction to a work different in scope and in methodological outlook.
Louis Hartz's 1964 The Founding ofNew Societies sparked a controversy in
Canadian political science akin to influence of The Civic Culture (Hartz 1964).
Hartz's work differed from that provided by Almond and Verba on a number of
levels, not least the reliance on historiography and normative readings of political
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development rather than an analysis of survey data. Claiming that political cultures of
colonial societies owed much to the attitudes held by the fragment populations
arriving from other, usually imperial, powers, Hartz's work had much to offer a
country which prided itself on being a nation of immigrants. Clearly this label means
something different now, in a multicultural Canada, than it did then, when immigration
often reinforced the British character of the country. The impact of these founding
fragments depends on the particular segment arriving, the ideological evolution
occurring at the point of departure and the point at which values in the new society
congeal into a distinctive blend. The debate among different theoretical visions ceases
upon arrival in the new society, where natural opponents have not yet formed. This
process, by which what existed as a fragment in one culture becomes the reference
point for a new culture, accounts for the marked differences among the English-
speaking democracies. For Hartz, the middle-class liberalism of the Canadian and
American settlers accounts for the less radical political system when compared to
political system formed by working class Britons who departed for Australia after the
Industrial Revolution. In addition, Hartz claimed that the seigneurial system of the
ancien regime in New France, as installed by the rural settlers from pre-revolutionary
France, led to a feudal fragment in the province ofQuebec. The result, according to
Hartz, is a blended Canadian political culture that is essentially liberal but contains
'illiberal' fragments. The magnitude and form of such illiberalism formed the focus of
subsequent works in Canadian political culture research.
Applying Hartz's theoretical framework, Kenneth McRae further analysed the dual
fragments affecting English and French Canada. French Canada, influenced by its
Catholic homogeneity and strong authority, was joined by a Loyalist population
characterised by its 'Lockean liberalism' rather than its Tory streak (McRae 1964,
McRae 1978). Nuances such as this, and the practice of comparing Canada and the
United States in tandem which tends to emphasise the distance between the two
countries at the expense of their overwhelming similarities, muddies what could be an
illuminating investigation. Bound by efforts to "assert a [distinct] Canadian identity",
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studies of political culture sought improper models with which to establish a
comparison (McRae 1978), McRae's gauntlet set the tone for further analyses.
In his adaptation ofHartz' theory Gad Horowitz sought to identify the ways in which
the Canadian political culture differs from American political culture (Horowitz
1966). Arguing that Hartz underestimated the differences between the Canadian and
American value sets, Horowitz claims the answer lies in the 'Tory-touched' liberalism
present in Canadian institutions. The arrival of the United Empire Loyalists exerted a
profound influence over the developing institutions both by virtue of their number and
the historical period in which they arrived. With their counter-revolutionary attitudes,
the loyalists emphasised the pre-existing British character of Canada. A preference for
order, authority and collectivist approaches to rights imprinted Canadian political
attitudes at a time when the institutions were sufficiently malleable to adapt to new
influences. This view is discounted by Azjenstat and Smith, who feel Horowitz
overemphasises the impact of the loyalists (Ajzenstat and Smith 1995). A sizeable
literature surrounds the presence or absence - and subsequent measurement - of a
tory-streak in Canadian political culture (Ajzenstat and Smith 1998, Christian 1978,
Horowitz 1977, Preece 1977, Preece 1978, Truman 1977, Wiseman 1998) In an
effort to bridge these divergent views, Seymour Lipset argues that formative events,
rather than fragment cultures or ill-defined points of congealment, exert the greatest
influence on the development of political attitudes (Lipset 1968). Thus, incidents like
the conquest ofNew France , the rebellions of 1837 and the Red River Rebellion
preceding the entry ofManitoba into Confederation encouraged the creation of a
strong central government. For Lipset, the significant event could not be the arrival
of the United Empire Loyalists, but rather the refusal of Canada to rebel against
Britain in an effort to secure greater political autonomy. Thus, the spontaneous
refusal of Canadians to rebel, rather than the arrival of a population that fled rebellion,
constitutes a significant formative event in Canada's political development because it
bound the population together in a united stand against rebellion As a result,
Canadian political institutions have become more elitist, ascriptive and particularist
The conclusion reached by Lipset resembles that advocated by Hartz and Horowitz
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although the logical arguments used to support the conclusion are quite different. As
a result, the presence of communitarianism in Canadian political attitudes holds a
similar place to the role of socialism in the myth of Scottish political culture. Whether
the enduring popularity of this view owes more to the emphasis placed on it by most
of the major text books introducing first year university students to political science
rather that strong evidence to defend its claim, is worth considering (Jackson and
Jackson 1998, Nevitte 1995, Whittington and Van Loon 1996)
Rival attempts to explain political culture in Canada are grounded in economic
analyses of the federation. As with the previous studies, the conclusion, that
Canadian political culture is characterised by a strong central government and
collectivist-tinged approach to rights remains the same. For Harold Innis, Canada has
been influenced by the State that developed during the colonial period when the
importance of economic development, and in particular the dependence on Britain for
a stable economy encouraged a strong central government to manage the fur trade
(Innis 1930). According to Innis, the Canadian psyche was marked by the colonial
experience as a staple producer; the attention to supply-side economics has
encouraged small 'c' conservatism, a sense of caution, and deference to dominate
Canadian political attitudes. Compatible with Innis's evaluation of economic and
political development, Creighton argues the entrepreneurial activity of settlers in the
St Lawrence valley created a dominant merchant class that, together with the ruling
colonial powers concentrated economic and political power in the hands of a
restricted elite (Creighton 1956). These two works, when considered in conjunction
with John Porter's seminal examination of Canadian elites, emphasise the power and
influence wielded by the (British-) Canadian political, business and media class (Porter
1965, Preston 1985). The diversity of these approaches, employing qualitative,
historical and economic lenses through which to analyse Canadian political culture,
stand in contrast to British political culture research, which has consistently prioritised
a qualitative approach
Despite their different attempts to explain relatively similar phenomena, each of the
studies rely on interpretations of history and examinations of institutional practice
140
Ailsa Henderson, PhD Thesis, Chapter 3
rather than survey data. These more intuitive studies were deal a serious blow by the
onset of statistical evaluations claiming Canadian conservatives were much less
communitarian than previously alleged (Nevitte and Gibbins 1985, Nevitte and
Gibbins 1990). In particular, in his analysis of recent World Values Survey results,
Neil Nevitte debunked the view of Canada as a deferential, illiberal political culture
(Nevitte 1996)
Table 3.4: Political Culture in Canada
%agreeing
1980 1985 1990 1993 1997
Politics and government so 48 60
complicated that cannot understand
what is going on
Average Canadian can't really do 54 55 46
much to change the course of events
Today's problems are so complicated 58 49 51
that a person like me can't really
understand what's going on
N 1500 1500 1500 1500 3949
Sources: CES 1997, Decima Quarterly 1980, 1985, 1990, 1993
Other questions receiving less consistent inclusion in statistical examinations of
political culture tap varying degrees of efficacy. Data from the most recent election
survey reveal that 80% believe MPs lose touch with people quickly, 68% believe
government doesn't care what the people think, and 83% believe politicians are ready
to lie to get elected The extent to which these attitudes vary across social groups
receives examination later in the chapter. As in the UK, trends over time demonstrate
a gradual realignment of political attitudes away from the traditional positions of
deference and efficacy towards more cynical and proactive attitudes. Whereas in
Britain this has been associated with a western pattern of increased disenchantment
with the political class, in Canada the debate has collided with research charting the
'Americanisation' of Canadian political culture
Early comparative examinations of Canadian political culture inevitably contained
comparisons with the attitudes and behaviours south of the 49th parallel Works by
Hartz, Horowitz, Lipset and Bell emphasised the difference between the conservative
and deferential Canadians and their liberal neighbours (Hartz 1964, Horowitz 1966,
141
Ailsa Henderson, PhD Thesis, Chapter 3
Bell 1979, Lipset 1968). In Lamentfor a Nation, George Grant argued that in their
attempts to distinguish themselves from Americans, Canadians created an identity
around their illiberal nature (Grant 1965). In other words, in an effort to distance
themselves from the most liberal nation, Canadians had to detract from their own
liberal views. For Grant, the declining importance of conservatism in Canada
signalled the end of a tory-touched liberalism and marked the "defeat ofCanadian
nationalism" (Grant 1965).
Questioning the deductive approaches of earlier works, Nevitte and Gibbins subjected
traditional understandings of Canadian political culture to a rigorous statistical
analysis (Gibbins and Nevitte 1985). Nevitte and Gibbins determined that Canadian
Tories were not more likely to favour State intervention. Furthermore, although the
English Canadian and American right occupied similar positions on the political
spectrum, the American left was farther from the centre than the left in Quebec and
English Canada. The French Canadian right occupied a middle role, creating a more
restrictive political spectrum than that available in English Canada and the United
States. Lastly, despite similar political spectrums, political issues in the United States
related to ideological issues while Canadian political contests, in both English and
French Canada, eschewed ideological debate in favour ofmore moderate issue-driven
politics (Nevitte and Gibbins 1985) The battle between deductive and inductive
approaches has also drawn attention from those who focus their attention on the
presence of Red Tories in Canada. In his 1977 article Truman applies a fourteen-
point scale to test the presence of a value set that "predate[s] the liberal revolution"
(Truman 1977). Declaring his scale a qualified success, Truman noted that although
Canadian and American responses did not point to large patterns of divergence, there
was a sizeable difference between the attitudes of northern and southern Americans.
In his analysis of the World Value Survey results, Neil Nevitte questioned the original
preconceptions of Canadian political culture: that it was a deferential culture
supportive of strong authority. Nevitte claims that Canadians, if they ever were
particularly deferential, are now less willing to accept government authority than
Americans (Nevitte 1996). The work also highlights the rise in cynicism and decline
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in satisfaction that plagues all regions of the country While limiting comparisons to
those between linguistic groups rather than between provinces, The Decline of
Deference thesis highlights several significant value differences that can be assumed to
represent inter-provincial divergence. Levels of support for protest activity and
greater moral permissiveness point to a French political culture that displays increased
support for non-traditional, post-materialist values. The extent to which these changes
represent an Americanising political culture in Canada has become an important
debate within Canadian politics (Nesbitt-Larking 1998a). Nevitte's tracking of the
inexorable march towards post-materialism in Canada stands distinct from works such
as Grant's Lament for a Nation, which equated the Canadian adoption ofWestern
political trends - in this case an increased support for individual rights - with the end
ofCanadianism. The debate over the Americanisation of Canadian political culture,
however, rages on (Charlton and Barker 1998) In each case, the presumed
Americanisation is presumed to be the process by which Canada takes on the political
values of the United States, rather than the creation of a unified, jointly (if inequitably)
created continental culture.
In his contributions to political culture research, Nesbitt-Larking has argued, not only
that Canadians are becoming more American in their attitudes, but that this pattern
has progressed, unchecked and under-analysed since the 1970s (Nesbitt-Larking
1998a, Nesbitt-Larking 1998b). Nesbitt-Larking credits the same Canadian jingoism,
which he labels as "pro-Canadian assertiveness" (Nesbitt-Larking 1998b) with
dissuading researchers from employing political culture analyses of the Canadian
political system. Nesbitt-Larking then goes on to chronicle the "grave dangers to the
integrity and continuance of Canada itself (Nesbitt-Larking 1998b) caused by the
gradual replacement of communitarian approaches to rights and society with a
liberalism that prioritises individual rights. Rather than relying on statistical data the
research chronicles the increased attention to balanced-budgets , government
downsizing, the growth of the right-wing, populist Reform Party, the power of the
corporate elite and decreased deference as proof of Canada's Americanisation.
Frustration with the traditional tenets of the Canadian federation, namely some
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measure of recognition for Quebec, official bilingualism and multiculturalism, have
also recently come under fire. Critics of these theories argue that Canadians were
never very distinct in the first place, were not more collectivist in their approaches,
not more socialist in their policies, not more deferential in their attitudes to elites nor
more Tory-touched as liberals. The alternative perception of Canada, promoted in
such diverse works as Lament for a Nation and The Politics ofRecognition (Taylor
1992) either stands in direct conflict with, or distorts beyond recognition, the actual
state of Canadian political culture (Peacock 1998). Such a construction will sound
familiar to researchers of Scottish political culture, who must contend with the gap
between perceptions of collectivism and the attitudes of voters within Scotland.
Other evidence of value change avoids the issue of Americanisation in favour of
global trends. In a twist on Inglehart's thesis, that unprecedented security in the post¬
war period has facilitated the development of post-materialist values, Environics
president Michael Adams claims that recent trends in Canadian attitudes betray an
increased insecurity, despondence an aversion to both political and economic risks
(Adams 1998). The factors that Nesbitt-Larking characterises as proof of
Americanisation are, for Adams, signs of widespread resentment and cynicism among
Canadians. For Adams, diverse evidence, from opinion polls to introduction of new
television programmes of political satire show that Canadians are running low on the
usual stock of political culture reserves: trust, efficacy, satisfaction and confidence.
Adams' book, Sex in the Snow, claims that Canadians - that nation of'repressed
hedonists', have finally broken free of the bonds of deference
Yet another debate concentrates on the existence of regional or multiple political
cultures. As stated in chapter two, those arguing for a series of sub-cultures within a
political system take an aggregate view of culture, arguing that the resultant political
culture is a product of the interaction among its diverse sub-cultures. For others, the
existence of sub-cultures, particularly in a State that has witnessed its share of
constitutional deadlock, is portrayed as a sign ofweakness, of a less than unified
culture (Almond and Verba 1963,Verba 1965). As a result, the debate about
144
Ailsa Henderson, PhD Thesis, Chapter 3
subcultures, particularly in Canada, is emotionally loaded, as if proof ofQuebec's
political distinctiveness might lend credence to the arguments of its separatists.
The most accessible proof of regional political divergence, as in the United Kingdom,
lies in voting patterns (Brown, McCrone, Paterson and Surridge 1998, Kellas 1989,
Wilson 1974). Evidence of distinct partisan preferences are compounded by the
electoral success of regional political parties promising to represent regional interests.
Thus, the existence of the Scottish National Party, the Parti Quebecois and the Bloc
Quebecois lends credence to the view that politics in Scotland and Quebec are
different from that in the rest of the country; different because the electorate expresses
itself through alternate parties and different because the agendas of these regional
parties contain local or region-specific issues of interest. The same could be said of
the Reform Party, which began its campaign for seats in the federal House of
Commons in 1988 with the slogan 'the West wants in'. Since then, however, the
party has attempted to field candidates across the country, detracting from its claim to
be a regionalist parties.
Although statistical examinations of regional political cultures are relatively rare in
Britain (Curtice 1988, Curtice 1992, Curtice 1996) attention to the different
provincial value sets has drawn the attention of Canadian researchers since the 1970s.
If, as Wilson argues, political culture reflects the way in which individuals orient
themselves within the political system, then the existence of meaningful political
boundaries in Canada - of provincial institutions, assemblies, bureaucracies and
legislation, has created distinct political cultures (Wilson 1974). Research discussing
the presence of one, two (English and French) three (English, French and Aboriginal)
five (regional) or ten (provincial) cultures mirrors debates concerning the existence of
two, three, four or ten founding partners in the creation ofCanada Research in this
respect divides along provincial lines. Those writing outside the province ofQuebec
highlight the dangers of excluding groups, whether First Nations Peoples, regions or
other provinces, from their role in nation-building. Those within Quebec, both
anglophones and francophones, tend to argue that the historical recognition of French
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Canada at the expense of other groups is a function of the constitutional settlement
negotiated by political actors from the Act ofUnion in 1840. Thus, as previously
stated, examinations of regional political cultures enter a politically loaded debate
where proof of difference adds to the political weight expressed by the subject area.
In their first examination of provincial political cultures, Simeon and Elkins
determined that the measures of trust and efficacy, as used by Almond and Verba,
appear higher for provincial governments than for federal governments. In their
attempts to examine regional cultures Simeon and Elkins created a typology relying
on measures of high and low trust and efficacy. Provinces were then categorised
according to their answers. The authors noted that on some measures of civic culture,
differences among provinces were larger than those between Italy and the United
States.
Table 3.5: Regional Political Culture in Canada
High Efficacy Low Efficacy
High Trust Supporters Deferentials
Low Trust Critics Disaffected
Source: Simeon and Elkins 1974, Simeon and Elkins 1980
In a previous analysis of provincial cultures, Wilson argued that the Canadian
provinces could be categories according to three types of culture. The distinction
between underdeveloped, transitional, and developed cultures lay in the voting
patterns of provincial electorates. If two parties were able to capture a large majority
of the votes, and if partisan preferences were stable over time, the culture could be
considered developed. Unfortunately for Wilson and for Simeon and Elkins, the
results of the two studies presented different views of provincial political cultures in
Canada. The confusion lies in the artificial priority given to provincial institutional
boundaries or systems. For Gidgengil, provincial political cultures are motivated by
centre-periphery relations (Gidengil 1990). Although the distribution of socio¬
economic characteristics could lead one to suggest that cohesive provincial cultures
exist, Gidengil's examination of regionally depressed areas within Quebec highlights
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divergent efficacy scores with wealthier, and similarly francophone, areas in the
province. The view is consistent with uneven development theories touted by Gellner,
Nairn, Hechter and others (Gellner 1983, Hechter 1982, Hechter 1987, Nairn 1977).
Other works analysing the potential for divergent political cultures within Canada
emphasise the potential cleavages of language and centre-periphery relations. In their
analysis of attitudes to language rights and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
Sniderman et al report that defensive support for linguistic stability encourages a
changing view of rights provision for anglophones and francophones in Canada
(Sniderman, Fletcher, Russell and Tetlock 1989). Each linguistic group seems
convinced of the necessity of specific rights provision with respect to their own
collective group while reluctant to extend similar rights to other linguistic groups.
The research shows that while francophones are more consistent in their support for
linguistic rights Anglophones exhibit a clear preferences for English language rights
within Quebec at the expense of French language rights outside Quebec. In his
critique of their research Macmillan argues Sniderman et al did not sufficiently tap the
group preferences for different rights (Macmillan 1990) Greater support for the
recognition of collective rights among francophones, rather than their existence as a
minority language group, could explain the consistent support for language rights.
Similarly, a general reluctance to ensure linguistic rights for francophones outside
Quebec could be motivated by a greater support for individual rights among
anglophones rather than a general reticence to secure minority language rights.
Furthermore, while the initial research highlights the individual motivation behind
attitudes within the Canadian political culture, there is insufficient proof ofmultiple
cultures within Canada.
For those who argue that Canadian political culture is the product of interaction
between several sub-cultures, Peter Lyon's question, "Is there an Anglo-Canadian
Political Culture (Lyon 1983) poses a simple question. Surely one of the most
important interactions must occur between the cultures of the two founding nations.
For many, however, the absence of a homogeneous English Canadian culture,
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particularly given the presumed unity of francophones in Canada, stands as one of the
most important threats to Canadian unity. In their textbook on Canadian politics
Jackson and Jackson refer to "English-Speaking Canadians: A Cultural Fruitcake"
(Jackson and Jackson 1998). Originally written in 1981 on the eve of the repatriation
of Canada's constitution, Lyon's focus was not the unity of English versus French
political cultures in Canada, but rather, whether Canadians were sufficiently distanced
from the UK in their political attitudes and behaviours to have anything other than a
variant-British political culture. His argument, that Canadians possess their own
political culture, points to the various attempts made since 1867 to accommodate
French Canadians within an otherwise British political setting. No mention is made of
the American influence referred to in other works.
In each of these themes, political culture in Quebec has been characterised as an
illiberal element tempering, or sullying, Canadian liberalism though it is worth
mentioning that traditional examinations of political culture in Quebec are rather thin
on the ground. Instead, the political attitudes and behaviours of Quebecers are
examined in works that seek to analyse the development of nationalism and nationalist
thought within the province (Cloutier, Guay and Latouche 1992, Taylor 1991) This is
not to distinguish between nationalism and 'other' political attitudes, for one surely
influences the other. Rather, that in their attempts to examine the most distinguishing
aspect of political life in Quebec, namely the presence of a large and vibrant
nationalist movement, social scientists within Quebec have not studied perceptions of
efficacy and trust within the State to the same extent as academics in the rest of the
country. As will be discussed later, several works integrate themes of political
culture, namely value change, into their analysis, but this is, for the most part, a recent
phenomenon.
In those works addressing aspects of political culture in Quebec, Canadian political
culture is portrayed as an amalgam of diverse influences, lying somewhere between
the individualism of the United States and the feudal fragment of French Canada.
This French 'illiberal culture' thesis was argued vociferously by former prime minister
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and academic Pierre Elliott Trudeau in his introduction to La Greve de I'Amiante
(Trudeau 1959). Citing the power of the Catholic Church and an under-developed,
rural economy, Trudeau later argued that the pillars of Quebec political culture
created obstacles to the development of democracy (Trudeau 1958). It could be
argued, however, that Trudeau's vision of democracy was based on an individualist
approach to rights and so while it is true to say that Quebec political attitudes did not
ape those in the United States, it is not strictly accurate to label them anti-democratic.
Research citing much of the same evidence, that Quebec owed its contemporary
political system to a particular blend of French feudal fragments, a strong,
authoritarian and involved Catholic Church, a fear of the State, underdeveloped
economy and the practice of political patronage lent credence to this claim (Belanger
1974, Bernard 1977, Brunet 1964, Heintzman 1983, Royal Commission of Inquiry on
Constitutional Problems 1956). For others, Trudeau's assessments of Quebec as a
priest-ridden, semi-feudal and illiberal society were fundamentally inaccurate
(Letourneau 1997). The retarded-development thesis has provided a particularly
active debate within Quebec historiography. The basic argument, that Quebecers are
much more collectivist, runs as follows: in the post-Conquest period, a dominated
population lost its natural elites (Brunet 1962, Brunet 1964, Fregault 1956, Iguarta
1974, Seguin 1970) and vigilantly protected its language and culture by prioritising
the values of survivance (Cook 1989), simultaneously developing a suspicion of the
(British) State (Bernard 1977 ). This view was supported by francophone and
anglophone academics, although within the province the social scientists ofMontreal
and Quebec City contested various points throughout their research for years (Rudin
1997). In the last decade, a cohort of academics has argued that the original analysis
over-estimated the influence of the Church, if not in the every-day lives of individuals,
then certainly in the formation of their overtly political attitudes (Letourneau 1997).
The extent to which the Quiet Revolution is seen as a dramatic break with the past or
an adaptation of previous practice depends on the initial analysis ofQuebec's
development. Those arguing for the dominant role of the Church tend to stress the
caesura between la grande noirceur of the immediate post-war period and the big-
government days of the 1960s. The role of the Quiet Revolution in Quebec's political
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culture has provided a rich literature though its main points lie outwith the scope of
this thesis.
An example of how the retarded development theory affects understandings of
political culture in Quebec proves useful. In one of the few works that explicitly
address the issue of political culture in Quebec, Bernard subscribes to the culture-
through-interaction thesis, arguing that the co-existence of several distinct ideologies
mould contemporary political culture (Bernard 1977). Admittedly written as the
Parti Quebecois came to power in Quebec, and thus presenting a view of political life
that has changed much in the past two decades, Bernard's argument, that a
combination of reactionary, progressive, radical and revolutionary ideologies form the
basis of political attitudes in Quebec, still holds weight. In particular, Bernard argues
that Quebec political culture is characterised by the particular nature of its interaction
between conservative, religious elements dominant in the 19th century and more recent
liberal values. While English Canada gradually lost interest with the traditional values
of conservatism, Quebec retained these elements, only prioritising liberalism in the
latter half of the 20th century. Notwithstanding the support for collectivism stemming
from a heightened attention to survivance, and the popularity of a political ideology
that maintained a holistic, if traditional, view of society, the growth of overtly socialist
parties in Quebec was stunted by the hostility of the Catholic Church to the more
fundamental aspects of socialism and Marxism This particular ideological blend has
had an effect on the perception of State authority, thought this fact is not paid great
attention in Bernard's work In particular, a heightened attention to the power of the
State-as-potential oppressor before the Quiet Revolution led to a profound belief in
its capacity for action during the 1960s (McRoberts 1993).
The attention to collective rights, whether stemming from a survival instinct or less
sociological origins, forms the source of the greatest fault-line between the political
cultures in English Canada and Quebec. The prioritisation of collective rights over
individual rights, evident in the popularity of first conservative and later social-
democratic political parties, and enshrined in the Quebec Charter of Human Rights,
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stands in conflict with the tendency to prioritise individual rights in federal political
life (Legault 1992, Taylor 1991). This seeming incompatibility is blamed for much
of Canada's current constitutional woes, not least the repeated failure to ratify
constitutional accords promising measures of collective security for Quebec through
items such as the 'distinct society' clause. It is worth stating that both systems
maintain a respect for both individual and collective rights, but that the tendency to
prioritise one over the other works in opposite ways. Thus even in the face of a
revisionist historiography, a general consensus surrounds the characterisation of
Quebec political culture vis-a-vis the rest of Canada: more collectivist, more
respectful of authority, and thus more supportive of the State.
The concerted practice of tearing down shibboleths is no less evident in recent
assessments ofQuebec's affinity to American attitudes and behaviours. The argument
that Quebecers are no less post-materialist in their outlook also forms the focus of
some recent works. Pelletier, for example, examines how the emergence of post-
materialist values, characterised by a commitment to public policy, a desire for active
and representative participation and 'new individualism' has affected partisan support
within Quebec. The results demonstrate that while activists in New Social
Movements exhibit post-materialist values to a greater degree than party workers in
general, supporters of the PQ are almost as post-materialist in their outlook as social
activists (Pelletier and Guerin 1996, Pelletier 1997). Furthermore, academics and
journalists have sought to emphasise the Americanite of Quebecers. The linguistic
border surrounding the province paradoxically ensures a level of cultural security that
those within English Canada lack, leaving Quebecers free to integrate themselves
more fully into continental culture and affairs (Lachapelle 1999, Beaudoin 1999) For
Lachapelle, the Americanization of Quebec, such as it exists, is a geo-political
inevitability (Lachapelle 1999). Quebec's support for the free trade agreements, and
indeed for former prime minister Brian Mulroney, who at his least popular earned a
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10% approval rating among Anglophones (Ekos 1998)16, points to level of
continentalism unmatched in tone if not degree in the rest of the country.
These different works agree on the basic context of political culture in Quebec.
Quebec as a liberal-democracy, Western First-World nation, province within a
federation and member region ofNAFTA, the Commonwealth, Francophonie and
United Nations, determines much of the political orientations within the nation.
Broad support for freedom of political expression and other fundamental human rights
co-exist with a declining interest and confidence in politics that can be found in other
Western countries. In addition, Quebec's political development has formed a polity
that takes a holistic view of society, supports collective measures and a strong State.
Despite their disparate origins, the obvious similarities with Scotland should not
escape notice.
NATIONAL IDENTITY IN SCOTLAND AND QUEBEC
National identity in Scotland and Quebec, both by structure and by content, stands in
direct contrast. The eighteenth-century accommodation of pre-existing 'national'
institutions each provided Scotland and Quebec with obvious markers of difference.
That said, the role of different social institutions, and the institutions themselves, have
imbued each nation, not surprisingly, with a distinct construction of nationhood. The
status ofGaelic as a remnant of a highland identity (Harvie 1998) and the
questionable position of the Scots language in contemporary Scotland (Miller 1996)
cannot equate themselves with the role and power of French within Quebec, where
language has created a separate forum for debate and social interaction. In addition,
the constitutional settlements in Scotland and Quebec, have, until recently, ensured
different roles of identity within society. In the drive for independence nationalists in
16 Recent research by public opinion polling firm Ekos demonstrates that former prime ministers
Pierre Trudeau and Briain Mulroney were more popular among English Canadians than among
French Canadians. When asked to decide who was the best prime minister of Canada, four percent
of respondents indicated their support for Mulroncy. (Ekos 1998).
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Quebec have politicised the concept of identity, increasing its salience in society.17
That, in conjunction with a readily identifiable marker such as language, alters the
extent to which Scotland can be compared with Quebec. In Scotland, the attainment
of devolution has been portrayed and understood as a problem of political inequality
(Brown, McCrone and Paterson 1998, Mitchell 1996). Debates about who is and is
not a Scot highlight the distance between the two notions of identity. Literature
often portrays Scottish national identity as the civic and inclusive contrast to
Quebecois identity (Hobsbawm 1990). Thus, in two key ways, national identity in
Scotland and Quebec distinguish themselves - in the pillars of identity and in the
salience of that identity within the political system. The following section examines
the treatment of national identity in each case by academics before turning to the
promotion and construction of identity by political agents of socialisation. In its
examination of identity in chapter four the thesis deals with salience, where it receives
a more quantitative focus.
The treatment of national identity in Scottish literature falls short of arguing that
identity is an essentialised, reified object bestowed upon residents at the border, yet
still points to the existence of common identity markers that Scots use as badges of
their identity (Beveridge and Turnbull 1989, Broun, Finlay and Lynch 1998, Finlay
1994, McCrone 1992). National institutions, in particular, draw attention from
recent works. This section emphasises two main themes in its analysis of Scottish
identity. First, how literature has sought to identify the pillars of Scottishness and
second, the treatment of Scottish and British identity as compatible or antagonistic.
In so doing, the section comments on the accessibility of Scottishness to those who
might consider themselves 'outside' the nation.
Pillars of Scottish National Identity
Early works emphasised the historical roots ofmodern Scottish identity (Harvie
1981, Smout 1986), obviously subscribing to the view that modern nations ground
11 As the author has argued elsewhere, by articulating sovereignty as a goal of a collective group
bound by national identity, the salience of identity in Quebec assumes a heightened importance
(Henderson 1999)
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themselves in the mythical past (Smith 1991). Most recent works, however, align
themselves with an instrumentalist view of nationalism, that national identity is the
product of social and historical forces manipulated, either wittingly or unwittingly by a
political or cultural elite. In this vein McCrone, Morris and Kiely highlight the
various attempts to create a banal nationalism (Billig 1995) that would allow Scots to
identify a distinct and tangible national identity. In this work, the processes of identity
construction, rather than the institutions responsible for them, receive attention. In
particular, the authors chronicle the way in which the current heritage industry
reinforces images and perceptions, both domestic and international, of Scottishness
(McCrone, Morris and Kiely 1995).
Other analyses of Scottish identity concentrate on the influence of institutions,
highlighting the role of the holy trinity of post-union Scottish institutions that carried
Scottish identity. The role ofCalvinism, a democratically-structured Church of
Scotland and school system ordered by the principles of egalitarianism and
meritocracy has created the current Scottish identity (McCrone 1992, Harvie 1998).
Created by John Knox, the General Assembly of the established Church offered
opportunities for Church members to debate and vote on issues related to doctrine,
practice and national life. That process has continued today in the activities of the
Church and Nation committee (Forrester 1994). In its ability to act as a social
leveller, the education system assumed integrates itself into the rubric of Scottish
egalitarianism.
If Scotland has made a great contribution to the theory and practice of
education, it is because of the tradition of Scottish homes, The Scottish
ploughman, walking behind his team, cons ways and means of making his
son a farmer, and so sends him to the village school. The Scottish farmer
ponders upon the future of his son, and sees it most assured not by the
inheritance of money but by the acquisition of that knowledge which will
give him power, and so the sons of many Scottish farmers find their way
to Edinburgh and a University degree (Menzies 1942)
Academic research ties the Scottish education system, as a pillar of identity, with
positive movements in Scotland's historical development. The Scottish
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Enlightenment, that period in the eighteenth century when Edinburgh writers such as
Adam Smith, David Hume and William Robertson articulated ideas that made
Scotland the intellectual vanguard ofEurope, is portrayed as the result of distinctly
Scottish traits (Calder 1994, Colley 1994, Daiches, Jones and Jones 1986, Devine
and Mitchison 1988, Harvie 1998, Lynch 1992).18 Thus by doctrine and by structure,
the church, education and legal system have created a lad o' pairts communitarian
outlook that has coloured everything from approaches to culture to voting patterns
(Product 2000, Brown, McCrone and Paterson 1998, Osborne and Armstrong 1996) .
Less traditional, though no less powerful, social institutions such as the press,
broadcast media and sports teams are entrusted with the dual role of socialising a
younger generation and providing markers of difference around which an older
generation can rally. Warning that the oft-assumed correlation between identity and
the press warrants close attention, Kendrick and McCrone argue that the Scottish
press has been successful because of a pre-existing Scottish identity (Kendrick 1989,
McCrone 1992). Maclnnes aruges, however, that the Scottish press accounts for
perceptions of difference (Maclnnes 1992). In the last two general election
campaigns none of the Scottish newspapers explicitly supported the Conservatives.
At one point, the absence of sympathetic coverage prompted Conservative-supporting
businessmen to bid for control of The Glasgow Herald (Smith 1994), Post-
devolution, the need for a separate Scottish six o'clock news was articulated as a
necessity if the media was to remain a legitimate national institution. Furthermore,
many of the recent attempts to prove that Scottish identity is civic, inclusive and
benign come from analyses of the divergent behaviour of Scottish and English football
fans. The friendly tartan army, bedecked in tartan hats and orange wigs, currently
receives favourable coverage when compared to the isolated examples of English
football hooliganism (Harvie 1998).
Paradoxically, the Scottish Enlightenment witnessed a period of enchantment with the notion that
Scotland was 'North Britain'. Scottish patriotism and a dedication to the British State went hand in
hand (Caldcr 1994, Colley 1994, Daiches, Jones and Jones 1986, Dcvinc and Mitchison 1988, Lynch
1992)
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A related debate concerns the importance of the pillar versus perception within
Scottish identity. In other words, does a distinct legal traditional actually affect the
way Scots interact with one another, or does the existence of a separate institution in
itself create a sufficiently meaningful boundary around the nation? For Thomson, "the
substantive rules of Scottish private law do not reflect any fundamental values
inherent in the Scottish character" (Thomson 1995). Similarly, until recently, the
Scottish curriculum remained overwhelmingly British in character (Humes and
Paterson 1983, Paterson 1994b). Valued in its creation of a literate society and tool as
a social leveller, the education system is credited with offering more than a sense of
Scottish particularity. In its 1998 update to the Higher Core requirements for History
and English, the Scottish Qualifications Authority notes that there is no obligation to
use Scottish texts in the syllabus for English, and only four of the twenty-two history
modules cover Scottish history. Attention to British, rather than solely Scottish,
literature and history, ensures that the education system reinforces a sense ofunity
within Great Britain. Despite this, the Scottish education system, in its structure if not
its content, has been considered one of the pillars of Scottish identity. This ties in
with research conducted by Finlay and Cohen: namely, that fact does not always
outweigh fiction in the construction of identity (Finlay 1994b) and that individuals
create their own identity from diverse material available to them in society (Cohen
1996). As previously stated, Cohen argues that what it means to be Scottish is
affected by personal circumstance as much as the accepted checklist of Scottish
pillars. The choice, however, does not take place in a vacuum. The pillars by which
individuals evaluate their choices, and the impetus to do so - whether it is popular to
consider oneself Scottish or not - change over time.
Scottish Identity and Scottish Values?
In addition to institutions, social values form important pillars of Scottishness. What
it means to be Scottish has as much to do with the socialising influence of a separate
legal system, education system and Church, as the end result. The previous section on
political culture highlighted some of the ways in which Scottish political attitudes
distinguish themselves from British attitudes. These values in themselves are
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important but it is the way in which they have been associated with Scottishness that
warrants attention here. The popularity of left-of-centre values, whether manifesting
themselves as egalitarian, communitarian, or socialist are closely aligned with
measures of Scottishness, in part because of the institutions that give rise to them, and
in part because of the way that political parties speaking for the nation have aligned
themselves with values. It is worth nothing, however, that the values equated with
Scottishness have changed over time. The most useful analysis comes from the way
in which political parties have aligned themselves with certain values and identity
packages in an effort to win votes.
Before the turn of the last century, the Liberal party enjoyed tremendous popularity in
Scotland. Keir Hardie, who founded the Labour Party in Scotland, so feared his
chances of electoral battle with the Scottish Liberals that he left Scotland to fight a
seat in England (Harvie 1998). Liberalism in the nineteenth century was the creed of
common sense. Individual responsibility, the equality ofmen before God, small
government, free trade, the iniquity of the House of Lords, the improvement of
popular education and later, home rule, bound notions of liberalism and Scottish
identity together. From 1832 to 1914 Scottish voters backed the Liberals, regularly
rewarding the party with more than fifty percent of the popular vote. In 1865, the
party won eighty-five percent of the popular vote in Scotland and it was not until
1922 that the Labour Party replaced the Liberals as the main alternative to the
Conservative Party. When Liberals divided over the issue of home rule, it was the
breakaway Liberal Unionists who absorbed the Scottish Conservatives into their
ranks, although the resultant name change can be blamed for leading people to believe
that the integration worked in the opposition direction.
With the extension of the electoral franchise and the political education of the
working class, the dominant Liberal values now had two identity-value competitors.
'Common sense' unionism,haft previously emphasised the cohesive bonds of
Protestantism and the economic benefits of imperialism (Colley 1994, Morton 1999).
Scottishness and, unionism were not anathema, as they could have been considered
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between 1979 and 1997, but rather, mutually reinforcing ideologies. In the immediate
post-Treaty period, the economic and political power enjoyed by an increasingly
affluent middle and upper class in Scotland backed a fusion of pro-union Scottish
identity (Morton 1999). Economic prosperity and the administrative control gained
through the creation of the Scottish Office in 1886 reinforced favourable
interpretations of the union (Paterson 1994). Calls for home rule within the Liberal
party, and later, the rise of the Labour Party challenged these notions of nationalist
unionism.
The economic conditions of voters, a decline in symbols of Britishness, such as the
army, and a simultaneous rise in institutions establishing boundaries around the
Scottish population, such as the media, encouraged a re-evaluation of the 'common
sense' identity-value relationship (Dickson 1993). While the literature charting the
rise of Labour within Scotland offers an interesting evaluation of national political
history (Donnachie and Whatley 1992, Keating and Bleiman 1979, Brown, McCrone
and Paterson 1998, Brown, McCrone, Paterson and Surridge 1999, Kellas 1989), the
fact that it occurred at all matters more for this thesis. Since 1922, the Labour party
has sought to align itselfwith what it considers to be key values of Scottishness,
emphasising support for the common weal and social democracy. The extent to
which it continues to do so forms the focus of the following section on agents of
socialisation. The Scottish National Party, at one point to the right of the Labour
party on the political spectrum, has since 1974 sought to defeat Labour on its own
ground (Mitchell 1996). As a result, the two dominant political parties in Scotland
each position themselves to the left of the political centre, and, until 1997, each
sought to portray itself as the nationalist defender of the Scottish people. In truth, all
four main parties have sought to portray themselves as the true Scottish party -
although the Liberal Democrats have done so less convincingly and more half¬
heartedly than the other three no doubt because their stance on nationalism (Lynch
1998) - but Labour and the SNP appear to have enjoyed greater success at this than
the others.
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Post-devolution, the party in the best position to argue that it is the inheritor of
Scottish identity-values, both as the original left-wing party and as the governing
party that brought devolution to Scotland, has been distancing itself from the identity
and values that gained it support during the 1980s. Labour's efforts to cool the
'flames of nationalism' have resulted in a decidedly unionist message from the party
(Blair 1999, Brown 1999, Brown and Alexander 1998, Dewar 1999). Unlike in
Quebec, where parties that do not support separatism may still claim to be nationalist,
Labour's post-devolution volte face mean that it is concurrently supporting the status
quo rather than change, but also denouncing nationalism in all its forms. Rather than
distancing left wing values and national identity, the party has distanced itself from
this construction, leaving the SNP to continue to argue that it stands for increased
autonomy in the name of national identity and a social democratic package.
Until recently, Scottish historiography highlighted the oppositional nature of nations
within Britain. As Smout has noted, Scottish history was often described as a litany
of defeats and victories at the hands of the English (Smout 1994). Finlay likewise
noted that the nineteenth century produced few Scottish histories of note, largely
because the Scottish identity was seen as secure (Finlay 1994b). Scottish history, and
the holy trinity of institutions, prevented Scottish identity from aligning itself entirely
with the State, but is also credited with the promotion of a low sense of collective
esteem (Beveridge and Turnbull 1989). The presumed static nature of this situation
negatively affected Scottish historiography. Recent attention to how Scotland has
historically asserted itself as different seeks to correct this trend (Colley 1994, Devine
2000, Lynch 1992). Within this context, Britishness has been treated as an artificially-
forged political identity that, when it suited the interests of its constituent members,
was only just appealing enough to ensure its continued existence (Colley 1994). The
identity amalgam was less linked to values fostered in daily lives and more to the
political projects of an imperial state (Brown, McCrone and Paterson 1998). Thus, if
Scottish identity could be considered a national identity promoted and sustained by
social institutions that were perceived to touch the daily lives ofmembers, British
identity was equated with a remote, political State (R. Cohen 1994).
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Since devolution, the compatibility ofBritish and Scottish identities has drawn much
attention as academics, political commentators and politicians attempt to predict
whether institutional boundaries will weaken further a sense of Britishness
(Macmillan 1999, Wilson 1999, Colley 1999). For Macmillan, devolution has
emphasised national difference to such a degree that it cannot be overpowered by a
re-branding of Britishness as 'Cool Britannia' (Macmillan 1999). In part, Colley
explains, this is because devolution alters the reference points for individuals (Colley
1999). The front pages of newspapers report events in the Scottish parliament and
the additional layer of politicians is physically closer to its electorate. For some, this
new-found freedom detracts from the oppressive nature of Britishness, making it
more easy to hold dual identities, rather than more difficult (Wilson 1999). In both
analyses devolution has strengthened national identity in Scotland. Whether this will
lead to calls for independence, or will solidify Scotland's place within the UK, is a
matter for future research.
In Quebec, the tension between Canadian and Quebecois identities exists although a
larger debate concerns the level of inclusion and access that Quebecois identity
affords non-francophones. Thus, if contemporary identity debates in Scotland ponder
the compatibility of multiple national identities - if Scots can still feel British -, the
multiple identity debate in Quebec wonders whether English Canadians can ever feel
Quebecois. An examination of identity literature in Quebec highlights the relevant
pillars by which individuals can assess their level of belonging.
Pillars of Quebecois National Identity
The creation of a distinct Quebec identity predates the creation of a francophone
province within Canada upon Confederation in 1867. The arrival of French settlers in
the 1600s and the British Conquest in 1759-1760 provide two developmental phases
for an identity with an ever-present attention to the 'other'. Although the Quebec Act
of 1774 guaranteed the continued prosperity of the French education system, the
Catholic Church and a seigneurial system of land tenure, the development of a
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distinctly Quebecois identity, as opposed to a French Canadian identity, lies in the
increasing involvement of the Quebec government in the social welfare of its citizens.
With the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s, the linguistic and cultural vitality of French
Canadians became a formal priority of a pro-active and interventionist provincial
Liberal government. While language differences prompted extra constitutional powers
in the Constitution Act of 1867 (Silver 1982), and in turn informed a francophone
vision ofCanada that relied on the partnership of two founding peoples, it was only in
the latter half of the twentieth century that provincial borders began to dictate identity
labels. As a result, Quebecers "reaffirmed [their] identity by rejecting the term French
Canadian and calling [themselves] Quebecois" (Lahaise in Gougeon, 1994, Gagnon,
Keating 1996)
Analyses ofQuebecois identity by English Canadian academics often emphasised the
previously-mentioned importance of survivance or survival. The post-Conquest sense
of dislocation, while examined as a social phenomenon by previously mentioned
francophone historians, appears as a pillar of identity among English works that argue
a fear of extinction has created a fierce collective spirit among francophones. As
one English-Canadian academic has argued, the linguistic and cultural fragility that
followed the Conquest created a "... defensive paranoia of a people who see
themselves threatened at every turn, and who feel they must assert their rights,
whether in fact these rights are being threatened or not" (Waite 1980). For others,
the sense of difference manifested itself in a lack of self-confidence not dissimilar to
that believed to exist in Scottish identity. In his previous incarnation as a political
science professor at the Universite de Montreal, Intergovernmental Affairs Minister
Stephane Dion emphasised the mutually reinforcing influences of hope and fear that
underline Quebec national identity and the separatist movement in Quebec Thus, fear
that the French language will be swamped by English influence and fear of
independence itself bind Quebecers in a perpetual state of flux (Dion 1995). In this
analysis, Louis Balthazar agrees, stating "By definition, nationalism is a movement of
people who feel uncomfortable" (Levine, Balthazar and McRoberts 1989). Thus
while most analyses agree that cultural survival formed an important pillar of early
French Canadian identity, the manner in which that concern for survivance manifested
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itself remains open to debate. Greater consensus surrounds the role of social
institutions.
The ease with which some authors claim Quebec and English Canadian identities
function differently (Laforest and Gibbins 1997, Trent 1997, Coleman 1984) could
rest in the assumed origins and pillars of these two groups. Efforts to explain that
Canadians are distinct from Americans, or rather that a Canadian identity exists, often
rely on analyses of political culture. As explained earlier, the arrival of the United
Empire Loyalists and a concomitant support for tory-tinged liberalism, in theory if not
in practice, is portrayed as the bedrock of Canadian identity. In other words,
Canadians are different from Americans because they approach politics differently
(Grant 1965, Lipset 1968). The arrival of the Loyalists, who felt caught between a
lack of support for the American revolution and an Americanised sense of identity, is
referred to by others as the beginning of English Canada's identity crisis (Bell 1970).
Thus the Loyalists imbued Canadian political culture with a perpetual search for
identity and a counter-revolutionary mindset (Lipset 1968). In his investigation of
shared values among Canadians, Taylor argues that Canadians feel different from
Americans because they display greater support for collectivism, and live in a less
violent and conflict-ridden society. The fundamental differences are ones of values
rather than an ethnic sense of difference (Taylor 1991). For Quebecers, there are
sufficient markers of difference between French Canadians and Americans that a
reliance on attitudes and values assumes much less importance (Preston 1985, Taylor
1991). A starting point for many analyses are the institutions that survived the
Quebec Act of 1774.
Religion rather than language remained the most important pillar of identity until the
1960s. Following the Conquest, the absence left by a departed political and social
elite was filled by a Church convinced of its providential mission in North America
(Dufour 1989). Language at this time, merely provided the cultural buffer that
sustained a Catholic presence within Canada (McRoberts 1988). The exact role of
the Church in articulating and sustaining national identity in Quebec remains outwith
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the focus of this thesis (Gingras and Leblond 1995) although the desire of the
institution to maintain a cultural served to construct an exclusive national identity.
Despite declining church attendance, the church still remains a powerful pillar.
Almost 90 percent of Quebecers are Catholic and the institution, through its annual
statements, often underlines the role of the Church in the nationalist movement and
contemporary political debate (Assemblee des eveques du Quebec 1973, 1977, 1981,
1995, Assemblee des eveques du Quebec. Comite des affaires sociales 1976,
Assemblee des eveques du Quebec. Comite de theologie 1994)
The secularisation ofQuebecois society and the spread of liberal values coincided
with a larger role for the State and shifting identity pillars. This change occurred in
the middle of the twentieth century. In one of the last articulations of traditional
visions ofQuebec society, the Tremblay report emphasised the importance of social
cohesiveness and the Church as a social institution (Royal Commission of Inquiry on
Constitutional Problems 1956). In the 1960s, as the identity label transformed from
Canadien ffan<?ais to Quebecois, language replaced religion as the pre-eminent marker
of identity (McRoberts 1988, Coleman 1984, Keating 1996a). In addition to these
two markers - religion, and language - a third institution separates Quebecers from
other Canadians. The position of the Quebec civil code resembles that of the Scottish
legal system. Although some argue that the spirit of "mutual interdependence" and
authoritarianism that motivates the code has drawn a boundary around Quebecers
(Waite 1980), these extent to which the legal system influences the day-to-day
interaction of provincial residents is a matter of debate.
Those who would argue that national identity in Quebec is linked to a civic
nationalism claim identity has less to do with pillars of collective association and more
to do with a profound sense of distance within the Canadian federation (Imbeau and
Laforest 1991/92, Laforest and Gibbins 1997, Nemni 1994). That the population is
French and Catholic matters less than the fact that it is not English (Robitaille 1999,
Laforest and Gibbins 1997, McRoberts 1988) In his attempts to chart increasing
support for sovereignty in the 1970s and 1980s, McRoberts hints that the Quebecois
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identity lies as much in English Canada's -or rather the federal government's -
intransigence as in a self-directed sense of difference (McRoberts 1988). McRoberts
further argues that the growth in support for nationalism, and by extension national
identity, lies in the materialistic impulses of the rising new middle class educated in the
1960s 19 Such a view is supported by quantitative examinations of opinion poll data
(Pinard and Hamilton 1986, Coleman 1984, Meadwell 1989, Guntzel 1997). Thus,
whether in reaction to federal deadlock or as a play for greater social mobility,
national identity remains divorced from the traditional pillars of society. Thus, the
project of national self-determination drives the sense of identity." And yet, the
correlation between support for an avowedly nationalist-sovereignist party and
national identity detracts from the diversity ofQuebec identity.
For some, the very phrase 'Quebecois identity' warrants attention as it denies
anglophones and allophones a descriptive label in their own language (Jenson 1995).
For others, the seemingly thwarted attempts of individuals other than French, Catholic
Quebecers to feel that they belong within society lead to charges of an ethnic national
identity (Breton 1988). Academic literature on identity in Quebec often equates
Quebecers and francophones. While lamenting the lack of attention to the diversity
within Quebecois nationalism and national identity Jean-Louis Roy claims the
underlying common factors among all notions of national identity is a sense of destiny
as francophones (Roy 1987). This tendency to equate Quebecers and francophones
prompts Keating to argue that "Quebec nationalism has in any case only partly made
the transition from ethnic to civic" (Keating 1995a). Thus, while the movement has
developed beyond inward-looking protectionism it remains civic by ideal rather than
membership
The reason that identity in Quebec has earned itself the ethnic label, while such
charges are rarely levelled in Scotland, has much to do with early ethnic analyses of
19 Elsewhere McRoberts distinguishes between nationalism as a sentiment of group membership, as
an ideology and as a social movement (Levinc, Balthazar and McRobcrts 1989). In his 1988
evaluation he suggests the social motivations of nationalism as a movement have affected the ways in
which people view nationalism as a sense of collective identity.
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Quebec national identity. For the previously mentioned Abbe Groulx, the nation was
a historical community rather than a racially-bounded entity. That said, Groulx
believed in the superiority of French civilisation although supporters are quick to
point out that the anti-semitism that appears in his work was peripheral to his
understanding of the nation (Trepanier in Gougeon 1994). Charting the changing use
of history and collective memory, Sarra Bournet notes that what was once the call of
separatists - 'Le Quebec aux Quebecois' - has now become 'Un pays pour tous les
Quebecois' (Sarra Bournet 1999). Furthermore, the extent to which Quebecois
national identity is seen as ethnic or civic depends on perceptions of language. Seen
as something attached to birth and ancestry, language acquires ethnic properties.
Seen as something acquired or learned, language can become a civic pillar. The
conditions ofmembership depend on the comprehension of a tool for social
communication, nothing more, nothing less. The distillation of ethnic language being
used by nationalists and separatists further reinforces the civic character of Quebecois
national identity. And yet ethnic traces remain. Former Quebec premier Jacques
Parizeau did little for his party when he announced on referendum night that the
Quebecois had been defeated by 'l'argent et le vote ethnique' (Parizeau 1995b).
Government pamphlets on the history of Quebec entitled 'Qui etaient nos ancetres?'
only serve to reinforce the view that identity in Quebec has more in common with the
primordial attachments analysed by Smith, Geertz and Brass than the modern
construct ofGellner and Hobsbawm.
And yet, little-read government pamphlets do not an ethnic nation make. Part of the
furore stems from the salience of national identity in Quebec rather than the way it is
constructed. The extent to which identity matters in both Scotland and Quebec,
forms the focus of the next chapter. The following section instead focuses on the
treatment of national identity by political agents of socialisation.
POLITICAL SOCIALISATION IN SCOTLAND AND QUEBEC
As highlighted in chapter two, agents of socialisation such as the family, Church
environment and education system exert an influence on the development of political
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attitudes and behaviours in childhood and adulthood. Family life, early education and
Church experiences, and later, the media, political parties and the governments they
form, colour the perceptions of individuals, socialising them into a wider societal
culture. In Stateless nations, the institutions of civil society are charged with
maintaining a sense of identity made potentially fragile by the absence of a State
(Keating 1996). For some authors, the very absence of a political system, which can
provide objective markers of difference to citizens, encourages a level of vigilance in
the protection of a national identity. Civil society, as the guarantor of that identity,
assumes a heightened importance in such situations (Keating 1996, Paterson 1994,
Flearn 1996). As explained in the previous section, the influence of a separate
Scottish Church, legal system, and, in the case of Quebec, a separate language,
whether by content or by mere presence served as pillars around which a distinct
identity could coalesce. In part because the influence of these institutions remains
well documented within their respective literatures, this section examines the efforts
of political parties and constitutional actors to influence the political attitudes and
values of national members. To this end it examines the manifestos for political
parties since the 1979 and 1980 referendums in Scotland and Quebec, in addition to
the various constitutional accords or constitutional briefs of governments and
implicated actors. The section examines three themes: how a sense of identity is
linked to the national debate, in other words, how these institutions promote the
markers and benefits of belonging, secondly, how these institutions view national
progress; and thirdly, how they link rights-based dialogues and notions of
empowerment with Scottish and Quebecois national identity. The section argues that
in their manifestos and public documents, parties and governments create a sense of
identity that allows individuals to make judgements about their level of inclusion in the
nation and the polity, and foster a sense of difference by emphasising homogeneous
political cultures within the nation or State
Traditional political culture texts often emphasise the role of childhood agents of
socialisation School curricula, classroom and peer group dynamics, or, for adults,
media coverage, receive well deserved attention in several noted texts (Hahn 1997,
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Putnam 1994, Chomsky 1990). This thesis emphasises the content of political party
documents and government accords for two reasons. Firstly, the thesis seeks to make
claims about national identity and its relationship with political attitudes and
behaviour. In order to discuss such issues, agents who provide expressed attention to
identity and political culture warrant close attention. Second, media coverage, as is
adequately documented (Smith 1991, Maclnnes 1992), can distort or ignore the
political views and intended messages of political actors. In an effort to overcome
this difficulty, the thesis argues that political documents and constitutional accords
represent the clearest distillation of political views, in part because they are public
documents, and in part because there is no medium between the reader and the agent
of socialisation. As a result, the section seeks to present the views of parties and
governments, as they related to identity and political culture, before analysing in the
succeeding two chapters, how such messages are received by the public. Documents
from Scotland and Quebec are reviewed thematically, to allow for a greater
comparison.
Difference
In his exposition of banal nationalism Michael Billig highlighted the subtle ways in
which public debate forms people's perceptions about the nation.
The everyday ideology of contemporary society will have its
nationalist themes and myths, permitting the national community to
be imagined in various ways. In this sense, the assumptions of
nationalism will be used in commonplace discussions about politics,
foreigners, and royal families ... by encouraging certain forms of
argumentation, also silence other arguments and other possible
critiques (Billig 1995a)
A similar pattern of emphasis governs nationalist publicity in Scotland and Quebec,
most strikingly, in attempts to establish a sense of national difference. How the nation
is described sets up an unspoken comparison with other countries Thus, claiming
that Scotland or Quebec is a social democratic nation suggests that there are other
polities less supportive of State-led responses to income inequality. The chronicling
of national characteristics, in party manifestos and constitutional documents co-exists
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with efforts to establish a sense of ownership over the national debate. An
examination of each of these aspects in turn highlights how a sense of national
difference is asserted in Scotland and Quebec.
Political parties have published separate manifestos for Scotland, though initially
without any regularity, since the 1950 general election. While the extent to which
these offer diverse legislative packages differs from party to party, the Scottish
manifestos attempt to establish a stronger link between the party and its intended
audience. For the Conservative party, this has meant, at times, replacing the word
Britain with the word Scotland, or adding specific references to Scottish organisations
by name. In its 1979 manifestos, for example, the British version mentions future
consultation with the unions, and warns that "In Britain, profits are still dangerously
low". In its Scottish manifesto, the party promises future consultation "with the
unions and the STUC" and warns "In Scotland, as in Britain as a whole, profits are
still dangerously low." (Conservative Party 1979, Scottish Conservative and Unionist
Association 1979). Then, as now, the section on democratic renewal provides the
greatest disparity between British and Scottish manifestos. The 1979 UK manifesto
does not include the page-long section promising "to bring government closer to the
people and allow more decisions affecting Scotland to be made in Scotland" (Scottish
Conservative and Unionist Association 1979). In addition to an altered section on
devolution, the 1992 Conservative manifestos contain significant differences in the
introductions and conclusions. The references are not attempts to tailor the debate to
the specific needs and interests in Scotland, but rather, efforts to reinforce a
recognition that the party is speaking to an electorate of Scots.
Let us affirm our faith in the historic Union which is the United
Kingdom and let us ensure that Scotland continues to flourish and
prosper We want a modern Scotland, a confident Scotland. We
have achieved much together and I believe we can build on that
success of recent years. We offer the vision of a prosperous
Scotland with a strong voice in the affairs of our nation (Scottish
Conservative and Unionist Association 1992)
Detractors of devolution, who argued that the imposition of borders between
Scotland and England would undermine perceptions of British unity, appear
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to have overlooked that this practice already existed in election campaigns.
While the British Conservative manifesto includes a detailed list of plans for
democratic renewal in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, the Scottish
manifestos mention only Scottish devolution.
Each of the four political parties operating in Britain chronicles the characteristics it
believes to highlight best Scottish distinctiveness. Efforts to emphasise a sense of
Scottish difference are often linked to the institutions that survived the Acts ofUnion.
In his 1995 Williamson Memorial Lecture SNP leader Alex Salmond emphasised the
"passion for improvement, education, family and tradition that buttress[es] our
society" (Salmond 1995a). Two years later the SNP manifesto re-emphasised some
of these pillars of identity:
Scotland still exists despite the determined efforts of those who rule us to
diminish, dismiss and deride our national aspirations. Scotland's
institutions in the law, education, administration and in sport still have
their distinctive national characteristics despite a constant erosion by the
Westminster Parliament (SNP 1997).
The 1999 manifesto of the SNP contains similar references as may be seen from the
following two quotations: "Scotland's great achievements have been built on the
foundations of great education"; and "the Scottish legal system has long been viewed
with pride and rightly so" (SNP 1999). Previous documents emphasise the
importance of similar pillars (SNP 1983, SNP 1987).
References to the institutions that have created a distinct national character are not
limited to the SNP. Each of the other three main parties in Scotland have underlined
the importance of Scotland's education and legal system. Even the Conservative and
Unionist party affirmed the existence of a "clear Scottish identity" (Scottish
Conservative and Unionist Association 1992). Conservative leader John Major, the
1992 manifesto adds, "believes that the growing successes of Scotland are down to
the qualities of the people of Scotland" (Scottish Conservative and Unionist
Association 1992). The qualities themselves lie undefined but constant references to a
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distinct Scottish voice within the document suggests that Scottish distinctiveness is
unquestioned. Later documents refer to the Scots as "the world's greatest instinctive
entrepreneurs", a nation of "patriots, entrepreneurs and innovators" with "an
internationalist outlook" "by culture and history" (Scottish Conservative and Unionist
Association 1997). The Liberal Democrats agree, noting "Scotland has a proud
tradition as inventors and entrepreneurs," "proud traditions in university education",
"once led the world in medicine", and has a "tradition of enterprise and innovation"
(Scottish Liberal Democrats 1999).
In addition to institutional explanations of Scottish distinctiveness the parties
emphasise the importance of distinctly Scottish values. In his 1995 10th Donaldson
speech former SNP MP and current MSP George Reid claimed identity "implies a
return to separate, national roots" (Reid 1995). The national roots he characterised as
"a tradition built on the commonweal of the Celts, the moral responsibility of the
Calvinists, the social concern of the Catholics, the humanity of the Labour movement
and the civic nationalism of today" (Reid 1995). Additional SNP documents further
elaborate on this theme (Salmond 1996, Salmond 1998, SNP Research Dept 1995).
The most recent party manifesto declared "traditionally, Scots have believed in values
of compassion, community and the common weel [sic] (SNP 1999). The 1999
Conservative manifesto confirms that "a sense of community is deeply ingrained in the
Scottish psyche" (Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party 1999). In his introduction
to A Lifetime ofOpportunity, Labour leader and then Secretary of State for Scotland
Donald Dewar agreed, noting "For me, what makes our country special is not just the
beauty of our land but the strength of our values. It is a country where equality of
opportunity and social justice are central to our sense of self." He adds "These
traditional Scottish values are also the values of Scottish New Labour" (Dewar
1998). This quote shows not only that parties of diverse political views share a vision
of Scotland's key institutions, shared values and distinctiveness, but also try to align
the views of their party with the historically- justified views of Scots. In 1988
Margaret Thatcher declared "Tory values are in tune with everything that is finest in
the Scottish character, and with the proudest moments in Scottish history ... Scottish
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values are Tory values - and vice versa" (Scotsman 14 May 1988). Political debate
has also involved efforts of parties to paint their opponents as out of tune with
traditional Scottish values. The SNP, in particular, has often adopted this approach,
criticising Thatcherite values as "anti-Scottish", contemporary Conservative policies
as "anti-Scottish elitist dogma" and Blairite policies as evidence of a "contempt for
traditional values and lack of respect for the common weel [sic]" (Salmond 1996),
Salmond's conference speech two years later repeated the attack on new Labour
values as anathema to Scottish "culture and identity" (Salmond 1998)
Until the 1997 Canadian federal elections, political parties rarely provided manifesto
booklets containing a full list of policies. Instead, the parties released policies to the
press throughout the campaign in an effort to capture the electorate's interest. As a
result, the statements reviewed for this thesis stem from the constitutional packages
published by political parties, provincial and federal governments and referendum
campaigns. That said, the Quebec parties have, since the 1994 provincial election,
provided full manifestos detailing their campaign promises. These works, and other
constitutional documents from the parties, are considered in tandem with government
documents and commission reports. Within Quebec, sovereignists and federalists
have provided lists of characteristics that distinguish Quebec from the other
provinces. The 1980 Yes pamphlet argues that by language and culture, Quebecers
are distinct from other Canadians, and furthermore, that this difference not only
conveys upon Quebec the status of proxy-nation for French Canada, but that any
constitutional settlement offering less than full equality between the two 'peoples' is
an injustice to Quebecers (Directeur general des elections du Quebec 1980a). In
part, the No side agrees, claiming that Quebec possesses a French culture and 'spirit'
that distinguishes it from English Canada (Directeur general des elections du Quebec
1980b). The major difference between the two, however, is that while the Yes side
argued that the difference predated Confederation, the No side argued that difference
developed as a result of post-1867 constitutional accommodation.
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Parti Quebecois documents from the same decade make the case ofQuebecois
distinctiveness, fulfilling almost perfectly, the requirements for citizenship as
established by Geertz (Geertz 1963): , the political action of the Parti Quebecois is
founded on the existence of the people ofQuebec, a distinct people; a people
occupying a clearly identified territory, a people with the right to self determination"
(Parti Quebecois 1987). Statements such as "la langue franqaise est au coeur de
notre identite (Parti Quebecois 1991) and "the education system is the cradle of
society ... the sense ofbelonging to Quebec society [is] shaped within it" (Parti
Quebecois 1991) further reinforce the message.
The comparison, of nation to State, appears frequently in political documents dealing
with Quebec. While campaign literature within Quebec has opted to reinforce the
distinct characteristics ofQuebecers, constitutional documents commissioned,
supported, or in some case written, by the federal government systematically attempt
to reinforce the common bonds between Quebecers and other Canadians. The
argument that similarities are larger that whatever differences may exist, appears to be
the preferred tactic of federal governments from Trudeau to Chretien. In his 1978
pre-referendum document, former prime minister Trudeau argued that Canadians
share a history, sense of national solidarity and democratic values. A new
constitution, promised Trudeau, would further encourage Canadians to 'enjoy full
pride and satisfaction in belonging and contributing to this great country' (Trudeau
1978). Six years later, the Quebec Draft Agreement on the constitution noted that
former prime minister Brian Mulroney argued for a different tactic although the goal
of national integration remained the same (Gouvernement du Quebec 1985) The
constitution, Mulroney argued, must re-establish the bond of trust between Quebecers
and the federal government, and therefor must acknowledge the distinct character of
the Quebecois. The agreement notes that recognition oft he existence of a people of
Quebec is a prerequisite to the agreement and participation of Quebec. Furthermore,
the draft argues that the agreement must be between the people ofQuebec and the
population of the rest ofCanada Thus, the draft draws a firm distinction between a
population - an aggregate of individuals - and a people in possession of a language,
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culture and history. Reflecting upon the wrongs caused by the repatriation of the
constitution without the consent ofQuebec, the agreement argues that Canadian
institutions must reflect the particular needs of the Quebecois people, influenced as
they are by a distinct language, culture and society.
It is worth noting that in its 1991 final report for the Citizen's Forum on Canada's
Future, the Citizen's Forum returned to the Trudeau-iste vision of the Canadian
federation, maintaining that 'Canadian citizenship is an emotional tie, a sense of
shared values and commitments to our country ... [a] focus for unity" (Citizen's
Forum on Canada's Future 1991). The report seems to mark a half-way point
between the views advanced by Trudeau and Mulroney by adding that 'being
Canadian does not require that we all be alike. Around a core set of values, Canadian
citizenship accommodates a respect for diversity that enriches us all' (Citizen's Forum
on Canada's Future 1991). The common bonds are characterised by a belief in
freedom, dignity, respect, equality, fair treatment and opportunity to participate. The
extent to which these values distinguish Canadians from, for example, Americans or
Britons, Germans or Norwegians remains open to debate.
History and Progress
If, as Edward Said claims, the process of self-definition is exposed in the practice of
writing history, the way in which political parties and constitutional documents view
the historical development and progress of the nation betrays certain predispositions
in their views on identity (Said 1995). In particular, the documents seek to locate the
present with respect to the past, chronicling an increasing sense of empowerment.
For Hall, "identities are the names we give to the different ways we are positioned by,
and position ourselves within, the narratives of the past" (Hall, 1990). In his
examination of Scottish history, Smout agrees: "National identities are constructed
out of references to history, or more exactly, to received popular ideas about history
that achieve mythic status" (Smout 1994). Interpretations of history, much as with
debates about which party best represents Scotland's interests, degenerate into
arguments over who best understands Scotland's development. Charges that other
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providing manufacturing muscle at the centre of a major empire. Now we
often appear to be a social and economic backwater, perched on the
fringes of a third rate, focused and perpetually wrong footed power
(Salmond 1995a)
Several of the documents refer to the need for Scotland to "become a normal nation,
playing a normal part in the world" (SNP 1995). Scotland deserves better, argues the
SNP, and must "put these wasted, futile years behind ... and be a nation again" (SNP
1992). In their assessments of the union, both Labour and the Conservatives highlight
the strong and vibrant partnership that has guaranteed economic success and political
voice for an otherwise small nation. "We are Scottish and British - proud to be both
and proud of what our partnership in the United Kingdom has achieved over the last
300 years" (Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party 1992). Remarkably similar, the
Labour party calls for "A vibrant Scotland within a strong Britain working together
for a healthy and prosperous Europe where our children can grow up confident and
comfortable in their complementary identities: Scottish, British and European"
(Labour 1992). A more tempered view of the union appears in Labour's New
Scotland, New Britain document: Scotland's new Parliament "addresses both the
wrongs of the past and the challenges of the future" (Brown and Alexander 1998). It
is in its assessment of the historical wrongs endured by Scotland that the Labour
document testifies to a particular view of national development. On the whole, the
paper treats Conservative administrations and negative aspects ofWestminster
interchangeably. Under Labour, Westminster is seen as a beneficent force in British
politics, granting democracy to Scotland. The problem, it would appear, was not the
British constitutional settlement but rather Mrs Thatcher. The personalisation of
history attempts to direct the critique away from English power within union towards
"the constitutional consequences ofMrs Thatcher ... NO second Mrs Thatcher could
ever inflict such damage on Scottish civic life again". Needless to say, the document
shies away from the generic applications of this statement - that no second
democratically elected and supported English prime minister could ever control
Scottish civic institutions again. The extent to which this is a valid critique of history
or democratic rhetoric receives attention in the following section
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Assessments of the desired future development of Scotland differ along party lines.
For Labour, success lies in the creation of a multinational country. "Can Britain
become, as we would like, the first successful multicultural multiethnic multinational
country?" (Brown and Alexander 1998). Despite the obvious problems with such a
statement, in particular the omission of various other countries possessing charters of
rights, multiculturalism policies and higher proportions of immigrants, the document
clearly elucidates Labour's preferred future strategy. The answer, is a renewed
democracy, new parliaments for Scotland and Wales, a freedom of information act
and charter of rights all under the rubric of "a modern democracy". Increased fairness
- a fair citizenship law, a fair chance - was seen as a definite marker of progress. In its
1992 manifesto, however, the Conservative party expressed its preference for a
different plan: "The Union has evolved since its inception in 1707. We have seen the
establishment of the Scottish Office and the creation of the office of Secretary of State
for Scotland. Most of Scotland's government is administered by Scots in Scotland .
it is only as a full and equal partner in the Union that Scotland can remain strong" In
an effort to undermine the links established by the SNP between self-confidence and
independence, the Conservative party claimed "As Scots, we are sufficiently self-
confident to be able to share our sovereignty within the United Kingdom, within
Europe an in the wider world" (Scottish Conservative and Unionist Association 1992)
Within Quebec, the emphasis of separatist partisan programmes has changed
dramatically over the past twenty years. Where once the Parti Quebecois attempted
to highlight and reinforce the sense of difference dividing francophone Quebecers and
other Canadians, party platforms now approach sovereignty and self-determination as
a natural, if long-overdue, step in the development of any nation. As the party stated
in 1994: "Le peuple quebecois existe. Le Quebec comme pays est encore a venir"
(Parti Quebecois 1994). Or, in an earlier document:
For generations and against all odds, we have maintained an identity that
sets us apart in North America . We must believe that we are mature
enough, and big enough, and strong enough, to come to terms with our
destiny . . [We have accumulated] all the essential experiences . The
Quebec nation is a family that will soon be four hundred years old Long
before reaching that age, in both the Americas, Anglo Saxons, Spaniards
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and Portuguese gained their sovereignty. History has delayed our
emancipation for a long time, but it has not prevented Quebec society
from maturing and painfully reaching a level where it could progress and
administer and govern itself. We Quebecers are a nation, the most firmly
anchored nation on this continent. Over the vast expanses of our land,
our deep-rooted memories and our vital presence are constant reminders
that the Quebec people is at home here, in this, its ancestral home ... this
home [is] completely ours ... delays have taken a heavy toll. We have
also been left with a strong inferiority complex, which is the only real
reason for our hesitations. We have the chance now to get rid of it once
and for all and we have no right to let this chance go by ... We will not
hesitate, then, at the great crossroads of the referendum, to choose the
only road that can open up the horizon and guarantee us a free, proud and
adult national existence, the road that will be opened by us
(Gouvernement du Quebec 1985)
In documents that consistently employ the future tense, national sovereignty is
portrayed as an essential prerequisite ofQuebec's social and economic development.
Federalism, not in its direct application but as a theory of governance, is portrayed as
a barrier to national development. If Quebec were to transcend its present
arrangements, the benefits would accrue not only from the security of an
internationally-recognised collective identification, but also through an end to feelings
of inadequacy and disempowerment (Bloc Quebecois 1998). If it is to be an adult
and legitimate nation, a step for which it is qualified, Quebec requires independence:
"the attainment of sovereignty is a normal process, one that has been undertaken by
all nations elsewhere in the world ... As Quebecers, we should be masters in our own
house, masters of our destiny" (Parti Quebecois 1994)
Those less supportive of the nationalist cause have attempted to interpret destiny in
their own way. The 1980 NO pamphlet reminds Quebecers of the strong francophone
leaders of their past, men like Lafontaine, Cartier, Laurier, St Laurent and Trudeau, to
whom it is obliquely argued, current voters owe their continued Canadian citizenship
(DGE 1980). In contrast, the 1980 Yes pamphlet and the 1985 Quebec government
report Quebec-Canada: A New Deal chronicle a list of injustices endured by Canada's
francophone population. Beginning with the Conquest, typical lists pass through the
Manitoba Schools Question, and Regulation 17 in Ontario. Earlier lists typically end
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with anglophone objections to Bills 22 and 101, both of which are portrayed as efforts
to maintain a fragile francophone identity. Later depictions, most notably the
preamble to Bill 1: An Act Respecting the Sovereignty of Quebec, decry the wasted
efforts of constitutional negotiations in 1982, 1987 and 1992:
We were hoodwinked in 1982 ... The failure of the Meech Lake Accord
in 1990 confirmed a refusal to recognise even our distinct character. And
in 1992 the rejection of the Charlottetown Accord by both Canadians and
Quebecers confirmed the conclusion that no redress was possible"
(Gouvernement du Quebec 1995)
At the same time, interpretations of the federation often highlight not inconsiderable
inequities. In 1990 Ontario received half of the federal government's research and
development funds. That same year Quebec received less than twenty percent of the
funds (PQ 1994)
In sum, if Scottish political documents differ in their understandings of the past,
political documents in Quebec offer diverse understandings of collective destiny. In
part this could stem from the stage and focus of each separatist movement. This is
not to deny that Scottish documents deal with future political issues. The Scottish
Constitutional Convention outlined the various ways in which devolution could
correct the specific injustices of the past. Calls for gender equality, for example,
constitute a specific attempt to deal with the present inequitable system and highlight
the ways in which a changed future could provide for greater political equality. The
difference between Scotland and Quebec stems from notions of destiny. Future
political change in Scotland was seen as necessary not because it was owed to Scots
but rather because the present situation had to be changed. Separatists within Quebec
have argued, in contrary, for the fulfilment of natural and evolutionary step in
national development.
Rights and Democracy
The third theme running through the public documents is democracy. More
specifically, the theme addresses issues of collective rights and self-determination An
examination of each of these themes highlights the ways in which organised groups
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have undermined the democracy of the pre-devolution settlement and the current
situation in Quebec. In Scotland, one of the most effective critiques of the unitary
system of government concerned the 'absence of democracy' (Brown, McCrone and
Paterson 1998, Kellas 1989). Unionism was seen as anti-democratic because
individuals were not receiving the governments that they voted for. If one sees a
democratic system as the political rule of the majority over the minority, however, the
democratic deficit years of 1979-1997 can be understood as unfair, but not necessarily
undemocratic. The reason such an argument is made possible lies in the use of
Scotland as a meaningful aggregate that deserves its own democratic system. Efforts
to link the democratic spirit of Scotland with the anti-democratic political system are
on shaky ground for two reasons: one, because the democratic spirit is a sociological
construct, and two, because the nature of Scottish representation in Westminster
remains largely unchanged
According to New ScotlandNew Britain, "Those of use who had consistently
supported Devolution had always believed that the absence of democracy in Scotland
diminished Scottish civic life" (Brown and Alexander 1998). The report adds that
the Scottish Constitutional Convention attempted to preserve all that was good in
Scotland. It "did not seek to destroy what was British that was of benefit to Scotland.
It was for Scottish democracy, not against British democracy" (Brown and
Alexander 1998). While it would be tempting to dismiss such a statement as utter
nonsense, a closer reflection reveals an attempt to define Scotland as a collection of
constituencies worthy of democracy. It would be a particularly difficult argument to
make that the Scots prefer democracy more than their English counterparts, or their
French and German counterparts for that matter. That said, the number of
constituencies voting against the Conservatives in Scotland remained throughout the
1980s lower than the number of English constituencies supporting Labour. As Kellas
notes, in 1983 a 25 percent spread developed between the support for Labour in
Scotland and support for the Conservatives in England (Kellas 1989). And yet,
constituencies within England continued to vote for the Labour party in the face of
Conservative governments. Why then is it accurate to claim that one constituency -
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or rather a total of 209 (1983) to 271 (1992) constituencies - voting against the
majority is not an affront to democracy while 41 (1983) to 50 (1987) constituencies
north of the English border voting against the majority is a sign of damaged
democracy?20 The answer is that Scotland is portrayed as a meaningful aggregate,
worthy of self-determination while the disparate Labour-voting constituencies in
England are not. Such an argument is not articulated by the political documents in
Scotland but rather is an assumed premise.
SNP documents also address the issue of rights, but rather than emphasising the
absence of democracy within the pre-devolution settlement, point out that Scots may
choose, at any election, to exercise their rights of self-determination (SNP 1983, SNP
1995, Salmond 1996, Salmond 1998).21 Scots must rise up and "demand what is
[their] birth right" (SNP 1987) for "the condition of Scotland is the inescapable
responsibility of every adult Scot" (Salmond 1996).
Aligning itself with strong democratic traditions, the Parti Quebecois notes that it was
the first in North America to elect a leader through universal suffrage (Parti
Quebecois 1994). Statements such as these not only reinforce the dedication of the
PQ to use the existing channels to achieve self-determination but also emphasise the
weight of democracy in the national debate. PQ justification for self-determination
stems, as stated earlier, from notions of cultural particularity and common destiny.
This in itself is not particularly remarkable. The way in which opponents of
separatism rebut these claims, however, highlights to relationship between rights and
self-determination in Quebec. The anglophone-dominated Equality Party defines itself
as a "100 percent Canadian voice" and encourages the voters to move beyond choices
offered by the "separatist PQ and the nationalist Liberals" (Equality Party 1994).
Promising to reverse "twenty years of provincial economic nationalism which benefits
"
In part, the answer could lie in the proportion of seats won by parties other than the government.
In the United Kingdom as a whole, the percentage of Labour seats 1979 to 1992 ranged from 23% in
1983 to 42 % in 1979 and 1992. In Scotland, the percentage of Labour scats ranged from 57% in
1979 to 70% in 1987.
21
Exceptions include the 1997 party manifesto, which stated Scotland "is denied its democratic right
to self-government" (SNP 1997)
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an educated, privileged French-speaking elite" the Equality Party policy booklet
pledges to reject the special status ofQuebec, sign the constitution, and declare the
distinct society clause as racist given its basis in ethnic origin and mother tongue.
Several pages later the party, which at its electoral height held four seats in the
National Assembly, pledges its support for self-government for Canada's Aboriginal
people. The ideological link between self-determination for Quebec and self-
government for the First Nations properly questions the logical extension of
separatism. In arguing that Quebec separatism is unfounded but that Aboriginal self-
government is not, the Equality party is attempting to argue that the rights of one
group to self-determination, rights which are grounded in a distinct culture, language
and history, carry more weight than another collective. This tension, between self-
determination and rights, dominates political literature in Quebec.
Conclusion
Although the previous section has provided a comprehensive examination of political
literature in Scotland and Quebec, where does that leave constructions of identity and
political culture in both case studies? In particular, how might individuals who would
consider themselves on the margins of national society, whether because they are
new-arrivals to the country or because they possess a particular mix of social
characteristics, integrate themselves into the nation? The literature in Quebec makes
explicit mention of non-Quebecois although the Scottish literature is more
circumspect. For Quebecois separatists, independence would "clarify the often
uncomfortable situation ofmany new Quebecers who feel a dual allegiance to Quebec
and to Canada" (PQ 1994). Both the Quebec Liberal party and the Parti Quebecois
have described themselves as tolerant and open, welcoming of immigrants and non-
francophones. The reaction of individuals, both national members and outsiders, to
these claims, forms the focus of chapters four and five.
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Contested Identities, Hierarchies of Belonging
and Political Attitudes in Scotland and Quebec
Institutional constructions of identity, as examined in chapter three, provide for a
relevant sense of distance between national members and non-members who may each
use pillars of identity to gauge their levels of inclusion. By ensuring separate
processes of socialisation, and by projecting images of the nation that highlight certain
markers of belonging, national institutions and political organisations further the
debate about collective difference and can ensure the continued political salience of
national identity. This chapter examines the ways in which these constructions are
internalised by individuals within the population in Scotland and Quebec. To this end
it examines how aggregate notions of identity have changed in the last forty years,
before examining how individuals understand their own sense of identity and the
interaction between the different linguistic, ethnic and political groups in each case
study. The chapter argues that constant reference is made by individuals to the
expectation of acceptance. Individuals are aware of the markers used to validate
claims to belonging and highlight these to reinforce or detract from membership.
Statements such as "I wasn't born here but.."I'm half-English" and "I'm married to
a francophone" betray an awareness of the variable importance of birth, ancestry and
language in Scotland and Quebec. Other markers of belonging such as popular values
also influence identity claims, The chapter deals with the selection and/or
appointment of arbiters of identity - institutions or national groups deemed to have
definitive power over the construction of national identity - and their influence on
individual perceptions of identity and belonging. Above all, the chapter argues that
the perceptions of others matter in our ability to make claims to national belonging
and that any acquisition of national identity depends in part on the expectation of
acceptance into the nation.
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As highlighted in chapter two, most examinations of national identity concentrate on
the collective markers of difference rather than the individual process of self-
alignment with the nation. This absence clearly by-passes a crucial element of the
identity process. Recently examined in a burgeoning literature on social identity, the
process of self categorisation serves as one of the more contested actions of self-
definition (Oakes 1996, Tajfel 1982, Turner 1982). Furthermore, as argued in
chapter two, the ability of individuals to determine their own membership in collective
groups relies on the expected acceptance of claims to belonging. Those lacking the
recognised markers ofmembership will encounter greater difficulty in their bid for
membership. The result, potential exclusion ffom the nation or, most likely, a sense of
doubt of place in the nation, depends on the saliency and construction of identity
within the nation. This thesis questions the extent to which the perception of
alienation within the nation can be redressed by inclusion in the political sphere;
whether those who would consider themselves outside the Quebecois or Scottish
nation can overcome their exclusion by participating in the politics, whether as
members of political parties, interest lobbies or civic organisations. This chapter
examines subjective understandings of the State, of deference, trust, efficacy,
confidence and satisfaction, as they differentially affect those with varying perceptions
of national inclusion to determine first, whether values are spread evenly throughout
society, and second, whether attitudes symptomatic of political alienation occur more
readily in those lacking the obvious markers of national membership. Clearly, the
absence of survey questions which engage belonging in more than a cursory manner
hinders a purely statistical examination of identity and political culture. With this in
mind the chapter builds on understandings of political culture and national identity as
promoted by the collective institutions mentioned in chapters three and four. The
chapter examines how these collective constructions affect individual perceptions of
identity and political community. Similarly, care is taken not to accept, a priori, the
direction of the relationship between national and political alienation. The two do not
exist in clear opposition and the extent to which individuals see them as separate will
determine much of the proceeding analysis. The relationship between inclusion, of
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any form, and positive evaluations of politics precede any attempt to determine
whether national or political inclusion exerts a greater, or prior, influence.
In the process of its examination, this chapter makes several claims. Primarily, it
argues hat the perceptions of others matter in our understandings of identity; that in
our claims to belonging and attachment we consider how these claims will be
perceived. Sometimes, however, our assessment ofwhat other people think, our
understanding of their perceptions, is not always accurate. This chapter evaluates the
negotiation of these claims to belonging, and their effect on one aspect of political
culture in post-referendum Scotland and Quebec, to determine whether hierarchies of
belonging exist, whether they are salient, and how they affect the political attitudes
and behaviour of all within the boundaries of the nation/province/country. To this
end, it examines how aggregate measures of identity in Scotland and Quebec have
changed since the 1960s before turning to the qualitative expressions of identity
gathered through more than 80 interviews with residents in Scotland and Quebec.
Lastly, the chapter uses this understanding of identity to test its theory of hierarchical
belonging and the distribution of political attitudes in the two case studies. In short,
the chapter focuses on how different groups and individuals in Scotland and Quebec
cope with their positions within or outwith the respective nation.
AGGREGATE MEASURES OF IDENTTY
Often criticised as blunt instruments of social investigation, aggregate indicators of
identity, and the measures used to extract such data, provide a coherent picture of
changing patterns of attachment and belonging. The absence of long and involved
identity questions on electoral study questionnaires, a result of limited space and
different goals for data, prevents a similar availability of individual measures of
personal identity. In the absence of comprehensive micro-data, identity research must
buttress existing quantitative data with qualitative examinations and surveys of
collective measures. Sometimes the availability of survey reports allows for an
analysis of these results on the basis of certain social characteristics. For example,
publicly available opinion poll data measure identity choices against such factors as
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social class, age, sex, housing tenure, and employment activity. Often, preferences for
parties or certain constitutional options are included in the analysis of identity
questions. The relative availability of this data allows for a fairly comprehensive
examination of the relationship between pre-determined identity choices and social
characteristics over time. Scottish and Quebec data highlights the changing nature of
identity preferences, and indeed, the changing influence of factors such as age and
social class, in the last decade. In both cases, the sheer amount of data allows for a
comprehensive examination of identity.
Measurement
Part of the problem ofmeasurement stems from the moving 'target' of identity. The
importance and substance of identity varies both in context and over time. Within the
literature, identity has been used as a sense ofbelonging (Turner 1982, Wetherell
1996b), a particular outlook (Erikson 1974) or a self-ascribed label (Hall 1996).
Recent efforts to problematise identity highlight the frustration with existing
measurement attempts (Mendelsohn 1999, Bechhofer and McCrone 1998) Criticism
addresses issues of definition and measurement, such as the construction of identity
scales (Mendelsohn 1999), the operationalisation of identity theory (Hall 1996), and
the treatment of identity data in the search for meaningful correlations. In particular,
researchers point to the low saliency of political beliefs and the questioned
relationship between attitudes, values, beliefs and behaviour. Each of these, when
compounded by the questionable ability of individuals to explain their own identities,
prove stumbling blocks for any empiricist attempting to capture the true meaning of
political culture and national identity
Evidence from World Values Surveys suggests that in general, individuals are
expressing a level of attachment to the nation or State rather than the town or region
Data from the 1981 and 1998 surveys, for example, highlight the dramatic change in
allegiance in the United States as well as debunking the long-standing myth that
Canadians have an underdeveloped sense of patriotism. The data also point to the lack
of a significant continental identity in Europe, notwithstanding the significant political
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change occurring there. At first glance, the data appear to detract from claims that
political boundaries reinforce a sense of shared identity.
Figure 4.1: Comparative Identity Support
Percentage responding to the Question: Which of these geographical groups would you say
you belong to first of all? And the next?
Can. Can. 90-81 US US 90-81 Eur. Eur. 90-81
1981 1990 1981 1990 1981 1990
World 6 10 +4 8 17 +9 8 8 0
Continent 3 3 0 2 4 +2 3 4 +1
Nation 30 40 + 10 20 30 +10 29 25 -4
Region 20 16 -4 19 12 -7 14 17 +3
Town 42 31 -9 52 38 -14 46 43 -3
Source: World Values Surveys 1981, 1990 in Nevitte 1996.
The World Values Surveys provide the largest databank of comparative survey data
(Nevitte 1996). In its first year, the programme gathered data in twenty-two
countries. One decade later forty countries were included in the project. The results
shown here allow for a simple comparison among Canada, the United States and
Europe over time. The statistics show that a greater affinity for the nation in North
America and a decreased affinity to smaller localities such as the region or town.
North Americans have not begun to feel a strong continental affinity, despite the
integrative efforts of the free trade. That said, a slightly larger percentage of the
population indicate that they feel an affinity to the 'world as a whole'. These results
stand apart from European data, which indicate that fewer individuals feel an affinity
to the nation and a greater proportion report regional ties. The influence of the
European Union, according to this data, does not appear to be any different than the
influence ofNAFTA as far as identity group membership is concerned. The questions
used in the World Values Survey, however, do not provide comprehensive
assessments of self-identification. A complete examination of quantitative identity
trends in Scotland and Quebec must predate any analysis of qualitative data.
Aggregate measures of identity in Scotland find little consistency prior to the
introduction of the Moreno question in 1986 (Moreno 1988). Prior to this, votes for
the Scottish National Party served as proxies for measures of increasing Scottish
identity at the expense ofBritish allegiance. As stated earlier, Moreno's scale asks
respondents to classify their identity as: Scottish not British, More Scottish than
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British, Equally Scottish and British, More British than Scottish, British not Scottish.
The equivalent poles in the Canadian version usually require respondents to choose
between their Canadian and Quebecois identities although questions probing
attachment rather than identity prove most popular.
In Scotland, results since the beginning of the decade show a gradual preference for a
Scottish identity allowing for a sense ofBritishness at the expense of a uniquely
territorial visions of self Complaints that the question itself encourages a false
opposition of Scottishness and Britishness find little support from those who accept
that the measure, for all its methodological faults, provides as robust a measure as the
public is willing to accept. As McCrone states, people seem to understand what the
question is getting at (McCrone 1996). This in itself makes the Moreno scale a more
valuable measure than other more complicated tests of allegiance or sense of self. An
examination of the trends over time highlight the malleability of identity choices in
Scotland.
Figure 4.2: National Identity in Scotland
—•—Scottish not British More Scottish than British —A— Equally Scottish and British
X More British than Scottish — British not Scottish
The Scottish data illustrates the extent to which identity preferences change over time
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although for the most part the movement occurs within the top three categories.
During past two general election campaigns the proportion of individuals who
reported that they felt 'More Scottish than British' rose from the pre-election period.
At the same time the proportion who felt 'Scottish not British' decreased. This
apparent paradox could stem from the participation of Scots in a British political rite.
Thus, the importance of Scottishness was increased because it represented an
occasion to speak 'as a collective' within the political system, and yet at the same
time, the practice ofvoting demonstrated an affinity to the British polity. For the
September 1997 devolution referendum, the proportion of individuals reporting that
they felt 'More Scottish than British' fell, perhaps because within an electorate
composed entirely of Scots, the importance of Scottishness is mitigated.
A comparison of recent data from Scotland, Spain and Quebec points to differing
understandings of the identity question. While Scots' answers tend to cluster at the
top of the scale, the more even distribution in Catalonia points to a lack of consensus
on identity. Results from the Basque region raise still other issues. The clustering of
results at the ends of the spectrum or at the mid-point highlight the lack of support for
more nuanced understandings of dual identity. (Brown, McCrone and Paterson
1998) For the most part, Scots appear more likely to prioritise their national, rather
than State, identity, than respondents in Catalonia or Quebec.
Figure 4.3: National Identity in Britain, Spain and Canada
Percentage agreeing with each statement
x=Scottish, English, Welsh, Catalan, Basque orQuebecois
Scotland England Wales Catalonia Euskadi Quebec
x not British, Spanish, 23 8 13 20 31 14
Canadian
xmore than British, 39 16 29 16 14 35
Spanish, Canadian
Equally x and British, 27 46 26 35 33 24
Spanish, Canadian
British, Spanish, 4 15 10 35 8 15
Canadian more than x
British, Spanish, 4 9 15 23 14 9
Canadian not x
Sources: SES 1997 in Brown, McCrone and Paterson 1998, CROP1998
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Within Britain, Scots appear more willing to prioritise their national or sub-State
identity than those in Wales or England. Residents in the Basque region of Spain
appear more likely to self-ascribe regional identities than those in Catalonia and
Wales. Within Quebec, the total proportion indicating a preference for a Quebec,
rather than Canadian identity illustrates that Quebecers are second only to Scots in
their level of attachment to the nation. It is worth noting, however, that the question
asked ofQuebecers differs slightly from the question asked of those in Britain and
Spain. Deviating slightly from the Moreno question, individuals were asked about
their allegiance, rather than identity. Thus, in Scotland, the identity question taps a
label of self-description, whereas measures in Quebec force respondents to assess
their attachment to the collective. Asking respondents for their level of attachment or
belonging to a State, province or nation is not the same as asking respondents how
they feel about themselves. A further gap, between attachment and belonging, has
forced at least one researcher to decry the undiscriminating use of opinion poll data to
explain sociological phenomena (Mendelsohn 1999), While both the media and
electoral study teams opt for the Moreno question in Britain, the division between
questions asked by private polling firms and electoral studies further inhibits a
comparison over time. For their part, private polling firms have opted for a single
identity question over the series of identity scales used by the election teams.
Identity changes in Canada address not only the issue of shared identities, but also the
changing self-definition from French Canadian to Quebecois. Although the data
highlights significant changes in the transfer of identity in the 1980s, this can be
interpreted as a delayed reaction to the influence of the Quiet Revolution. The period
of modernisation and increasing use of provincial machinery as a guarantor of
Francophone rights and cultural vitality is usually seen as the engine of identity change
(Martin 1998).
Figure 4.4: Identity Change in Quebec
Percentage listing the following in response to the question: How would you describe your
identity?
1970 1977 1979 1984 1985 1988 1990 1998
Quebec 21 36 37 37 39 49 59 52
French Canadian 44 48 45 48 42 49 59 52
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Canadian j 34 16 14 13 16 11 9 15
Source: Mendelsohn 1999
As explained in chapter three, the transition of the label, from French Canadian to
Quebecois, occurred in the 1960s, when the provincial government of Quebec took
on an stronger role not only with respect to social and economic provisions but also
as a guarantor of the Quebecois culture and identity. As a result, the most dramatic
change in identity labels may have occurred before the data indicated in this table.
And yet within twenty years, an additional forty percent of the Quebec population
thinks in terms of their province rather than in terms of the State. This could also
stem from the increasing distance between Quebecers and francophones outside
Quebec. As the Quebec government became more pro-active it also became titular
head of the francophone population within Canada; ensuring that francophones had a
voice within Canada and ensuring a strong Quebec became synonymous. As a result,
a pan-Canadian identity linked by language, because increasingly irrelevant.'
More recently, private polling firms have begun employing variations of the Moreno
question in Quebec. Although the data stems from a relatively restricted period of
time, the results show a small change in identity preferences. As in Scotland, the
general election year 1997 coincided with an increased proportion of Quebecers
emphasising their provincial, rather than State identity.
1 The interaction between Quebecers and francophone hors Quebec is charted in a number ofworks
(Bonin 1992, Donneur 1975. Laponcc 1987).
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Figure 4.5: National Identity in Quebec
—•—Quebec only —0—Quebec then Canada —A—Canada and Quebec
X Canada then Quebec — Canada only
Although the results display a stronger attachment to the larger entity than data
gathered in Scotland, the general trend, of support for a multiple identity that favours
the nation, mirrors the British data.
Within Canada, whether as a result of the continued attention to regional identity or a
greater preference for quantitative methods, a diverse package of identity questions
have been used to gauge allegiance, identity, belonging and attachment over time. In
addition, questions have sought not only to track identity changes over time, but to
understand the reasons why identity appears malleable. These measures have not
been employed in the Scottish case, and thus a direct comparison between the case
studies remains, for the moment, impossible. However, an analysis of how these
questions relate to one another raises questions about accuracy with which social
scientists and private polling firms measure identity. In an adaptation of the identity-
poles questions offered by Moreno, the polling firm Ekos sought to compare identity
trends throughout Canada. The results, published in the English-language daily
Gazette in Montreal show that there is little to distinguish the provincial allegiances of
all Canadians, regardless of place of residence. The figure that separates Quebecers
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from other Canadians is thus not an inordinately high attachment to the province, but
rather, a below-average attachment to Canada.
Figure 4.6: National Attachment in Canada







0 -I 1 1 1 1 1
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Data over a longer period of time display a similar trend. The following table tracks
the locus of attachment for Quebec residents.
Figure 4.7: National Attachment in Quebec
Percentage listing the following in response to the question: Who do you feel closer
to?
1980 1995/08 1996/03 1997/12 1998/04 1998/11
Quebec 92 91 91 90 92 91
Canada 76 67 63 63 75 72
Source: Mendelsohn 1999
Results from figures 4.6 and 4.7 demonstrate that while Quebecers record similar
levels of allegiance to their province as other Canadians in their respective provinces
(apart from a high of 87 percent in the referendum year), their sense of belonging to
Canada is less than that of other Canadians by an average of 35 percent. Support for
autonomy in Quebec appears to stem more from a lack of attachment to the federal
entity than a stronger sense of belonging in Quebec. Additional poll results highlight
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referendum examination of attitudes in Canada, pollster Angus Reid also asked
whether individuals felt less attached to Canada than they did a few years ago.
Figure 4.8: National Attachment in Canada and Quebec
Percentage agreeing with the statement "I feel..."
Identity Country of Residence
Canada Quebec Rest of Canada
profoundly attached to Canada 86 62 95
profoundly attached to province 89 91 88
more attached to province than to Canada 46 66 40
less committed to Canada than a few years 31 53 23
ago
Angus Reid 1996 sample size 3603 (Quebec 650)
As these results indicate, the declining attachment to Canada among one in two
Quebecers accompanies a similar decline among one in five Canadians outside
Quebec. Similarly, two in five Canadians outside Quebec feel more attached to their
province than to Canada. The poll results demonstrate a clear trend of allegiance
away from the larger entity towards the nation although at present this trend occupies
only one third of Canadians. Dis-aggregated data from CROP gathered for the
Council for Canadian Unity displays a similar trend.
Figure 4.9: Regional Attachment in Canada
Percentage agreeing with the statement: I feel ...
Atlantic Quebec Ontario West
Attached to Canada 97 75 96 95
Attached to province 94 92 90 92
Attached to City/ 92 90 87 87
Community
Attached to World 86 75 86 87
Source: CROP 1998
This statistics differ from results presented in figure 4.1. In the World Values Survey,
respondents were asked to chose from a list of options whether they felt more
attached to the world, continent, country, region or city. The CROP study does not
require that individuals chose one option over the other, but rather asks respondents
to assess each factor on its own. As a result, these statistics provide higher levels of
attachment than the World Values Surveys. As other data explains, the level of
provincial attachment among Quebecers is indistinguishable from the provincial
attachments of other Canadians. Furthermore, attachment to city or community
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compares favourably across the regions of Canada. Just as a smaller proportion of
Quebecers report an attachment to Canada, so does a smaller proportion indicate an
attachment to the world.
As previously stated, Canadian methodologists have experimented with several
questions in an attempt to unpack the identity dispositions of Quebecers and other
Canadians. Part of their quest has involved efforts to understand the motivations for
different levels of attachment and belonging. In its 1998 examination of attitudes in
the Quebec, polling company CROP provided respondents with double-barrelled
questions that encouraged individuals to justify their attachment by the second clause
Figure 4.10: Justification of Attachment in Quebec
Percentage agreeing with the statement "I feel ..." C= Canada, Q=Quebec
Quebec French
Quebec
Profound attachment to C. 1 like this country and what it 32 24
represents
Attached to C so long as it gives me a good standard of 30 32
living
Not attached to C but 1 would prefer that Q remained part of C 18 20
Not attached to C and 1 would prefer that Q stopped being 15 19
part of C
Source: CROP 1998
The problems associated with using this data are many and varied. First of all, the
pre-determined selection of options severely limits the explanations that can be used.
Sovereignists who retain a level of attachment to Canada, either as a nation or as a
political jurisdiction, would not find their views expressed in the options on offer.
Likewise, those who feel that attachment to a larger entity detracts from personal
identity would not be pleased with the options listed above. As will be discussed
later, similar issues affect questions offering a majority of answers in reference to dual
national identities. In each case, the answers of individuals are limited to
preconceived notions of identity.
The distinction between measures of attachment and measures of identity emphasise
different aspects of the identity debate. Moreno-type questions tracking identity
labels suggest that a smaller proportion in each location feel that they possess solitary
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identities as either Scots or Quebecois. In addition, a greater proportion express an
attachment than prioritise their national identity. The results suggest that a sense of
identity does not automatically accompany a sense of attachment but that attachment
is more prevalent that identity. This link, between identity, attachment and, later
belonging, remains the subject of analysis in later sections.
The plethora of Canadian data on the issues of attachment and belonging suggest that
the long standing Canadian identity crisis has led to a level of reflection and
measurement that attempts to come to grips with some of the more slippery aspects of
identity. Within Scotland, a consistent application of the Moreno question has
provided a reliable tool for measuring identity over time. Even with this tool, the data
has not been particularly useful in explaining the content and salience of identity.
Some of these issues are highlighted in the following section.
ISSUES IN IDENTITY MEASUREMENT
As stated earlier, most survey work using national identity as an independent variable
exerting influence over partisan preference or voter turnout rely on a variation of Luis
Moreno's five-point identity scale (Moreno 1988). Developed while comparing
national identity in Scotland and Catalonia, Moreno's scale lends itself to
straightforward quantification and cross-national comparison. Despite the importance
of creating data to test relationships between variables, what Moreno's scale gains in
applicability it lacks in description. The scale fails to identify the strength with which
national feelings are held, what such self-identification actually means to the
individual, and leaves hidden the components of identity itself. What, for instance, are
the distinguishing characteristics of the Scottish or Quebecois national identity? How
is the identity of an individual who self-identifies as solely Scottish different from the
identity of an individual whose self-definition allows for a minimal sense of
Britishness? If used in isolation, Moreno's categories, while valuable in their ability to
demonstrate the effect of national identity on political behaviour, fail to provide a
sense of context to national identity; what it is about national identity that affects
subsequent behaviour. Although Canadian newspapers have been quick to
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commission opinion polls using the Moreno identity scales, the election surveys in
Canada rely on a different instrument to measure the varying levels of identity within
the country. Asking respondents to indicate their level of attachment to their province
and country on two scales of 1 to 100, while avoiding the binary opposition of the
British scale, provides little insight into the motivations of belonging. As previously
argued, identity is not a thing and should not be treated as such. Within this process
nationalist parties encourage the creation and acquisition of a definable identity
package that provides citizens with the tools to interpret the past, present and future
in an effort to mobilise national identity behind a political project. For those who
exclude themselves from national identity, a reluctance to align oneselfwith the
associated values and characteristics of the nation matters as much as the notion of
belonging itself.
A second issue concerns the notion ofmultiple national identities. While Hall has
adequately argued that individuals possess multiple social identities (Hall 1992), the
proof of multiple national identities comes from the measurement side of the debate
rather than from theoretical understandings of identity. The use of scales in which
individuals may choose between polarised identity options emphasises the supposedly
multiple nature of identity. Students constructing scales for surveys are warned that a
five-point scale in which three of the answers are generally positive and two are
negative will skew the results in favour of the positive. If, for example, respondents
are asked to score their answers according to a scale that runs from excellent, very
good, good, poor, to terrible, the results will be biased. The same can be said of
identity scales in which three of the five options refer to a shared identity and the
remaining two refer to a sole identity in relation to the 'other'. A comparison of the
Moreno question and two other identity questions found in the 1997 Scottish election
survey proves this point.
Figure 4.11: Statistical Measures of Identity in Scotland
Percentage agreeing with the statement "I feel ..."
Moreno % SES questions %
Scottish not British 23 Scottish on both 74
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More Scottish than British 38
Equally Scottish and British 27
More British than Scottish 4
British not Scottish 4_
Source: SES 1997 n=882
61
Scottish but not primarily 9
Not Scottish at all 17
The two identity questions included in the SES measures ask: Do you feel Scottish?;
What is your primary identity? As a result, those who indicate that they feel Scottish,
and would consider it their primary identity form 74 percent of the sample. This
compares with 64 percent of those asked the Moreno question who indicated that
they feel primarily Scottish (Scottish not British, More Scottish than British).
According to these measures, either Moreno underestimates Scottish identity, or the
SES questions overestimate Scottishness. Cross-tabulations for these three questions
indicate that the distributions for the Moreno question and the two other questions fail
to prove that the two bind together perfectly. For those who indicate that their
identity is equally Scottish and British, almost sixty percent describe their 'best
identity' as Scottish and forty percent describe themselves as British. For a measure
that seeks to prove that individuals hold both identities in equal regard, the tendency
to prioritise a Scottish identity over a British identity should not happen more than
fifty percent of the time. Instead, despite claiming under some circumstances that
they feel equally Scottish and British, individuals do not include the British label when
it is not presented to them in the question choosing instead to describe themselves as
Scottish.
Figure 4.12: Identity-Related Questions in Scotland
Number of respondents indicating yes to following questions (% in brackets)
Scottish More Equally More British
not Scottish Scottish British not
British than and than Scottish colum
British British Scottish n total
1 best identity 194 306 134 3 1 638
Scottish (96) (91) (56) (9) (3)
column % 30 48 21 0 0
best identity 7 28 85 27 22 169
British (4) 0) (36) (77) (63)
column % 4 17 50 16 13
total in SES 203 335 238 35 35
2 see self as 198 318 179 13 2
Scottish (Y)
see self as 7 28 85 27 22
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| British (y)
Source: SES 1997, n=882
Thus, when not offered the option of combining their British and Scottish identities,
fewer Scots suggest they are carriers of dual identities. While the existence of
multiple national identities is possible, researchers should be wary of the way in which
the questions asked will influence the results. This is not to say that Moreno is
incorrect, but rather than it should not be used as a proxy question for identity. Those
involved in the Canadian election survey have opted for a different tactic. Perhaps
wary of employing questions that combine multiple identity options, the researchers
have relied upon two thermometer scales with which to test the identity of Canadians.
Thus, respondents are asked to indicate how they feel about Canada, and in a separate
question, how they feel about their province, on a scale of 1 to 100. The results for
the 1997 general election survey for Canadians were as follows.
Figure 4.13: Identity in the Canadian Election Survey
Percentage of respondents according to each identity thermometer decile
Canada cum% Quebec cum%
0 2 1
1-9 0.5 2.5 0.5 1.5
10-19 0.8 3.3 0.6 2.1
20-29 2.6 5.9 1.1 3.2
30-39 3.5 9.4 1.1 4.3
40-49 4.6 14.0 2.4 6.7
50-59 14.7 28.7 7.1 13.8
60-69 10.8 40.5 8.5 22.3
70-79 17.3 57.8 19.5 41.8
80-89 16.2 74.0 24.6 66.4
90-99 9.9 83.9 15.5 81.9
100 15.5 99.4 16.9 98.8
Source CES 1997, n=1034
The results indicate that over half of Quebecers feel a strong attachment to both
Canada and to Quebec. The thermometers, while useful in analysing the depth of
feeling among respondents, do not allow for a comparison of attachment to Canada
and Quebec. The following table attempts to provide such a tool. The results from
the Canadian Election Study have been re-coded to approximate the results provided
by the Moreno question, for despite the previously mentioned limitations of the tool,
the accurate reflection of attachment and identity to nation and to State proves an
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essential index in any analysis of identity. For the above data, respondents whose
attachment to Canada was greater than that to Quebec were coded as 'More Canada
than Quebec' and vice versa for those whose attachment was recorded as greater for
Quebec, Those respondents who indicated an equal attachment to both, whether that
level was twenty, fifty or eight, were coded as 'Equal to Canada and to Quebec'.
Lastly, respondents who listed zero for attachment to either Quebec or to Canada
were listed as possessing binary identity, as in the poles of the Moreno question. The
following table summarises the results.
Table 4.14 Dual Attachment in Quebec
Number in each reconstructed identity group
# %
Quebec not Canada 14 1.8
Quebec more than Canada 334 42.4
Equally Quebec and Canada 261 33.2
Canada more than Quebec 172 21.9
Canada not Quebec 6 0.8
Total 787
Source: CES 1997, n=1034, 247 missing values
When compared with data collected by private polling firms the CES thermometers
reveal a higher proportion of residents who indicate that their attachment is to Quebec
more than Canada. In addition, the data show a very small proportion of individuals
whose attachment to either Canada or Quebec is solitary. In chapter five, statistics on
political attitudes, behaviour and socio-economic characteristics are analysed within
these categories. It should be noted that the question asked by the CES team deals
with feelings towards Quebec and Canada - attachment to an entity - rather than self-
perception. In each case, a combination of multiple-identity options, or rather, asking
about one identity with respect to another, and questions offering only a reflection on
national or State identity, would provide for a more robust understanding on identity
in Scotland and Quebec.
It is possible that when choosing results emphasising a shared identity, respondents
distinguish between an allegiance to nation (Scotland/Quebec) and an allegiance to the
State (Britain/Canada). Respondents in different regions of the country may opt for
similar answers (for example, 'both Albertan and Canadian') but in this case, Canada
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may be seen as the nation, and Alberta as the political jurisdiction. Just because the
same words are used by different respondents should not suggest that the words
possess the same meaning. So far, identity measurement has failed to gauge the
extent to which the identity selection is a meaningful aggregate, or an association with
political rights or citizenship. Two individuals within Quebec may each select the
option "Quebec first then Canada". For the first individual, Quebec could signify the
nation, a meaningful aggregate of shared customs and values, myths and symbols,
while Canada refers to the State in which she lives, provides her a passport, currency,
and collects taxes. For the second individual, Quebec could refer to the political
jurisdiction in which he lives, works, and votes while Canada is the meaningful
aggregate of shared history. This tension between meaningful aggregate and salient
presence lies, in part, in the tension between static label and dynamic process.
That multiple identities are possible, is without question. It could be argued,
however, that they are not the automatic construct of federal or asymmetrical political
systems in which individuals can have dual allegiances. An attachment to two entities,
yes, two examples of national identity, not necessarily. As stated earlier, just because
the option chosen is understood by some as a nation, does not mean that it is
understood as a nation, or chosen as a representation of national identity, by all.
Identity measurements have failed to capture this notion of a meaningful aggregate
and the interactive processes associated with identity. Thus, while the provision of
open-ended questions may inhibit quantitative analyses of identity, it may further a
greater understanding ofwidespread changes in identity preferences over time.
MARKERS OF IDENTITY AND HIERARCHIES OF BELONGING
Statistical examinations in Scotland and Quebec provide little evidence of a hierarchy
of belonging. In part, this has much to do with the methods used to examine identity.
In Scotland as in Quebec the available data by its content and its presentable form,
limits any examination. The Scottish Election Study (SES) asked a variety of identity
questions during the 1997 General Election campaign. Works treating the 1997 SES
emphasised the continued preference for a Scottish identity over a British identity
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(Brown, McCrone, Paterson and Surridge, 1999), In a departure from earlier works
the Scottish Election Survey asked individuals about the components of Scottishness.
Table 4.15 Identity components in Scotland
# %
Important to have been born in Scotland 723 82
Important to have Scottish ancestry 643 73
Important to live in Scotland 573 65
SES 1997 n=882
The data in Table 4.15 show a subtle ranking in the minds of respondents with a
preference for ethnic rather than civic characteristics. Fewer Scots believe it is
important to be living in Scotland in order to be considered Scottish than the
proportion who believe that being born in Scotland is important. Despite this view, it
is likely that when faced with different combinations of the three previously mentioned
components of national-membership, alternative hierarchies could form. An
individual who lives in Scotland and was born in Scotland could be seen to have a
greater claim to Scottish identity than an individual with Scottish ancestry, despite the
weight assigned to ancestry over residence in the previous table. The following tables
summarises the relationship among these variables and the Moreno question
Table 4.16: Relationship among Identity Components in Scotland












Sources: SES 1997 n= 882
The table shows that the strongest correlation occurs between the two 'ethnic'
categories. Thus, those who feel that it is important to be born in Scotland are also
more likely to believe that ancestry, rather than residence, is important. For those
who prioritise ancestry, being born in Scotland is more important than living there.
Those who prefer more 'civic' notions, tied to residence, feel slightly more strongly
that birth, rather than blood, accounts for Scottishness. Perhaps with these
correlations in mind, McCrone, Stewart, Kiely and Bechhofer have compiled a table
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of possible combinations, ranging from true Scots, to accidental Scots but have not
attempted to attach a scale of increased importance to the characteristics (McCrone,
Stewart, Kiely and Bechhofer 1998). Whether these categories vary according to
self-assigned identity label forms the focus of the following table.
Table 4.17: Moreno and Hierarchies of Identity
born ancestry living
Scottish not British 88 76 72
More Scottish than British 90 81 72
Equally Scottish and British 78 75 66
More British than Scottish 80 74 60
British not Scottish 57 54 37
All 82 73 65
Source: SES 1997, n=882
The table shows that those who consider themselves primarily Scottish place less
stock in place of residence as a determinant of identity, and more emphasis on birth.
At the same time, place of residence as a determinant of identity is even less important
for those individuals who are living in Scotland but do not consider themselves Scots.
Such data makes sense on an intuitive level: those who live in Scotland but do not
consider themselves members of the Scottish nation indicate that residence does not
correlate with Scottish identity. Perhaps this group is more aware of the ephemeral
'other' characteristics that are necessary to acquire a sense of belonging in Scotland.
The relationship among blood, place ofbirth and residence appears in other articles by
McCrone. In his 1994 Scottish Affairs editorial he points to the three possible
definitions of being Scottish. The first, based on blood, appears less popular in the
20th century, largely because of the negative connotations of'ethnic' national identity.
A second definition grounds Scottishness in place of birth, which he sees as an
attempt to "short-circuit the lineage issues" (McCrone 1994a). The third and final
definition is based on territory, a seemingly inclusive definition in which Scottishness
is available to all within its borders. McCrone notes the pattern of Scots to
domesticate potential aggressors and invading forces. The view sits well with
Malcolm Dickson's analysis of the political values of English-born Scottish residents,
who show very little deviation from their Scottish counterparts (McCrone 1994a,
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Dickson 1994), Recent attempts to measure public perceptions of citizenship
regulations devote still further attention to this troika of characteristics. In its survey
of Scots, ICM created a hierarchy of characteristics that would determine an
individual's right to a Scottish passport. In broad terms, support decreases when one
moves away from place of birth.
Table 4.18 Scottish Citizenship and Identity
Which of the following types of people should be entitled to a Scottish passport?
%
Born and live in Scotland 94
Born in Scotland but live elsewhere 81
Not born in Scotland, live in Scotland 55
Neither born nor live in Scotland but one Scottish parent 50
Neither born nor live in Scotland but one Scottish grandparent 26
All within the UK 31
ICM November 1998, n=1010
That only halfof Scottish residents support the provision of a Scottish passport to
those who were not born here must appear as a stumbling block to those who claim
Scottish nationalism is resolutely civic and inclusive. Civic it may be, but not
necessarily inclusive. Although it would be accurate to note that the provision of
citizenship on the basis of parentage is more liberal that any other State in Europe, the
conditions under which passports would be delivered sufficiently alters the context of
these claims. Conditions prompting the very existence of Scottish citizenship would
follow a departure from the United Kingdom where, at present, all Scots hold
citizenship. Thus, in moving from a situation where all share citizenship to one with
divided citizenship would perhaps encourage a more liberal policy than under 'normal'
circumstances. It would have been interesting to divide the second question into two
parts, born in Scotland but live elsewhere in the UK, born in Scotland but live outside
the UK.2 Furthermore, it could be that when asked of individuals who were not born
in Scotland but are living in Scotland, most respondents thought of their English
counterparts rather than, for example, Americans living in Scotland. The extent to
which individuals internalise these seemingly objective determinants as important
2 The author was present at interviews for the recent Scottish Parliamentary election survey. When
similar questions were asked, many respondents appeared unwilling to answer the question until they
knew how the existing legislation concerning passports operated. Such information was not divulged
by the interviewer.
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markers for their own sense of identity, or whether these markers are used as an
informal checklist when evaluating the identity of other individuals, receives attention
in the following section.
INTERNALISING HIERARCHIES OF BELONGING
When seeking to determine how individuals express and understand the functioning of
identity and how it affects their interaction within the political system, both with
respect to other citizens and with respect to the state, the thesis seeks to offer answers
based on the analysis of interviews conducted as fieldwork. Those interviewed
include members of each of the major parties operating in Scotland and Quebec - and
in the Canadian case, include representatives of federal parties - as well as journalists,
and members of civic organisations involved in the constitutional debate. Individuals
were asked how they would describe their own national identity, which markers they
would use to describe Quebecois or Scottish national identity in general, and whether
they perceived any real differences between Scots/Quebecers and other
Britons/Canadians. Additional questions treating the nature of political culture in
both locations receive attention toward the end of the chapter. Quotations were
selected that showed an internalisation of publicly-projected markers of difference in
Scotland and Quebec. In addition, the quotations seek to provide some depth to the
factor analysis listed in the chapter five. While it is not entirely possible to classify all
interview subjects by their views on separatism, several, by virtue of their associations
or membership, or by statements made in the interviews, made such information
known. Where relevant, information on language, partisan preference, ethnicity and
support for sovereignty accompany quotations.
The interviews emphasise that individuals do use the popular markers of identity to
buttress their own claims to identity. When seeking to explain their own identity,
individuals relied on notions of blood, residence and specific values to justify their
statements. For example, the previously-mentioned hierarchy of identity is reinforced
in the credentials considered worthy as markers of Scottishness by subjects
interviewed in 1998.
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What we're concerned about in the [Conservative] party, everyone is
harping on "You must be more Scottish and this is the antithesis of
being British" which I find quite objectionable really. Although I'm
completely Scottish by birth and parentage I have through marriage in
the family many English relatives.
Malcolm Rifkind when he was Scottish Secretary he took [Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher] aside and said look, you should really not
say "you Scots" so she came out with "we Scots" which was even
worse. 1 mean she had no Scottish blood in her. And that sort of
grated on the Scottish psyche
These quotations highlight the emphasis of blood and ethnic components in
determining Scottishness. Such statements would seem to suggest that nationalism in
Scotland, despite the political emphasis on civic goals, relies, at times, upon
references of blood and belonging. As stated previously, the markers and measures of
national identity matter less than the hierarchy that such signifiers create. The
hierarchy, rather than the pillars of identity themselves, demonstrate how disparate
concepts of birth, values and characteristics hang together to create a meaningful
aggregate identity. The following two quotations indicate how individuals with
entirely different political views can construct similar notions of Scottishness. The
first quotation, by a researcher from the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party,
highlights the key differences between the Scots and the English. The second,
provided by a Church of Scotland minister and SNP supporter, raises similar themes
of self belief, democracy and community.
I don't think Scots are fundamentally different to the English but we
are different. I think there's a .. . in Scotland you'd probably find a
greater sense of community than in England ... Scots are probably a
slightly more religious nation than England. Also, there's a sense of
proportion to things. I would say we don't like to do well at things but
we're understated. We don't like to brag about things. I think in
England you'd probably find a greater brashness. When people come
into money - if you take a Scotsman and an Englishman of similar
backgrounds and you gave them a whole lot ofmoney, 1 think you'd
probably find the Scot would be less ostentatious with their wealth
than the English person. I think there's almost a Calvinistic attitude
that we don't rise above our station - that's not the right phrase - that
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we don't flaunt our wealth. And I think there's a sense of community.
But that's my impression of it, [Conservative]
Scotland has the infinite capacity to snatch defeat out of the jaws of
victory ... that's been absolutely right. Somehow, and I think that's
probably why we fail to go for a greater measure of independence,
there's a kind of... self-belief is low. And we counter that by
belligerence, the tartan army kind of thing ... The church influence has
been a mixed bag ... there has been the Calvinist total depravity thing.
You know, "that thou might have plunged me into hell to gnash my
gums and weep and wail." I do HolyWillie's Prayer at several Burns
suppers. But it's that kind of thing. There's original sin and we're all
damned and we're all miserable worms. There's that side of things,
but on the other side there's the strong democratic tradition ... [SNP
Church of Scotland minister]
Both quotations highlight themes raised in the political documents. Despite their
divergent political beliefs, and different positions within institutions of national
society, the two respondents presented similar views of Scottishness. This suggests
that a consensus exists across social groups about markers of Scottish identity.
National institutions, and the values created supposedly created by them, also figure
among responses. These values reflect the image of Scots portrayed in party
manifestos, media reports and academic literature; the nation as an egalitarian, if
slightly defeatist, left-of-centre society. The following quotations, from interviews
with social activists, highlight this point.
one of the things about Scots is enquiring minds
[I came to Scotland] out of a conscious preference for the firm belief [in
Scotland] in the existence of simple society ... a sense of egalitarianism
and social justice not found in England
As a Scot I'm probably biased in saying we're probably, we're a very
intelligent nation, our education system is such that it brings out people's
best talents. I think Scots the world over are respected people
When Scotland were beaten by England 5-0 or 5-1, it was 5-1, at
Wembley in 1975, Stuart Kennedy the Rangers goaltender had a
nightmare game, and the story is told that when all the departing English
fans were out of the stadium there was a wee guy with a, in the days when
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you could bring bottles into a game, a bottle of whisky, tammie, a kind of
almost parody of a Scot, and he waved the bottle at the departing English
fans and he said, You's couldne score six. Now that's a very significant
statement. To be absolutely hammered into the ground 5-1 but the
glorious, almost illogical defiance, you's couldne score six, well we really
won because we stopped you from scoring six goals
The value of the education system, a sense of social justice and egalitarianism and a
defeatist attitude were all highlighted in political documents detailing the traits of
Scottish identity. In other examples, the values associated with Scottish identity refer
either to global values, or to isolated examples. As one Conservative MP noted:
I'm sometimes a bit of an agitator. That must be my Scottish ancestry
coming out.
The absence ofproof characterises most of these statements. And yet for the most
party, quotations coalesce around popular visions of the nation. As the quotation
above indicates, the ability of individuals to define for themselves how they see
'Scottishness' allows for a certain diversity around the concept that does not always
permeate popular notions.
For others, attention to popular notions detracts from identity as a self-directed
process. Questioning the assumed relationship between left-of-centre values and
Scottish identity one academic noted:
This idea of a democratic intellect, lad o' pairts egalitarianism has a grain
of truth but it's the product of a Scottish political elite. If Glasgow had
the same waves of immigration in the 1950s that other part of Britain
witnessed, who knows how egalitarian and tolerant it would have been.
Scotland hasn't been exposed to the clashes and crises the way the rest of
the country has. And so it's a self substantiating myth. There's a terrible
history of intolerance in Scotland. In Edinburgh in the 1930s you had an
extreme political party, Protestant Action, running on an anti-Catholic
ticket even though the Catholic population measured around 6 percent.
There's also the sectarian undercurrent in Glasgow. It's not as strong as
in Northern Ireland but it's still there.
Thus, Scottish identity appears to be both exclusive and inclusive. Markers attached
to identity as a label appear to be fairly restrictive while those associated with
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personal attachment rely on self-defined markers of belonging. As another academic
noted, the inclusiveness is linked to self definition.
What makes Scottish small 'n' nationalism so compelling is it is not
specific to these characteristics. The broadest range of people can identify
with it. ... it might be anti Victorian, it might be a hostility to England,
you can make anything grist to the mill. There are numerous Tories who
will identify themselves very assertively and aggressively as Scottish and
as Scottish small n nationalists and who deeply resent any suggestion to
the contrary.
For this reason, Scottish nationalism in general and the SNP in particular have
escaped charges that they support ethnic or exclusive notions of identity. Rather,
both are seen to promote civic notions that, for reasons discussed later, are given
greater scutiny in Quebec. While the quotation emphasises that Scottish
Conservatives, who are seen to hold values seemingly anathema to Scottish identity,
may feel themselves proud Scots, the interviewee does not deny that there are some
individuals who would challenge the Scottishness of these Conservatives. In part, this
could stem from a series of campaigns conducted by the Scottish National Party to
portray the then-government as 'anti-Scottish' (SNP 1995)3. Thus, there appears to
be a difference between the right of individuals to call themselves Scots, and a right to
express their attachment without challenge, but that the views of others may
contradict these sentiments. An additional quotation highlights the potentially
exclusive aspects of Scottish national identity.
National identity is a problematic term. The content is ill-defined. When
it is defined it includes certain sections of the population to the exclusion
of others. Whether that has taken the form of Catholic suppression or the
north Britain theory. Recently it's been connected to a working class
heritage. This conception excludes people like highlanders, women...
And so, as a concept, national identity is doomed to failure.
While the first quotation argues that Scottish national identity includes everyone, even
portions of society that might be considered on the fringes, the second, provided by
1
Academic literature also charts the increasing alienation of the Scottish electorate with policies that
were perceived to be English-driven and enacted by former prime minister Thatcher (McCronc
1992).
208
Ailsa Henderson, PhD Thesis, Chapter 4
yet another academic, argues that all notions of national identity are inherently
exclusive. For each quote, different sections of the population find themselves
excluded from dominant understandings of Scottish identity. In the first quotation,
Scottish Conservatives find their identity under challenge, whereas the second
quotation notes that Catholics, highlanders and women may each find their own
identity distorted by dominant definitions of Scottishness. Thus, different groups of
people may each, at times, feel themselves excluded from popular understandings of
the nation. Thus, notions of Scottishness are not by their very nature more inclusive
that notions ofwhat it is to be a Quebecois. Rather, the pillars normally grounding
notions of Scottishness are less visible, and therefor less likely to attract attention than
language in Quebec.
Statistical examinations of identity in Quebec tend to use the category as an
independent variable exerting influence over sovereignty support and voter preference
(Martin 1998, Blais, Martin and Nadeau 1995, Nadeau and Fleury 1995, Lachapelle
1998, Guerin and Nadeau 1998). Political values, for their part, tend to receive
treatment as determinants of voting rather than composite markers of identity. Most
agree that support for greater political autonomy and nationalist parties correlates,
broadly, with identity. Little mention is made, however, of any hierarchy of belonging
in such studies. For analyses of identity in context, more sociological examinations
provide supplementary evidence. In an early work Donald Taylor and Ronald Sigal
examine the influence of ethnicity, language and partisan support in defining notions
of the 'true Quebecois' identity (Taylor and Sigal 1982) Taylor and Sigal gave 120
Montrealers booklets containing descriptions of 24 individuals of various ethnic,
linguistic and political backgrounds. Asked to determine whether each individual
could be classified as a 'true Quebecois' the respondents indicated that political
orientation and language play a greater role in determining identity than ethnic
heritage (Taylor and Sigal 1982).
The above data and discussion raise certain questions. How are these relationships
understood by the people that are affected by them9 How do people interpret or
make sense of their negotiated identity? How do the daily identity claims function?
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The following quotations from field interviews provide a sense of context to the
statistically significant correlations between identity and political attitudes. The
inclusion of such data seeks to argue that it is not enough to register a relationship
between two variables. Any understanding ofwhy such a relationship occurs relies
upon an attempt to understand how identity functions for those who consider
themselves outwith the nation. In each case study, the saliency of national
membership determines the consequences of a position lower down the hierarchy of
belonging. In Quebec, where a nationalist movement has sought to mobilise support
on the back of a challenged identity, belonging assumes a role of greater importance
(Henderson 1999). Furthermore, language, as one of the markers of identity, is a
more visible characteristic that pillars such as values. It is relatively easy to tell if
someone is a francophone or not. It is much less simple to determine whether
someone supports sovereignty or, in the case of Scotland, how they feel about
egalitarian policies. The attention to visible markers such as language, and the
tendency to see identity as a right, as expressed in the following quotation, has not yet
established itself in Scotland where much of the devolution movement has been
motivated by the political inequities of a unitary state. ".. qa ce n'est pas une
question de tolerance, ce n'est pas quelque chose qui m'est confere par la societe. Qa
encore, c'est un droit inherent qui m'appartient en tant qu'individu" (Gouvernement
du Quebec 1992).
Recent constitutional submissions suggest that this hierarchy is not only
acknowledged, but linked to individual characteristics or personal history. For one
member of the Federation des groupes ethniques du Quebec speaking before the
Belanger Campeau Commission: "Un Quebecois est celui qui demeure au Quebec et
l'aime assez pour le considerer comme sa patrie. Pour ce qui est de la patrie, elle
n'est pas accessible a ceux qui sont arrives avec une education completee. 11 faudrait
se rappeler que la patrie c'est l'enfance." (Commission nationale sur l'avenir du
Quebec 1995). This statement corresponds to the data collected by the Scottish
Election Survey which demonstrated that those within Scotland attach differing levels
of importance to a list of possible personal characteristics. As in Scotland, the claim
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to identity is linked to birth or, in the case of Quebec, childhood socialisation within
the nation.
The interviews demonstrated support for, or at the very least acceptance of, the
markers promoted in political documents. The most significant difference between
markers cited by respondents in Scotland and Quebec relates to language. The
presence of a separate language, and thus an entirely different sphere of
communication, reinforces the importance of national boundaries in Quebec.
Language, as linked to cultural survival by agents of socialisation, remains a pre¬
eminent marker of identity. Language also exerts a day-to-day influence that subtly
distances the French population of Quebec from other Canadians. Not surprisingly,
the importance of language for Quebecois identity surfaced in several interviews.
.. the effect ofBill 101, the charter of the French language which
favours integration of immigrants to the French speaking community,
that makes French a real language of communication of young
immigrants, that's influencing them in their choice of identity as well
(francophone, separatist).
The influence of your parents of schooling is I think fundamental.
There's also the influence of the media, when you listen to French
speaking media you hear people being Quebecois (francohone,
separatist)
. . . I think language permeates your way of thinking, of referencing.
And I think your references, cultural references are through language.
You read in French, you see French films, you see French TV, you
read French books and you think in French and that links you to a
debate and it gives you an identity where language and nation and
identity are linked very closely (francophone separatist).
Once you speak French it's all right (francophone nationalist)
.. just the fact that we exist in French, that there is the media, the
history in Quebec is quite different than in the rest of Canada. It
creates a sense of community (francophone nationalist)
If you talk to a francophone they'd say their first allegiance is to
Quebec, second allegiance is to Canada. Simple because there's a
strong linguistic, cultural hegemony that exists when you are six million
people surrounded by 300 million who speak a different language.
There's a tendency to circle the wagons (anglophone)
211
Ailsa Henderson. PhD Thesis. Chapter 4
Both anglophones and francophones emphasised the role of language as a pillar of
Quebecois national identity. The assumption made in the last quotation, that all
francohpones, by virtue of their language, feel a greater attachment to Quebec,
underlines the extent to which language is seen as important. The quotation also
betrays a tendency among some individuals to assign values, attachments and thus,
identity labels, on the basis of language. For this anglophone, francophones feel a
greater attachment to Quebec, because they are French. In later sections this chapter
deals with the role of perceptions of identity and expectations of belonging such as
those mentioned here.
Just as political documents in Quebec make note of certain historical events to explain
the contemporary position of the Quebecois nation, so too did several interviewees
highlight key dates in the formation of a national identity in Quebec. The Conquest in
1759, the repatriation of the constitution without Quebec consent in 1981 and the
failure of the Meech Lake Accord in 1990 were cited most often. As one anglophone
explained
[French Canadians] were an entity and an identity before the Conquest
so they have kind of felt that in their, now 'myth', built into their view
of history, that the conquest robbed them of this identity (anglophone
federalist)
As in Scotland, the sense of being a minority - although in this case not compounded
by what some would label as the defeatism of Calvinism - surfaces in popular
concepts of nationhood.
you always have a sense in Quebec that you cannot make it, that it's
too small, that the problem is that we're too small and we need
Canada It's less than it was of course when I was young
(francophone nationalist)
As in Scotland, respondents focused on the values that distinguished Quebec from the
rest of the country.
I think that we are more of a social democratic kind of place than the
rest of Canada (francophone, separatist)
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Each of these quotations clearly emphasises the acceptance ofmarkers, as highlighted
by agents of political socialisation. What appears less clear is the distinction between
identity as a label, for which individuals must possess definite and objective
characteristics, and attachment, which appears more linked to self-defined values.
The distinction, between being Scottish and feeling Scottish, or rather being a
Quebecer and exhibiting a sense of belonging as a Quebecois, surface in the
quotations offered by individuals. Thus far, quotations from both Scottish and
Quebec interviews prove that individuals are aware of identity packages, coalescing
around institutions, characteristics and values. The individual pillars may differ
between case studies by the process appears similar in both nations. Whether
individuals assess their own sense of Scottishness or Quebec-ness, and how they
choose to do so, forms the focus of the following section.
SELF ASSESSMENT OF MARKERS OF BELONGING
It could be argued that a recognition of certain markers of identity, as highlighted in
the previously-mentioned Scottish passport question for example, and the emphasis
on certain markers of identity in the literature of political parties, has not infiltrated
the efforts of individuals to assess their own identity. Individuals may feel that
birthplace and ancestry are important in determining the right to a passport, but do
individuals exclude themselves or others from such claims to belonging in the absence
of these markers? McCrone, Stewart, Kiely and Bechhofer argue, for example, that
however individuals answer questions related to the identity of others, at the level of
inter-personal interaction, more inclusive notions of belonging are used (McCrone,
Stewart, Kiely and Bechhofer 1998). Such a view is consistent with research charting
the often inconsistent relationship between attitudes and behaviour (LaPiere 1934,
Minard 1952, DeFleur and Westie 1958, Fishbein and Azjen 1975, Hewstone, Stroebe
and Stephenson 1996). While only experimental design would have allowed for a
definitive retort to McCrone and Bechhofer's problematisation of identity, the
following section highlights that individuals do use relatively exclusive notions of
identity to assess or prove their own level of belonging. The following quotations
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chronicle the attempts of interviewees to establish their authenticity by highlighting
proof of Scottish or Quebec identity. By highlighting their own markers of identity,
or signposting their absence, interview respondents appear to have internalised
popularly-held notions of the nation and are using them to emphasise their level of
national belonging - or lack thereof.
I would never claim that I'm from Scotland. I am what I am. I was
born in England (English journalist in Scotland)
Although I'm completely Scottish by birth and parentage 1 have
through marriage in the family many English relatives (Conservative
party member)
Speaking as an outsider - because I am completely English ethnically -
and working in Scotland the first thing you find is this is a nation more
at ease with itself that you would believe if you listened to the
chattering classes (English author living in Scotland).
I can't claim to be a Scot. I wasn't born here. However much I love
this place ... [and] I don't want to be a New Scot. It sounds somehow
second best (English civic activist working in Scotland)
... to what degree can you accept someone as being a Scot if the voice
they adopt in their fiction is not Scottish. Is the fact that I love this
place enough? Does that qualify me? [other writers are more active in
social and political life] Am I one of the lines that you need to draw?
(French author working in Scotland)
but most of the people who work the Paris-Montreal [Air Canada]
route are separatists, more than I am ..so I'm very popular with them
because we're the only newspaper with a separatist stance
(francophone)
I came to Quebec because it was majority francophone, I was born in
England, and lived in Ontario, but I came to Quebec, and I happen to
be an Anglophile, I'm proud ofmy culture. But I love the idea of
coming to Quebec and speaking - well Westmount is essentially
English, but I can enjoy working and living in French if I want. 1 can
speak French in restaurants (anglophone)
When asked if he felt like a 'Quebecois', one of the anglophone interviewees
responded as follows:
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Oh, increasingly - as I go back to Ontario, Mike Harris made it a lot
easier. I find Ontario a very depressing place to be ... and I went to
school here in the fifties, so I had a certain experience and shaping that
has engendered a view ofCanada that does include Quebec and
understands Quebec is different and can function well as a different
place, can function better as a different place, than as a homogenised
region of Canada.
A further example highlights the extent to which those lacking what they perceive to
be credible markers feel they cannot participate in debates about identity, During one
interview, the subject asked his colleague why Scots feel the way they do. Both
individuals work for a tabloid newspaper in Scotland. The 'subject', despite growing
up in England, has spent the last ten years in Scotland. Both 'subject' and 'colleague'
work with the editorial team selecting letters to the editor for publication and cover
local issues for the paper. The 'colleague' is a Scot. When asked why Scots respond
to the 'kilting up' of newspapers in Scotland, the following interaction ensued:
Colleague: Because the Scots are at heart a deeply sentimental, slushy
race.
Subject: I couldn't have dared to say that.
In the subject's eyes, not being a Scot restricted the amount of criticism that could be
levied against the group That the subject asked a Scottish colleague to verify how
'Scots' feel betrays a reticence to speak 'out of turn'. The view correlates well with
the following quotation from an English-resident in Scotland.
As someone who's not from Scotland it's difficult to question whether
devolution is a good thing without being castigated by polite society.
In each case, membership in the nation provides the perception of voice. Similar
statements are made in Quebec, where language is seen as the first step in gaining
authenticity. Beyond language, interaction with the dominant linguistic group is seen
as proof of belonging
Having spent a lot of time outside Montreal, in the real hinterland,
where most anglophones never dare to venture, I mean, they rarely go
east of St Laurent. My plant was in the East ofMontreal, the
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anglophones that tend to be the most strident about partition are
usually the ones who are either not bilingual or don't know what's
going on.
As the previous quotation highlights, contact with 'real' Quebecois, in this case those
in the hinterlands of east Montreal, provides additional proof ofbelonging. The
following quotation also highlights the different ways in which anglophones may react
to identity challenges.
I find it some people like me generally tend to be more sympathetic to
the French cause than people who were born here. The people who
were born here say, "I was born here, I have a right to speak English
da da da da da, I don't want my identity to somehow be wiped out.4
The quotations emphasise the extent to which individuals link markers and belonging
with authenticity. In particular, those who feel that they belong express greater
confidence in discussing political affairs. In contrast, individuals lacking markers of
identity tend to highlight this before they discuss nationalism or politics. This was
found in academic literature as in the interviews. In his analysis of two recent works
on identity in Scotland and Britain, Bernard Crick prefaced his essay with the phrase
"As an English incomer" (Crick 1996). The quotation earlier in the page, noting the
threat of'castigation' begins with the phrase 'As someone who's not from Scotland'.
Thus, exclusion occurring at the national level exerts an influence on notions of
political inclusion. The potential effects of questionable - or doubted - political
inclusion on perceptions of political efficacy receive treatment later in the thesis.
Given the existence of questioned identity, the chapter next examines how individuals
evaluate the identity claims of others, and how individuals cope when their identity is
challenged.
INTERGROUP PERCEPTIONS: NEGOTIATING IDENTITY
As explained in chapter two, this thesis argues that the application of social identity
theory and the use of sociological examinations of national identity inform an
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understanding of the potentially exclusive effects of identity. Furthermore, it argues
that exclusion occurring at the national level, as affected by the markers of inclusion
and the salience of identity, exerts an influence of self-perception within the State
political culture. This section examines relevant literature and statistical data before
returning to an analysis of interviews.
A recent paper on identity in Quebec examines the negotiation of belonging and
perception of integration among visible and non-visible minorities. The survey
determined that majority members ofQuebec society differentiate members according
to a hierarchy of acceptance. Non-visible minorities overestimated their acceptance in
society whereas visible minorities tended to underestimate their acceptance. Both,
however, were not sure whether they belong in Quebec society (Moghaddam,
Pelletier, Taylor and Chepanek 1994). This distance, between self-perception and the
level of inclusion assigned by others received additional attention in recent CROP
opinion poll data. The survey results, which received minimal statistical treatment in
the press, extend the notion of a hierarchy from one based on characteristics to one
based on attachment and belonging (CROP 1998 March)
The survey posed three questions related to belonging and national membership5:
1. Vous considerez-vous vous-meme comme faisant partie du peuple quebecois?
2. Croyez-vous que les membres de la minorite anglophone du Quebec font partie du
peuple quebecois?
3. Croyez-vous que les Cris et Inuits du Quebec font partie du peuple quebecois?
Table 4.19 Belonging in Quebec














Self 79 75 82 77 80 79 81 75 80 79 79
Anglophones 72 71 72 72 72 71 75 68 67 74 80
1 The quotation also highlights how those who arc outside the dominant construction of national
membership may feel a greater freedome to express themselves outside the confines of the collective
group.
5 In English, the questions read: 1. Do you consider yourself to be part of the Quebecois nation? 2.
Do you consider members of the anglophones minority to be part of the Quebecois nation? 3. Do
you consider the Cree and the Inuit to be part of the Quebecois nation?
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Cree, Inuit | 63 60 64 62 63 60 63 64 64 60 63
Act Inact $<20 $20-40 $40-60 $60+ Ec'y Ec'y Ec'y
VG G Bad
Self 80 77 81 83 86 72 93 84 76
Anglophones 72 71 61 74 82 75 51 80 68
Cree, Inuit 61 66 57 64 74 56 46 66 62
Fr Eng Oth ADQ EP PLQ PQ X Yes No X
Self 81 73 66 78 75 69 96 75 95 72 67
Anglophones 70 80 75 72 89 70 76 66 72 74 53
Cree, Inuit 61 70 65 55 61 64 61 50 67 64 38
X = did not vote, Source: CROP 1998
The table contains cross-tabulations according to several social characteristics
including city of residence, gender, age, years of education, labour force activity,
income, perception of the economy, mother tongue, party affiliation, and reported
vote in the 1995 sovereignty referendum. As can be seen from table 4.17, with three
notable exceptions, a higher proportion of francophones within Quebec tend to
perceive themselves as members of the Quebecois people than the proportion who
believe that two of the minority groups within society are Quebecois. There is also a
hierarchy of acceptance, in each case, the proportion convinced of anglophone
belonging exceeds the estimated value for Cree and the Inuit within Quebec. Thus, a
larger number believe the anglophones belong to the Quebecois people, than believe
the Cree or Inuit belong The three exceptions to this trend highlight the process of
negotiation between personal and collective identity claims. For anglophones,
Allophones and supporters of the Equality Party, the aggregate estimation of English
membership in the Quebec people exceeds not only the provincial average, but the
proportion who believe that they themselves belong in Quebec. Put another way, the
proportions of those feeling a sense of personal belonging (73, 66, 75) lies between
the perceived right of the collective group to belong (80, 75, 89), and the view
ascribed by others (72). That the resulting statistic for self belonging is much closer
to the provincial average than the number ascribed by group members suggests that
the perceptions ofacceptance matter much more that the perceived right to belong.
At the other end of the spectrum, the proportion of those who feel they belong is
much higher than the proportions of individuals who feel that either the anglophones
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or Cree have a right to belong. It is not the case, then, that these individuals merely
possess heightened notions of belonging and extend these to all groups. For PQ
supporters, Yes voters, and those with optimistic views of the economy, personal
belonging far exceeds that of other groups.
The absence of similar data for Scotland, although preventing a direct comparison,
also highlights one of the key distinctions between the two movements.
Notwithstanding the attention to characteristics such as blood and birthplace, the
identity debate in Scotland does not emphasis the collective acceptance ofminorities
as in Quebec. Scotland lacks a minority within its borders defined, as the
anglophones, by language, or, in the case of the Cree and the Inuit, by ethnicity. This
lack of a rival internal nation, or coherent national minority - with its own language,
culture and history - individualises the belonging debate in Scotland. Thus, it can be
argued that the distinction between the two nationalist movements should not be
grounded solely in notions of civic and ethnic nationalism, but rather, in the way each
context prioritises either collective and individual belonging. Although the literature
avoids direct comparison, the emphasis on the collective nature of Quebec nationalism
and collective solutions posited by academics underlines this point (Taylor 1992,
Kymlicka 1995, Gignac 1997).
In his examination of the Scots and English in Scotland, Dickson produced a version
of the following table from British Rights Survey data.
Table 4.20 Reasons for Discrimination in Scotland
Percentage claiming they have "personally ever felt discriminated against in some important
matter"
English bom Scottish bom English born
living in living in living in
Scotland Scotland England
Discrimination ? 32.8 28.3 26.4
Of those, reason for discrimination:
Sex 47.3 43.6 40.6
age 16.4 15.6 19.1
race 10.6 4.8 8.6
ethnic background 7.3 3.1 2.2
religion 5.5 13.8 8.1
political beliefs 3.6 8.7 5.6
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disability 0 3.1 4.6
other 9.1 6.2 9.8
Source: Dickson 1994
The results show that a higher proportion of English-born residents of Scotland feel
they have been discriminated against on the basis of race or ethnic background than
their Scottish-born or English-residing counterparts. The results also show that the
incidence of discrimination on the basis of race and ethnic background is relatively
low compared to the proportion who allege discrimination on the grounds of gender.
The table shows that subjective, or less visible, characteristics such as religion and
political beliefs are less likely to be the source of discrimination. While the absence of
national minority communities within Scotland detracts from the extent to which
national exclusion could function according to collective characteristics, that the
sampled English-born population in Scotland reports a higher incidence of
discrimination points to potential access barriers to Scottish belonging. In their
compilation of discrimination statistics, the Commission for Racial Equality note that
discrimination on the basis of 'Englishness' forms a small proportion of all complaints
brought before the CRE6. The visible minority population of Scotland is more likely
to suffer discrimination than English-born residents. Different groups are accorded
different levels of belonging within the nation.
The emphasis on collective rights in Quebec, and in particular, the lack of belonging
for groups such as the anglophones or the Cree, has recently drawn attention from the
Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs in Canada. In his public speeches Minister Dion
has stressed the importance of individual rights and in particular, that national
recognition may be linked to individual recognition, in an effort to detract from the
collective understanding of identity in Quebec (Dion 1998a). In arguing where the
debate should go, or how it should develop, Dion highlights the existing collective
nature of the debate. Despite his efforts, however, the debate remains grounded in
notions of collective identity. Understandings ofbelonging in Quebec thus return
constantly to group membership, in other words, whether anglophones or allophones
6 A more complete discussion of the results appears in chapter five,
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or members of visible minority communities truly can feel that they belong in Quebec.
Largely because of the homogeneity of the Scottish population, the parallels in
Scotland extend to those who have recently moved to Scotland and, in some cases, to
members of visible or religious minority groups (Jedrej and Nuttall 1995, Ouseley
1998, Rothwell 1998). Thus while it is fair to say that some collective groups may
question their belonging as collective members, the lack ofminority institutions and
cultural coherence detracts from the collective nature of the debate in Scotland.7
More individualised approaches to identity may be seen in the quotations offered in
interviews. These surveys indicate that there is a greater sense of personal
empowerment and personal responsibility for belonging in Scotland whereas in
Quebec, the issue is more polarised according to group membership. Those who have
moved to the province tend to exhibit a much greater sense of self-determination over
their level of inclusion than those who were born in Quebec. That these distinctions
exist might not surprise observers of political life in Quebec. The way in which they
exert an influence over personal belonging and political culture, however, remains an
under-explored aspect of identity in Quebec. This section charts this navigation by
examining the way in which individuals attempt to form a coherent view of the
collective group to which they belong, whether the nation or national minority.
Within the negotiation for belonging, the views of diverse cultural groups and, more
specifically, the capacity for misunderstanding between them, play a role in
internalised notions of identity. If one acknowledges that individuals take the
perceived views of others into account when they gauge their own levels of inclusion,
the accuracy with which the views of others are portrayed matters much to the
debate. The following section concentrates on the views that group members -
divided by language in Quebec and divided by country of birth in Scotland - have of
their fellow group members and of the members of other groups. This division finds
justification in the collective nature of the debate in each case. In Quebec, the starting
point from which one measures one's level of belonging is tied to language or, in
1 That said, the existence of separate religious schools in Scotland ensures a separate socialisation
process for some Catholics within a Protestant nation. The influence of religion on identity and
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some cases, to constitutional preference (Taylor and Sigal 1982). This thesis argues
that in Scotland, the collectivised aspect of the debate exerts a smaller impact on
understandings of identity. That said, distinctions may be drawn according to place of
birth, membership in visible minority communities and, in some cases, partisan
preference. For the most part, the inclusion and integration of group members into
the dominant national identity form coherent clusters according to the following
group alignment: anglophones, francophones, Scots and non-Scottish born. The
section begins with an examination of inter-group views to highlight the way in which
individuals draw boundaries around the nation. The section then proceeds to examine
intragroup perceptions in an effort to underline the divergent approaches to the issue
of integration and identity within Scotland and Quebec. The inability of individuals to
exercise complete control over the characteristics, tactics, goals and behaviour of the
group highlights one of the tensions within linguistic or birth groups in either case
study. In both cases, associated quantitative data supplements the qualitative analysis.
Perceptions of cultural communities in Scotland often receive minimal attention,
largely because they represent a small proportion of the population. As highlighted in
chapter three, the Scottish immigrant population represents approximately one
percent of the population. Thus, examinations of visible minorities and immigrants as
a whole, tend to receive treatment on a British-wide basis. In his analysis of the 1997
election results conducted for the British Commission for Racial Equality, Saggar
presented survey results on perceptions of inter-cultural integration in Britain (Saggar
1998).
Table 4.21 Inter-cultural Integration in Britain









Adapt and 73.0 53.5 52.8 32.6 59.2 66.2 57.8
blend
Source: Saggar 1998. Data from BES 1997
inclusion (Devine 1998, Dcvine 2000), while of obvious importance, remains outwith the remit of
this thesis.
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The data demonstrate the varied wishes for different groups to assimilate into
dominant British culture. In all but one case, a majority of the population feels that
diversity should be suppressed in the name of national coherence. The ability of
identifiably different groups to assume dominant characteristics receives attention in
Scottish political literature. In contrast to the cultural communities, the English
remain one group receiving particular attention in the Scottish identity and political
literature. In his analysis of political attitudes Dickson highlights the level of
integration enjoyed by English immigrants to Scotland (Dickson 1994). While noting
that new-Scots tend to adopt political values and attitudes more in line with political
views in Scotland, New Scots represent the closest approximation of a collective and
coherent national minority.
In an effort to head off charges of potential exclusion, the Scottish National Party has
established two groups, Asian Scots for Independence and New Scots for
Independence. In spite of these attempts to emphasis the inclusive nature of Scottish
nationalism (Denholm 1996), perceptions of exclusion or difference, particularly for
those born outside the United Kingdom, necessitate a regular negotiation of identity.
In other words, although Scottish nationalism appears civic in its goals, is treated as
inclusive by academic literature and political parties alike, perceptions of exclusion
within Scotland still exist. The following quotations indicate the extent to which
individuals are aware of a hierarchy of belonging, and how they cope with their
identity designation
When our first child was born, his name was Tarn. Tamir. All names
have meaning and we decided to give our son this name because it's a
pre-Islamic name. Secondly we wanted a name that's easy to
pronounce. Thirdly we wanted a name that when shortened becomes
Tarn and it's a very Scottish name. Even then we were trying to
negotiate our identity and express a sense of belonging. I know
negotiating identity is a fashionable term but if you're a Palestinian you
know what it means. You're constantly negotiating your identity in
concrete terms.
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The worst British regiment was the Black Watch The Black Watch
terrorised Palestinian villages, They would mix the sugar with the salt,
spill the kerosene. I wear Black Watch trousers and when I go to the
loo I want to pee on them.
I do not want to assimilate but I would not want to be outside.
I certainly in many respects feel like a Scot and I didn't accept British
national identity until 1 felt like I belonged.
Some people question [my belonging] on the basis of the fact that I'm
different.. I feel different... my face doesn't fit. I'm annoying in many
respects. If you heard my accent you wouldn't be able to tell where I
come from but I'm not from here. But I know more about the Scottish
context than some Scottish people do.
The Scots are open-minded and they accept you but up to a point.
I've never personally had any sense of being unwelcome here
Some years ago a friend from Budapest said to me, are you happy [in
Scotland]? I said, how can a Scot be happy without his own
Parliament. I feel very Scottish. That's our home, our roots. We had
many opportunities to go farther afield and I'm still here ... I must
confess I voted No.
I'm not Scottish. I'm English. People in Scotland talk about being
Scots to a far greater extent than people in England talk about being
English. It's constantly in public life, people almost reminding
themselves they're different from the English, and keen to reinforce the
ways in which they're different, the different ways in which they'd like
to see the society go
The last quotation highlights the tendency of individuals to draw attention to their
authenticity, or lack thereof, before making pronouncements on Scottish identity or
Scottish politics. In general, the quotations demonstrate a consistent attempt by non-
native Scots to acquire a sense of belonging without a loss of pre-existing identity.
That assimilation and full acceptance are neither attainable nor desirable suggests that
even the most inclusive nation will face internal barriers to integration. That this
suggests multiple national identities present a personal barrier to belonging remains an
under-explored aspect of existing interpretations of identity.
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The view of Scottish-born residents towards English arrivals or cultural communities
varied across the interviews. For the most part, subjects mentioned a gentle rivalry
with England that did not filter through to inter-personal relations. Perhaps the most
oft-quoted example referred to competition on the sports field.
I have a friend with whom I go to the rugby and he's a lecturer in St
Andrews in maths and he always talks about We did well, and We being
any team that is playing against England. I said to him the other day,
Good Test result for you, and I'm not really a follower of cricket, but the
West Indies had just beaten England and he said, Oh fabulous. It's
bizarre. I'm slightly ashamed of it. But the Herald once had a thing
about two World Cups ago and England were playing Romania and the
team playing England scored a goal and the Herald said the next morning
that five million Scots leap out of their seats and sat down feeling slightly
guilty. And I was watching and I did cheer and felt slightly bad about it.
I was in St Andrews at the time and I used to play five aside in the maths
department and I related this and one of the English guys said, five million
minus one, that man over there, and that's the man I just told you about.
And [Martin] said I didn't feel the least bit guilty, I just cheered and I
honestly think that ifwe had independence, and this is my own, we would
be able to be less neurotic about that, we would be able to relate to our
English neighbours in a much more creative and sensible way
Still others referred to the influence of social characteristics on perceptions of
inclusion. As mentioned previously, the presence of a sizeable west-coast Catholic
population has presented an obstacle to those linking Scottish identity with the
institutions that survived the Treaty ofUnion in 1707.
Catholics for a long time have found themselves a bit schizophrenic in
identifying with Scotland but also having an Irish identification. I think
there's another factor, there's the Episcopalians ... many people in
Scotland refer to the Episcopal church as the English church which
annoys many Scots in the Scottish Episcopal church as you can imagine.
.. when I was a minister in Coatbridge, my Catholic colleague had a
request from a group to use the hall and they were called the Bobby
Sands8 Gaelic football club and he said 'No way', and they said 'We just
want to have a dinner, we're just a social club' and he said 'You're
8
Bobby Sands (1954-1981) died in prison after having led a hunger strike in denial of his own
criminal status and in protest of the government of former prime minister Margaret Thatcher.
Classified as a political prisoner, IRA-membcr Sands went without food for sixty five days.
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making a statement'. He said, 'Listen, you are living in Scotland and you
ought to identify with Scotland not with Ireland'. Because of course
there's been .. a huge identity with southern Ireland.
Tensions among national identities surface also in Quebec. Based upon an analysis of
English media coverage of Quebec Le Devoir columnist Antoine Robitaille
emphasised the lack of empathy between French Quebecers and English Canadians
outside Quebec (Robitaille 1999). Despite attempts by the current Minister of
Intergovernmental Affairs to steer the debate towards a recognition of individual
rights, the situation appears to be understood as a debate about collective survival.
The problem, according to Robitaille, is that just as English Canadians appear
unwilling to acknowledge the profound threat to survival felt by French Quebecers, so
too do French Quebecers appear unwilling to acknowledge the frantic fear with which
English Canadians view the incursion of American culture into Canadian society. As
two interviewees stated
That's what English Canadians never understand, the visceral fear of
French Canadians that they'll lose their language, and they'll do
anything to do that even have their own country.
... the idea of an identity, of a French Canadian identity or a French
Quebecois identity is hard for some people outside Quebec to grasp.
There is variable understanding among English Canadians for the potentially
destructive presence of almost 300 million anglophones to the vitality of the French
language and culture in Quebec. French Quebecers possess a similar inability to
understand the fear ofEnglish Canadians that their identity will be subsumed by the
United States. The sustained popularity of both former Prime Minister Brian
Mulroney and the Free Trade Agreement among Quebecers, two issues particularly
linked to English fears of American influence, highlights the chasm between the two
groups. English Canadians grew increasingly resentful ofMulroney, partly motivated
by the suspicion that he would deliver Canada to the arms of a welcoming American
administration. This dissonance of views extends to the regard with which the
different groups hold each other. French Canadians in Quebec feel that they are seen
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in an inferior situation by English Canadians outside Quebec. The situation finds a
parallel in Scotland with respect to the European Union. Convinced that greater
integration with the European Union will aid Scotland economically and loosen the
grip of London and public policy Scots appear more favourable to European
integration that their English counterparts (Bennie, Brand and Mitchell 1997, Brown,
Paterson, McCrone and Surridge 1999, Europinion 1995, Europinion 1996,
Europinion 1997).9 Whether this stems from the stronger economic situation in
England, as a whole, or a perception of cultural fragility remains outwith the remit of
this thesis. The gap between the way groups are perceived, and the views that others
will admit to, must be seen as a significant stumbling block to productive dialogue.
Table 4.22 Inter-group Perceptions in Canada
Percentage agreeing with the following statement
Q Atl On AB BC
English Canadians often have a tendency to consider 60 35 32 39 28
French Canadians as inferior
French Canadians often have a tendency to consider 26 54 53 54 43
English Canadians as inferior
Quebecois francophones don't get the respect they
merit in Canada
59 18 25 19 25
Quebecois francophones are dominated in the 46 34 24 19 14
economic sphere by anlophones
Source: CROP 1998
As stated earlier, emphasis by Intergovernmental Affairs Minister Stephane Dion on
the individualised aspects of the 'Quebec situation' suggests that the Privy Council of
Canada has discovered a key element of the debate. Namely, that without the
collective aspect of sovereignty, its very justification, and thus support, decreases.
Maitres Chez Nous has no meaning if the Nous does not conjure up a collective
resonance. The promise of self-determination does, but that is not the language
employed by the sovereignists. Unfortunately for M. Dion, whether the debate really
is about individual rights, or whether it should be, is a moot point. The Quebec
electorate sees the debate as one grounded in notions of collective national identity.
9 In their analysis of the 1992 British Election Study Bennie, Brand and Mitchell note that 51% of
Scots support the EC versus 43% in England (Bennie, Brand and Mitchell 1997). Brown, Paterson,
McCronc and Surridgc note, however, that support for the European Union vanes across party lines
in Scotland, Supporters of the Liberal Democrats and SNP look more favourably on the EU than
supporters of either the Labour Party or the Conservatives (Brown. Patcrson, McCrone and Surridgc
1999).
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Although the issue of exclusion presents itselfmore readily in Quebec, the civic nature
ofQuebecois nationalism confuses the debate. The extent to which membership in the
nation is based on ethnic characteristics depends entirely on how one views language.
Perhaps predictably, those on either side of the sovereignty divide use opposing
definitions. Critics of nationalism claim that the confusion of a nationalist message, a
spectrum of opinion that ranges from acceptance to tolerance to forced resignation,
accounts for the low sense of belonging that has plagued many anglophones and
Allophones in post-referendum Quebec. In pre-referendum submissions to the Special
Jount Committee of the Senate and the House ofCommons on a Renewed Canada
(Beaudoin-Dobbie Commission) in 1992, representatives of two anglophone-rights
organisations expressed their frustration with the mixed messages of Quebecois
nationalists.
Les tensions constitutionnelles des dernieres decennies et les
manifestations particulieres de ces tensions dans notre province ont mine
la confiance des Quebecois d'expression anglaise au sujet de leur place au
sein de la societe quebecoise et de la societe canadienne (Canada 1991)
One day the government will try to say 'We want you here. We want to
try to find jobs for you' and all that but the next day other statements are
made. It's a hell of a mess (Canada 1991)
As the following quotations indicate, frustration and confusion have continued
throughout the decade. The most striking use ofmembership markers occurred on
referendum night in 1995 when an exhausted Quebec premier indicated that the Yes
side, which lost the referendum by less than one percent of the popular vote, had been
defeated by money and the ethnic vote. In an effort to repair the relationship, the new
premier held a 'Dialogue with the anglophone community' in which he promised to
safeguard the rights of the minority community (Bouchard 1996). The pattern of
events, between exclusionary statements and overtures of co-operation has prompted
interviewees to question their acceptance in Quebec society.
It's a vicious circle. There are some exclusionary incidents and
there are some people who feel excluded, and it feeds off each
other. It's not a direct exclusion ... Ninety-five percent of those
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who vote federalist have no chance ofmaking any direct impact on
decisions in the government. That's not a direct form of exclusion
but it presents a problem ... There's frustration, a sense that we're
dis-empowered from a lot of incidents that occur, whether it's
Jacques Parizeau, the most outstanding one of the 90s, the money
or the ethnic vote thing ...
Francophones have had a much harder time in the Canadian context
because they - as a people, as an identity, as a cohesive identity -
have never been properly recognised by the rest of the country
either officially in the constitution as more and more of the country
was peopled by people who came here from all over the world had
absolutely no idea what, you know New France was not something
that was part of their consciousness. And they've seen the country
change very much , But this has been vitally, vitally important to
French Quebecers right from the very beginning.
The previous quotations highlight the difficulty of projecting messages of inclusion
and ensuring that such messages are received as they were intended. Charges of
exclusion in Quebec, and more particularly, attempts to understand them in the face of
generally inclusive nationalist messages, have encouraged the development of several
survey instruments measuring the level of cross-cultural acceptance in Quebec. The
following table, created from data gathered for the Ministry of Cultural Communities
and Immigration in 1993 highlights the issues causing particular tension within
Quebec.
Table 4.23 Inter-cultural Interaction in Quebec
Percentage agreeing with the statement...
Yes No Neutral
Cultural communities favour economic development 61.9 14.1 24
Government measures favour immigrants in regions 67.7 14.2 18.1
Presence of immigrants contributes to development of 67.8 11.4 20.7
values
Cultural communities favour the cultural enrichment of 70.2 11.7 18.1
Quebec
Immigrants andmembers of cultural communities respect 49.3 21.6 29.1
the values of Quebec
Immigrants make efforts to integrate into Quebec society 60.9 15.2 23.9
1 am reluctant to be close to visible minorities 11.4 79.1 9.6
1 am angry to see visible minorities in the police force 8.7 82.7 8.6
1 am angry to see white Quebecoises marry visible 15 71.2 13.7
minorities
There are too many visible minorities in my 6.4 84.7 8.9
neighbourhood
Immigrants impede the use of French in Quebec 14.5 65.2 20.3
Immigrants contribute to rise in population 87.2 5.2 7.6
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Members of cultural communities are expensive to the 32.4 41.4 26.2
health system
Immigrants have tendencies to form ghettos 51.4 23.4 25.2
Visible minorities cause the crime rate to rise 32.2 43.9 23.8
Quebec has received too many immigrants 32.1 45.3 22.6
Cultural communities take the new jobs 20.1 54.7 25.2
Immigrants contribute to the deterioration of the economy 11.8 71.5 16.7
Immigrantsmust learn to use French 88.8 4.3 6.9
Immigrants have a sense ofbelonging 78.8 5.4 15.8
Cultural communities must adopt the use ofFrench in 56.5 27.2 16.3
their private life
The construction of synagogues shouldn't be tolerated 15.3 64 20.7
Religious demonstrations shouldn't be tolerated 30.8 45 24.2
The wearing of scarves or turbans makes me uneasy 27 59.8 13.2
Everyone has right to free manifestation 86.4 5.8 7.8
New Quebecers are integrated into French Quebec society 48.2 19.1 32.7
Immigrants have tendency to favour English 53.8 22.3 23.9
The media has unfavourable predispositionss 28.8 44.1 27
There is racial discrimination in the health service 28.4 33.9 37.7
Source: Joly and Dorval 1993
Surveys such as these attempt to determine whether the problem of exclusion stems
from genuinely prejudiced values within the majority of the population or with self-
driven perceptions of alienation among anglophones or members of cultural
communities. The previous statistics demonstrate the value that cultural communities
and immigrants bring to Quebec and recognise the efforts made by members of these
groups to integrate themselves into society. Quebecers do not blame immigrants for
rising crime rates, tolerate the construction of synagogues and support the wearing of
turbans. In most respects, the responses portray an open and welcoming society. The
differences stem from the use of language. A majority of respondents believe that
immigrants still demonstrate a preference for integration within the anglophone
community and that French should be the language of private life. For the Quebec
government, the integration of allophones into the official language of the province,
betrays an effort to accord immigrants equal rights. That which the government
identifies as an issue of rights for non-francophones - in other words, the right to
participate within the same sphere as the province's francophones - highlights a
marker of belonging from those on the margins of the nation
Before turning to an examination of political inclusion and behaviour in the next
chapter, a brief word about diversity within contested identity groups, highlights the
diverse ways in which markers of identity are used to assess voice and authenticity.
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While the undermining of opponents on the basis of national membership is rare in the
Scottish context, the use ofmarkers to emphasise the right - or more often the
absence of a right - to speak for a community figures prominently in post-referendum
Quebec.10 In particular, the divisions within the anglophone community of Quebec
focus of length of residency and language acquisition. Thus, those who seek to
undermine Bill Johnson, leader of the hard-line anglophone-rights organisation
Alliance Quebec, mention that he was educated in French, by Jesuits. The allusion, is
to the education received by both former premier and PQ founder Rene Levesque,
and former prime minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau. The following quotations are from
interviews with three Quebec sovereignists, two anglophone, one francophone:
it happened that as Quebecers politicised I was politicised but I was a
minority, and people ofmy age missed that ... like Bill Johnson. And
that's not fair because Bill's bilingual but Bill's got his own schtick
It's fair play in a way what Bill Johnson is doing because at least Bill
knows who we are, and Bill can speak French very well. He's been
educated in French and he knows what he's talking about so he's
playing his game to inoculate in the people of this province some
measure of guilt
I mean, Bill Johnson used to write these columns for the Vancouver
Sun, the view of Quebec to British Columbia. He was so ideologically
biased, all about intolerance and how anglophones are persecuted. I
mean, he speaks French and he'd say this stuff... he's useless as a
bridge builder to the French community though. His supporters don't
speak French.
Thus, Bill Johnson's hard-line approach is juxtaposed with his possession of one of
the key markers of identity in Quebec. The similar denial of voice occurs with recent
arrivals, or sometimes, not-so-recent arrivals. Mentioning a prominent anglophone
academic who advocates the support of the 'distinct society' clause and Bill 101,
anglophone interviewees often made reference to the fact that the academic, although
born in Quebec, has spent much of her adult life outside the province, and thus could
10
It is entirely possible that this pattern of interaction appeared before the 1995 referendum, but
fieldwork dates for this thesis, and an absence of relevant literature would make such a claim
untenable.
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not understand the succession of language legislation that undermined the
Anglophone community within the province.
[Name]'s not good to talk to. She came from the outside. She's not
really a good reflection of the average anglophone Quebecer.
She tells everyone she's from Quebec, but it's not really true. She only
returned here as an adult.
As these quotations show, the markers of identity used to determine membership in a
predominantly - and nationally - francophone society are used by individuals who do
not always consider themselves inside the nation, as markers of authenticity within
their own 'contested' group. Markers that originally excluded, or made individuals
feel excluded, have been used by members of this outside group to exclude potential
members.
This chapter has shown that the influence of national identity on the political debate
has led individuals to draw political boundaries around certain national members while
-in the views of others - excluding non-members. As stated at the outset, the degree
to which individuals feel that they are included depends in part on the level of
inclusion or exclusion inherent within the construction of identity and in part on the
salience of national identity. The importance of national identity to the nationalist
projects in both Scotland and Quebec accounts for the attention paid to constructions
and membership. The chapter has also argued that it is unfair to classify identity in
Scotland as inclusive and Quebec identity as exclusive. Rather, it is more appropriate
to argue that identity in Scotland is individualised whereas in Quebec it relies on
collectivised notions ofmembership. With these conditions in mind, individuals may
assess their own level of belonging. The following chapter argues that the co-existing
spheres of national and political activity allow individuals to mediate their lack of
inclusion at the national level by participating in State-level politics.
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Political Inclusion in Scotland and Quebec
The previous chapter examined the ways in which individuals explain their own
identity processes and the way in which social scientists have sought to rely on
various tools ofmeasurement to track identity changes over time. This chapter adds
to this discussion by analysing the relationship between national identity and political
culture. Much former examination of identity and political culture, as stated in
chapter two, has relied explicitly on quantitative examinations of each concept in an
effort to determine whether, for example, those who identify as members of the nation
are more likely to support political leaders or the political system (Bluhm f974,
Brown f979, Dickson f996, Hill 1990, Inglehart 1977, 1990, 1995, Miller Timpson
and Lessnoff 1996, Pammett and Whittington 1976, Pye and Verba 1965, Westle
1993). As that chapter states, however, such a view equates identity with state
loyalty and pays insufficient attention to the identity process. In an effort to uncover a
more nuanced understanding of identity and political culture this chapter will examine
the two concepts in light of quantitative measures before turning to an analysis of the
appropriateness of data.
Any examination of the statistical relationship between identity and political attitudes
must first establish that the two are separate phenomena. In an effort to test whether
feelings of attachment to the nation and views of the State may be distinguished from
one another the thesis relies on results from the 1997 election studies in Scotland and
Quebec. To this end it employs principal-axis factoring, a method of factor analysis
which highlights the existence of internally consistent groups of answers within the
larger data-set. Exploratory principal-axis factoring breaks down all the answers
provided in the election survey into blocks of data. The reduction of a data-set into a
manageable number of data clusters simplifies the analysis of political attitudes. These
data clusters are called factors. In the selection of factors, the goal is to encounter
the smallest number of factors with the largest amount of variance explained. The
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number of factors selected depends on a variety of tests, two ofwhich have been
employed here. Initially, Kaiser's criterion was used to select all items with
Eigenvalues greater than 1 (Bryman and Cramer 1997). Following this, a Scree test,
which graphs the amount of variance explained by each of the factors, illustrated the
usefulness of each factor (Cattell 1966). This Scree test indicated that the amount of
variance explained by the factors decreased dramatically after the fourth factor in the
Scottish dataset and after the sixth factor in the Quebec dataset. Finally, it is worth
noting that exploratory factor analysis, rather than confirmatory factor analysis was
used, and as such, no prior assumptions were made about the way the factors would
hang together.
The factors that stand as clusters within the dataset are composed of individual
questions. If the items within a factor address similar political attitudes or refer to
similar types of questions then the factor can be considered an internally consistent
building block within the data-set. Because of the different questions and scaling in
the datasets, the results for the factor analysis in Scotland and Quebec offer different
views of interaction among political orientation. For this reason, the chapter first
examines the results of the principal-axis factoring for Scotland before turning to an
analysis of the Quebec election study. A final word about the analysis of exploratory
principal-axis factoring: for the most part, the following analysis concentrates on
those items that received factor loadings greater than .30. While it could be argued
that this unnecessarily excludes items possessing smaller loadings, the following
analysis seeks to present a basic view of the results insofar as they affect the
relationship between identity and political culture. This is consistent with the aim of
identifying the smallest number of factors while maximising the amount of variance
explained. A complete investigation that sought to analyse the dataset as a whole
would, obviously, devote greater attention to items possessing smaller factor loadings.
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Scotland
The Scottish factor analysis reveals the presence of four main factors that account for
46 percent of the variance in the dataset. The first factor, which accounts for 27.6
percent of the variance, includes a combination of personal characteristics and social
habits. Items include the respondent's race, language, citizenship and type of
education in addition to newspaper readership and party membership. The factor also
includes items which tap moral issues - whether lawbreakers should get stiffer
sentences, whether life sentences should mean life - and views on nationality,
citizenship and the future ofGreat Britain as a single state. This collection suggests
that the first factor is not particularly internally consistent. However, of the 15 items
that possess factor loadings greater than .3 for the first factor, 7, or just under half,
deal with perceptions of the self and social habits. It is also worth noting, that some
items that are present within one factor are also present within another factor. In this
case, party membership, extent of political knowledge and views of equal
opportunities for women are present in the first factor and in the second factor. One
item, whether the respondent sees himself as Scottish or not, appears in the first three
factors.
The second factor, which accounts for 8 .2 percent of the variance in the dataset,
contains 14 items with a factor loading greater than .3. Apart from two questions that
probe identity, and two that test views of politicians, most of the items deal with
visions of society. Determinants of nationality, whether one must be born in Scotland,
live in Scotland or have Scottish ancestry to be Scottish, and equal opportunities
within Britain are contained within the second factor. Thus while the factor contains
some diverse items, it could be argued that it taps views of society, and particularly
notions of inclusion within society. Items tapping views of the self, as found in the
first factor, and views of politicians, are only nominally present in the factor.
The third factor contains 7 items with factor loadings greater than .3 and accounts for
5.5 percent of the variance within the dataset. Four of these items deal with views of
government. Interestingly, the four deal specifically with the government's spending
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capacity. These items are joined by another which refers to the redistribution of
income and wealth. Thus, while a first glance might suggest that the third factor
contains items that would be considered traditional measures of political culture
insofar as they tap attitudes to the government, a closer inspection reveals that they
are not just political views of the government, but economic views.
Table 5.1: Exploratory Principal-Axis Factoring for Scotland
1 2 3 4
Nationality best describes respondent .838 .295 .191 .000
Race self-rated .792 .313 .223 .000
Language spoken at home .661 .266 .294 .000
Think ofself as Scottish .626 .366 .307 .000
British citizen .564 .000 .417 .161
Rather be GB citizen than any other .483 .174 .117 .000
Lawbreakers should get stiffer sentences .474 .166 .199 .000
Life sentences shouldmean life .422 .297 .211 .000
Government should keep GB as single state .400 .199 .000 .000
Regularly read paper .395 .000 .274 .235
Important to have Scottish parents, grand-parents to .213 .603 .173 .105
be Scottish
Important to be born in Scotland to be Scottish .239 .588 .202 .000
Important to be living in Scotland to be Scottish .137 .588 .257 .000
Partymember .492 .573 .000 .000
Extent ofpolitical knowledge .403 .493 .182 .180
Go to private fee-paying school .358 .481 .000 .119
Only Black and Asian MP can represent Black and .105 .481 .239 .000
Asian
Phase out Scottish Catholic schools .288 .448 .104 .117
Are there equal opportunities for women in Britain .316 .446 .000 .190
Only women MPs can represent women .111 .437 .254 .000
Trust any politician to tell truth 312 .414 .000 .286
See self as Scottish or British .133 .404 .296 .000
Trust government to put nation above party .275 .363 .000 .317
Government should spendmore money on education .187 .125 ..640 .104
Government should spendmore money to get rid of .000 .222 .636 .135
poverty
Government should putmore money into NHS .225 .162 .633 .101
Income and wealth should be redistributed .159 .212 .500 .000
Government should give workers more say .130 .254 .455 .149
Woman's place is in the home .273 .000 .371 .187
Liberal Democrats stand up for Britain abroad .000 .000 .000 .651
Labour stand up for Britain abroad .000 .000 .000 .647
Trust Liberal Democrats to act in Scotland's interests .000 .000 .000 .611
Conservatives stand up for Britain abroad .114 .000 .000 .547
Are SNP an extreme party .000 .000 .000 .535
Trust SNP to work in Scotland's interests .000 .000 .242 .462
Trust Labour party to work in Scotland's interests .000 .175 .254 .441
Have business and industry too much power .000 .240 .197 .387
Variance Explained (%) 27.6 8.2 5.5 4.7
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Source: SES 1997. Principal Axis Factoring, Varimax rotation with Kaiser Normalization,
Pairwise deletion of missing cases, Total variance explained 46%
The fourth factor contains 8 items that together account for just under 5 percent of
the variance in the dataset. With the exception of one item, which probes views of
business and industry, the items all deal with perceptions of political parties. This
suggests that the fourth factor contains a relatively consistent measure of parties. The
existence of a separate 'party' factor suggests that views of political parties and views
of government may be considered distinct.
The exploratory principal-axis factoring does not reveal the presence of a single
'identity' factor, although it does suggest that how respondents feel about themselves,
including their national identity, may be distinguished from views of national
membership. In other words, how individuals feel about their own identity, and how
they feel about the conditions under which others could claim to hold that identity can
be considered to be distinct and separate views. To further examine the relationship
between identity and political attitudes the factor scores for each of the Moreno
categories were produced. In an effort to aid the analysis the four factors have been
given names that summarise the main items within the factor. Factor one is referred
to as view of self, factor two as view of society, factor three as view of government
and factor four as view of parties.
5.2: Mean and Standard Deviation for Scottish Identity Groups
Mean(St Dev)
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
View of View of View of View of
Self Society Gov't Parties
Scottish not British (N=204) ,00(-.33) -,33(,59) 00(.79) -,10(.76)
SE .001 .003 .004 .004
Scottish more than British (N=342) ,00(.52) -.21 (.55) 00(.80) ,00(.67)
SE .002 .002 .002 .002
Equally Scottish and British (N=228) .00(.75) ,00(,60) 00(.90) .00(.74)
SE .003 .002 .004 .003
More British than Scottish (N=36) -,50(.52) ,57(,44) .00(84) ,16(.82)
SE .014 .012 .023 .023
British not Scottish (N=31) -,28(,23) 92(.65) .22(1.29) -,12(.65)
SE .028 .021 .042 .021
Total (N=882) ,00(,88) ,00(,85) .00(89) .00(.87)
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SE 0 0 .001 0
One-way ANOVA F 46.33** 97.59** 5.22** 16.72**
Source: SES 1997 **=0.01 significance
The previous table contains a list of factor scores for each of the Moreno categories.
The factor scores are averages of individual scores within each of the five identity
groups. By calculating the mean, standard deviation and standard error such a table
highlights whether any of the identity groups possess different orientations for each of
the four main factors. Because large groups will possess means that approach zero,
both the standard deviation and standard error are required to provide an accurate
analysis of the variance within the dataset. The table shows that those who consider
themselves more British than Scottish and British not Scottish differ from the other
identity groups on the items included in factor 1. This is unsurprising, as some of the
constituent items in the first factor include measures of nationality. In addition, those
who consider themselves British not Scottish record different means for factors three
and four. This suggests that only if an individual considers herself'not Scottish' in
Scotland will her attitudes to politics and parties differ from the norm. The small
numbers for both these groups will affect the means. This can be seen in the higher
standard errors recorded for both these groups. Factor two produced the most varied
results, with the four groups on either side of the Moreno mid-point recording varied
factor scores. Those who prioritise a Scottish identity have recorded negative means
for the items on factor two, while those who prioritise a British identity record
positive means. Although a full analysis of these results is contained at the end of this
chapter these results suggest that identity has a small effect on political attitudes. In
addition, the differences among identity groups imply issues of inclusion within
society - notions of national belonging and equal opportunities - cause greater
division.
One-way analysis of variance , or ANOVA, reveals F test figures which suggest that
there is some variance between one or more of the groups. Although comparisons
between two groups may be analysed by using a t test, comparisons between more
than two groups rely on a test with less restrictions. The F test allows us to test the
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null hypothesis, that the factors do not contain items that produce varying results
among the different identity groups. Table 5,3 suggests that each of the factors
causes statistically significant variance within the identity groups. These F tests do
not, however, indicate where this difference lies. In order to determine which identity
groups differ, a further post-hoc or a posteriori test is required. For this purpose, a
Scheflfe test was used. The test is useful for comparisons of groups with uneven
numbers. Because the identity groups created by the Moreno question range in size
from 31 to 342 a Scheflfe test is appropriate. Most importantly, the test provides a
conservative estimate of significance, thus reducing the likelihood of incorrectly
crediting identity with influence. This test, a conservative estimate of variance,
compares the scores of each combination of identity groups for each factor. In so
doing it is able to determine which group accounts for the variance recorded in the F
test.
Table 5.3: Summary of Scheffe results for Scotland
Factor Statistically significant comparisons
Factor 1 Scottish not British - More British than Scottish*
View of Self More British than Scottish - More Scottish than British *
Factor 2 More Scottish than British-Equally Scottish and British*





vice versa pairs have not been included
*=0.05 significance **=0.01 significance
The results of the Scheflfe test for Scotland show that the first factor divides the
identity groups at the ends of the Moreno scale. Thus, those who consider themselves
Scottish not British, more Scottish than British and British not Scottish possess
markedly different responses to the items contained within factor one. This is not a
particularly surprising result, as some of the items contained within the first factor
address issues that would have a predictable impact on identity. Whether respondents
see themselves as Scottish, whether they are British citizens, and how they describe
239
Ailsa Henderson, PhD Thesis, Chapter 5
their nationality are all contained within factor one. Factor two, by comparison,
divides the identity groups that form the middle of the Moreno scale. Those who
consider themselves Scottish more than British, equally Scottish and British, and more
British than Scottish possess statistically significant variations on the items that form
the second factor. This suggests that while social characteristics and social habits
divide the identity groups at the end of the scale, those who profess equal support for
two identities, or do not hold one identity exclusively, are divided more on visions of
society. This contrasts with the relationship between identity groups and the items
contained within factors three and four, neither ofwhich significantly divided
respondents according to their national identity.
Quebec
The exploratory principal-axis factoring for Quebec results revealed the presence of
six factors which together account for 47 percent of the variance in the dataset. The
first factor contains six items with factor loadings greater than .3 and accounts for
14.7 percent of the variance within the dataset. These items tap attitudes to the
present political system, and include perceptions of political parties in Canada. These
items appear to tap what would be considered traditional measures of political culture,
including system efficacy, and satisfaction. In this respect, the factor could be
considered to contain internally consistent items. Factor two, however, appears to tap
similar issues. Accounting for 8 .36 percent of the dataset and composed of six items,
the second factor contains perceptions of those in government The distinction
between the first and second factor stems in part from the question wording of items.
In the second factor, questions require respondents to evaluate negative views of
politics and politicians. Factor one, by comparison, contains five positively worded
items. Furthermore, factor one appears concerned with issues of political stability
whereas factor two contains items that would gauge political efficacy.
The third factor, accounting for 7.5 percent of the variance in the dataset also
contains six items. Here, four of the items deal with issues such as women's interests,
minorities, bank profits and national problems. This suggests that the third factor
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deals with contemporary issues rather than views of politics as such. The fourth
factor, which accounts for 6.6 percent of variance, contains only two items, each of
which deals with attachment. Both are thermometer scales that require respondents
to indicate first, how they feel about Canada and second, how they feel about their
province. The factor loadings thus show that sense of attachment stands as an
independent factor. The fifth factor, which accounts for 5.7 percent of the variance in
the dataset contains views on moral issues. The items, which tap attitudes on women
in the home, unmarried parents and religion, could be considered an internally
consistent factor probing measures of social conservatism or traditionalism. The last
factor, which contains four items, accounts for just under 5 percent of the total
variance. It is worth noting that two of the items within this factor also possess factor
loadings greater than .3 for the first factor. These are the first and second questions
probing satisfaction with democracy. The other two items deal with views of Quebec
sovereignty. As a result, this could be considered a 'sovereignty' factor.
Table 5.4: Exploratory Principal-Axis Factoring for Quebec
1 2 3 4 5 6
Parties in Canada care what people think .672 -.231 .000 .000 .000 .000
Makes a difference who is in power .668 -.121 .000 .000 .000 .106
Parties necessary to make system work .504 -.191 .000 .000 .105 .151
MPs know what ordinary people think .490 -.132 .000 .114 .000 .000
Who people vote for can make a -.431 .129 .000 .000 .000 -.179
difference
Not think government cares what people -.229 .619 .105 .000 .000 .000
think
Politicians ready to lie to get elected (1) -.132 .603 .000 .000 .000 .000
Elected to parliament lose touch with .000 .442 .140 .000 .000 .000
people
People like me don't have a say in what -.113 .422 .000 .000 .000 .000
government does
Politics and government seem so -.148 .377 .000 .000 .177 .000
complicated
Politicians ready to lie to get elected (2) -.202 .350 .169 .000 .000 .000
All federal parties are basically the same -.157 .162 .492 .000 .000 .000
Solve national problems with grassroots -.133 .000 .489 .000 .000 .000
decisions
People have sense to tell government .000 .000 .486 .119 .000 .000
doing goodjob
Parties spend too much time on .000 .000 .445 .000 .000 .000
minorities
To protect women's interests needmore .000 .000 .445 .000 .000 -.100
in parliament
Profits banksmaking are a scandal .000 .157 .407 .000 .000 .000
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Rating - How feel about Canada
Rating - How feel about Quebec
Better off women stayed home with
children
Onlymarried people should be having
children
Importance of religion in your life
Favourable to Quebec sovereignty
Possibility of separation worry you
Satisfaction with way democracy works
(1)
Satisfaction with way democracy works
(2)
Variance Explained (%)
.000 .000 .000 .762 .000 -.139
.000 .000 .000 .745 .000 .000
.000 .000 .000 .000 .753 .000
.000 .000 .000 .000 .509 .000
.000 .000 .000 .000 .405 .209
.000 .000 .126 .000 -.208 -.573
.147 .000 .000 .000 .100 .553
.402 -.176 .000 .000 .000 .446
.301 -.120 .000 .000 -.104 .352
14.7 8.3 7.5 6.6 5.7 4.7
Source: CES 1997. Principle Axis Factoring, Varimax rotation with Kaiser Normalization,
Pairwise Deletion of missing cases, total variance explained 47%
Given the items contained within the factors, the following names form useful short¬
hands for use in future analysis: Factors one and two are referred to as political
stability and political efficacy respectively. Factor three is referred to as political
issues, factor four as social conservatism and factor six as sovereignty. In an effort to
determine whether the identity groups created in chapter four differed significantly
with respect to certain factors, the mean, standard deviation, standard error and F test
were calculated. The identity categories can not be considered directly comparable to
the Scottish Moreno identity groups. In the process of collapsing two groups the
resultant attachment variable has created two very small identity groups. This is no
doubt due to the absence of any measure which asked respondents to evaluate their
identity in terms of nation and State. As a result, it would be safe to conclude that the
collapsed attachment variable under-emphasises the number of respondents who hold
exclusive identities akin to those at the ends of the Moreno scale. These small
numbers affect the amount of further statistical analysis possible. The discussion at
the end of the chapter contains an additional analysis of the amended variable.
242
Ailsa Henderson, PhD Thesis, Chapter 5
Table 5.5: Mean and Standard Deviation for Quebec Identity Groups
Mcan(St Dev)
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6
Political Political Political Identity Social Sov'y
Stability Efficacy Issues Con'm
Quebec not Canada (N=2) -.69 (.22) -.35 (.38) .20 (.46) -.28 (0) 1.0 (.19) .82 (.45)
SE .11 .19 .23 0 .095 .225
Quebec more than Canada (N=158) .00 (.82) .00 (.76) .00 (.65) .00 (.15) .25 (.7) .00 (.69)
SE .005 .005 .004 0 .004 .004
Quebec and Canada (N=100) .00 (.82) .00 (.71) .00 (.75) .00 (.20) ,00( .79) -.28 (.70)
SE .008 .007 .008 .002 .008 .007
Canada more than Quebec (N=57) -.19 (.89) -.15 (.61) .17 (.85) -.11 (.19) -.67 (.86) -.25 (.61)
SE .016 .011 .015 .003 .015 .011
Canada not Quebec+ Na Na Na Na Na Na
Total (N=317) .00 (.84) .00 (.72) .00 (.73) .00 (.18) .00 (.78) -.14 (.69)
SE .003 .002 .002 .0 .002 .002
One-way ANOVA F 1.91 1.43 2.72* 4.59** 6.04** 4.89**
+ insufficient numbers* = 0.05 significance **=0.01 significance
Source: CES 1997
As can be seen from the previous table the factor scores for the Quebec results face
serious limitations in the small numbers for the exclusive identity groups. Due to
small numbers it was not possible to analyse results for the Canada not Quebec
identity group. In addition, with only two cases in the Quebec not Canada group,
these results must also be questioned. These small numbers do not represent the size
of the original identity group but rather the amount of cases with complete answers
for the identity question and all the items contained within the factor analysis.
The Quebec results show greater variety in the means recorded for identity groups
although the larger groups with more stable means have not differed greatly from the
total means recorded for the dataset. The small Quebec not Canada group has
differed from the total mean on all five factors although the group has also recorded
high standard errors. By contrast the larger Canada more than Quebec identity group
has also recorded factor scores that differ from the total means on each of the six
factors. Initially this suggests that each of the factors contain items that distinguish
the polarised identity groups from one another. The two largest identity groups,
those professing an attachment to Quebec more than Canada and to both Quebec and
Canada differed from the total mean for the last factor. Indeed factor six produced
the most varied results among the identity groups. This result is predictable as the
243
Ailsa Henderson, PhD Thesis, Chapter 5
factor contains two items on Quebec sovereignty. Those professing an attachment to
Quebec more than Canada recorded deviant factor scores for the social conservatism
factor as well. Although mitigated by the small number of individuals in the two
exclusive identity groups the analysis suggests that the issue of sovereignty is
characterised by considerable dissent among identity groups. Furthermore, each of
the factors appears to contain some items that provoke dissimilar responses among
members of different identity groups. The extent to which this stands up to more
rigorous statistical testing warrants further attention.
Results of the one-way ANOVA test revel that only the four last factors provoke
statistically significant differences among the identity groups. This ANOVA test is
more reliable than the factor scores themselves because the small numbers within one
or more of the identity groups will not negatively affect the result. Factors one and
two, measuring traditional indicators of political culture, including regime stability and
political efficacy, do not produce statistically significant results, suggesting that if one
were to take a limited view of political culture, the relationships between identity and
political attitudes would appear weak.
As with the Scottish results, a Sheffe test reveals the location of variance captured by
the F test. Factors one, two and three, which tap attitudes of political stability,
efficacy and issues, fail to provoke significant differences among the adapted identity
groups. On factor four, which deals exclusively with attachment to Canada and to
Quebec, the identity groups show significant differences. Likely because of the small
sample sizes, only the middle categories, those professing equal attachment for
Canada and Quebec, or some for both, show significant differences. This too is a
predictable result, however, as the two items which compose factor four were used to
created the identity categories. Factors five and six also show significant differences
among the identity groups. Factor five, which taps attitudes of social conservatism,
records significant variance for those who feel greater attachment to Canada, but still
feel some attachment to Quebec, and those who feel greater attachment to Quebec
but still report a sense of attachment to Canada. Factor six, which contains two
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questions on Quebec sovereignty, records significant differences for those who feel
attached to Quebec more than Canada, and those who feel an equal attachment to
both. This suggests that differing views of sovereignty do not necessarily belong to
polarised identity groups.
Table 5.6: Summary of Scheffe results for Quebec







Factor 4 More Canada than Quebec - Equally Canada and Quebec*
Identity More Quebec than Canada - Equally Canada and Quebec*
Factor 5 More Quebec than Canada - More Canada than Quebec**
Social Conservatism
Factor 6 More Quebec than Canada - Equally Canada and Quebec*
View of Sovereignty
vice versa pairs have not been included *=0.05 significance **=0.01 significance
Measuring Political Inclusion in Scotland and Quebec
What then can be said of the quantitative data collected in the 1997 election studies?
First of all, the presence of two thermometer scales in the Canadian election study
inhibits the comparison with Scottish data. In an effort to make the two datasets
more comparable the amended attachment variable seeks to re-create the dual
identities contained within the Moreno question. And yet the new Quebec scale
cannot be assumed to function as well as the Moreno categories. Individuals
classified as having greater or lesser attachment to Canada and Quebec may have
answered differently if responding to a question that demanded an explicit comparison
of identities, as does Moreno. Individuals who might have indicated an attachment to
Quebec not Canada, for example, may have recorded very low thermometer ratings in
the initial question probing Canadian attachment. As a result, these individuals would
have been recorded as belonging to the identity group More Quebec than Canada.
Survey data analysed in chapter four suggests that the amended scale under-estimates
the proportion of individuals who profess an attachment to Quebec not Canada
(CROP 1998). This limitation co-exists with the use of different question items
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probing political attitudes in the Canadian and Scottish surveys. Any comparison
must take care to compare the interaction of items within each dataset, rather than
compare the two sets of results directly. With this in mind, it is possible to compare
the relationship between identity and political culture in each nation.
The factor scores, ANOVA and Scheffe tests for Scotland and Quebec reveal that in
each case, identity groups react differently to some of the items contained within the
factors. For certain factors, certain groups may record statistically significant
variations. Overwhelmingly, however, the evidence suggests that whatever differences
do exist are subtle rather than profound. In the majority of cases the statistical
analysis present here confirms evidence provided by earlier studies of identity (Brown
1979, Pammett and Whittington 1976, Westle 1993), that identity groups possess
dissimilar views on identity issues such as nationalism or sovereignty but possess
similar views of the State such as efficacy, deference, satisfaction and confidence.
As chapter one argued, an expanded definition of political culture, one that includes
perceptions of relations between individuals and the State and between individuals and
their fellow citizens, encapsulates some of the measures that might otherwise have
been considered outwith traditional analyses of political culture. Furthermore, with
increased attention devoted to the benefits of social networks, as profiled in social
capital literature, such a definition of political culture could provide an alternative
view of analysing social capital within society.
Perhaps the most striking comparison may be found in the apparent lack of a
statistically significant relationship between identity groups and views of the State.
Neither the Scottish data, which contains two small factors on political attitudes, and
the Quebec data, which contains two larger factors tapping political stability and
efficacy, record statistically significant relationships between the 'political' factors and
the identity groups. If one excludes the identity factor for Quebec, the items of
which were used to create the identity groups, identity groups in both Scotland and
Quebec differ significantly on two factors each. For the exclusive or polarised identity
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groups, social characteristics and habits, as in the case of Scotland, and views of
sovereignty in Quebec, produce divergent results.
In addition, it is not just polarised identity groups that record dissimilar views. The
Scottish society factor, and identity and sovereignty factors for Quebec reveal
significant differences between the mid-point group and groups on either side of the
mid-point. In other words, identities that would appear to be mirror opposites - More
Canada than Quebec and More Quebec than Canada - differ less than each of these
groups and the mid-point, suggesting that those who claim to hold both identities in
equal regard are the odd ones out. Within Scotland, factor two illustrates that those
who claim to be equally Scottish and British differ from those prioritising a British
identity and those prioritising a Scottish identity on their view of society. By contrast,
polarised identity groups in Scotland are distinguished more by their social
characteristics than either their views of society or their politics. Within Quebec
polarised identity groups are only distinguished by their views of social conservatism,
Identity and the issue of sovereignty further divide those who profess an equal
attachment to Canada and Quebec and those who prefer one over the other. These
results suggest that it is not politics that distinguishes members of identity groups, but
rather views of society, and levels of integration within society.
This analysis of the statistical data is supported by qualitative material gathered from
the 65 interviews. For the most part, individuals felt that within Scotland and within
Quebec individuals shared similar approaches to political life, if one ignores the issue
of sovereignty. In addition, the perception of individuals was that politicians were
held in similar regard not only across identity groups within each nation, but within
the larger Nation-State. The following quotations illustrate this point.
Interviews in Canada, in particular, evaluated the extent of political difference on a
Quebec-Canada scale. As one Bloc Quebecois MP explained:
. . .they share the same kind of commitment to democracy, human rights,
an area that is of great concern for me foreign affairs, foreign aid for
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example. There's a lot of shared values and I think that is quite
understandable. They've been living together for more than 300 years and
in the federation for more than 130 years now
The following respondent, a journalist with Le Devoir, took a different view. The
comparison, as with the BQ MP, was with the rest of Canada. No distinction was
made among attitudes held by different Quebecers.
I think there's more trust towards politicians. Traditionally politics has
more prestige in Quebec. And there's more trust. But that doesn't
apply across the board. It's balanced. There's more trust for those
you like but there's a lot less trust than elsewhere if you're disliked.
And sometimes prestige and trust don't go together.
These two quotations illustrate not only the perception that within Quebec individuals
hold similar views but emphasise also that support for sovereignty, as was the case for
these two individuals, does not determine a particular view of shared values such as
trust or efficacy. Others, when answering questions about the different views of
political culture within Quebec relied on issues of wider authority to explain their
point. As this McGill University professor explained:
The Montreal cops are more likely to belt you to get a confession out
of you than the Windsor police are, even though they're quite capable
of it. There's a different set of rules. My experience with cops and
soldiers in English Canada is that they obey the small rules but in
Quebec police and soldiers don't obey the small rules. Is that better?
Do you want to be stopped for speeding over 10 miles an hour, for
jaywalking, all the things Quebecers and Montrealers take for granted?
If not, you'll enjoy Quebec. If you find that frightening, appalling,
demoralising, disgraceful, you should stay in Ontario.
This supports the view that while perceptions of political parties and government
success continue to bind individuals across identity and provincial boundaries,
differences of opinion do exist. Still others stressed different approaches to social
issues. As this francophone sovereignist explained:
I would say that the idea of how we deal with social problems, how we
develop ourselves economically, there are some differences because I
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think for example, Quebecers are really keen on making sure that the
social policies of Quebec and everything that relates to social policies
are dealt with by the National Assembly and its government and not by
the federal government. Whereas I think in Canada there is a
willingness to impart the federal government of a very important role, a
key major role in those areas and that could even extend to education
which could never be acceptable to Quebec. And the economic model
which 1 think does not discard the State, the government as a player,
and in some cases as a major player, whereas I think the trend in
Canada is to less government because people believe its never
government, a bit like along the line of what's happening in the United
States.
Again, though, the distinction is drawn along provincial lines. For most of those
interviewed, any difference that existed could be seen between Quebec and the rest of
the country, rather than within Quebec. One exception was for a member of the
Westmount municipal council, who claimed that francophones and anglophones hold
different views of social issues:
Culturally speaking, the English municipalities, there's a greater interest in
municipal affairs, secondly, there's a much greater sense of benevol, of
voluntarism, which is why there's a volunteer umpire for the soccer team,
for donating money, I think anglos give more to charity than the
francophones do, I think because the church took care of that so there
was no need for the individual person to do that. The hospitals, for
example were run by the Church, and the schools were run by the Church
and the politics were run by the church. So there was not a tradition of
giving. But in the English community there's a much greater tradition of
giving. So there you'd have people running for council to generally give
back to their communities. It wasn't ulterior motives
Again, however, the qualitative information suggests that for those interviewed,
different identity groups would not hold drastically different political or social values.
Among those who felt that differences of opinion existed, Quebec as a whole was
compared with the rest of the country. The sole individual who claimed that
differences of opinion might exist within Quebec pointed to language, rather than
national identity, as an explanatory factor.
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For Scottish interviewees, there was a similar tendency to mitigate the impact of
identity on political values or behaviour. The following quotations, provided by a
Labour local councillor and a Sunday Mail journalist capture this view.
The divergence isn't as big as it's commonly made out to be.
I don't think we like government any more than the rest ofBritain. It's
not an ideological preference for State action. It's just that we're kind
of stuck here, things are harder here, and the State better fix things for
us.
Equally prevalent, however, were claims that Scottish political attitudes were different
from those in England. "Of course they are" was a popular response. As stated
earlier, these views do not relate directly to the differential attitudes held by identity
groups within the nation, but rather speak to the way we usually talk about difference.
This suggests that there is a level of inclusion within the nation, as neither social
characteristics nor national identity were identified as a potential source of friction.
The exception, however, was in the field of voting. As one political scientist argued.
Politically, Scottishness only comes out in terms of electoral behaviour.
By social and political measures, there's little substantive difference.
There's a degree of difference, but it's not large, and its not really
systematic differences. The natural avenue of Scottishness, politically,
was the development of the SNP. .. [but] Scots aren't out in the
streets demonstrating about the constitutional issue. There's no mass
agitation.
Unlike in Quebec, however, no one sought to point out the differing views of social
relations, voluntarism or inclusion that might exist among different identity groups.
As a result, the qualitative data suggests that individuals are neither of the belief that
identity influences political views such as efficacy or deference, nor are they in the
habit of speaking about social characteristics or identity in such a way that might
suggest a level of exclusion within the nation
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These results are consistent with the qualitative information provided in chapter four.
For some individuals the inability to demonstrate foil possession of the various
markers of identity results in an insecure sense of national belonging. For some of the
individuals interviewed, a nationalist discourse has provoked feelings of exclusion
even in the face of inclusive messages from political parties. In the previous
quantitative analysis, factors tapping views of social relations provided some of the
sole means of distinguishing identity groups. This suggests that the process of
national or nationalist debate heightens our attention to our social relations with our
fellow citizens or provides an opportunity for disparate notions of society and social
inclusion to be expressed In either case, the data provides evidence that identity
groups possess different attitudes for some of the factors. For those holding exclusive
identities, social characteristics and views of sovereignty distinguish group members.
For those with equal or prioritised identities, however, the difference lies not with




This thesis has examined the relationship between national identity and political
culture. In particular, the thesis has advanced analyses of the promotion of identity
markers, the identity process and the interaction of identity and attitude variables in
electoral studies. In so doing it has sought to provide a comprehensive view of
national identity and political culture in Scotland and Quebec. First, the thesis has
argued that despite the capacity for individuals to self-select their national identities
and what they mean, certain political actors consistently promote visions ofwho is,
and what it is to be, Scottish or Quebecois. Second, it argued that even in the face of
inclusive notions of national identity some individuals may feel excluded from the
nation. Third, it argued that quantitative data demonstrates that there is little
statistically significant relationship between national identity and political attitudes but
that identity groups possess different views of society. In an effort to elucidate
several of the conclusions reached by this thesis this chapter will revisit the
methodology and research design employed in the work and discuss in turn the key
themes mentioned above.
In part this thesis was motivated by the under-explored relationship between national
identity and political culture. Recent increased attention to political culture studies
and the growth in social capital literature suggests that cultural analyses of the polity
have much to offer the field of politics (Guttman and Pullam 1999, Rotberg 1999).
At the same time, however, such analyses have often avoided references to national
identity. As a result, these two literatures have only rarely crossed paths (Badie and
Birnbaum 1994, Bluhm 1974, Hill 1990, Pammett and Whittington 1976, Pye 1965,
Westle 1993). This thesis sought to correct this by providing an analysis of the way
national identity functions and how the markers and processes of that identity might
affect political attitudes held by individuals. Throughout, a wide definition of political
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culture was used, one that included the perceptions of relations between individuals
and the State, and between individuals and other members of the polity. Such a
definition includes attitudes and behaviours and seeks to encompass not just how
individuals relate to one another and the State, but also how individuals think they are
relating.
While studying national identity and political culture the thesis relied on comparisons
between Scotland and Quebec. Each contains peaceful and democratic nationalist
movements that seek to use the political process to gain greater autonomy, and thus
possess several advantages for any comparative analysis. Both contain current
nationalist parties that espouse left-of-centre or social democratic values and gained
parliamentary seats in the 1960s.' Both contain nationalist movements that claim to
be examples of civic nationalism. Both have relied on referenda within the
sovereignty debate. Both occupy similar economic roles within the larger State. And
yet the components of national and political life in each case are sufficiently different
that the comparison is not a needless repetition of similar material. In particular, the
absence of a Scottish Parliament before 1999 and the role of language within Quebec
distinguish the two case studies. Membership, through Britain, in the European
Union and a comparatively small ethnic minority population further differentiate
Scotland. By employing two case studies that approximate similar parliamentary
designs and yet possess particular national characteristics the comparison aimed to
provide some general conclusions about national identity and political culture.
To provide a balanced view of national identity and political culture the thesis relied
on a series of integrated research techniques. Party manifestos and constitutional
documents provided views of the markers of national identity while interviews with 65
individuals determined how the promotion of certain visions of the nation and national
belonging were received. Greater detail on the selection of interview subjects is
located in Appendix D. In addition the thesis relied on quantitative data gleaned from
private opinion polls and election surveys to provide evidence of the relationship
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between the two concepts. The quantitative analysis contained in the last chapter
relies exclusively on data from the 1997 election studies in Scotland and Quebec. The
goal, then, was to offer a triangulated view ofboth national identity and political
culture to determine how the two concepts fit together. Throughout the research
process additional data were gathered. Surveys of activists at each of the four
Scottish political party conferences and analyses of Scottish and Quebecois
newspapers over a four-month period provided a wealth of information but were
eventually excluded from the thesis, in large part because of restrictions of space.
The identity Process and the Hierarchy of Belonging
The first theme addressed by the thesis concerns the identity process in Scotland and
Quebec. Through manifestos, constitutional documents and academic literature,
political parties and political actors have sought to reinforce an inclusive notion of the
nation that rests on a holistic view of society and social democratic values. Even
parties advocating minimal or no constitutional change contain references to the
distinctness of Scotland and Quebec. Overwhelmingly, then, the rhetoric in both case
studies suggests an open, and pluralistic nation where residency is more important
than ancestry and where distinct social or political values bind the population. In an
effort to determine how the messages promoted by political parties and constitutional
documents were received by individuals the thesis used material gathered from 65
interview subjects. These individuals, who were members of political parties or
ethno-cultural organisations, civil servants or journalists were asked about their
visions of identity and their views of political culture. The results demonstrate that
the individuals interviewed think of their identity in terms ofmarkers of identity such
as birth, residency, ancestry, social or political values. Individuals who feel that they
possess a questionable claim to belong use these markers to evaluate their sense of
national identity. For these individuals, identity functions as a hierarchy of belonging,
in which members who possess ethnic markers of identity feel they belong and those
who lack one or more markers occupy the identity periphery. This view contrasts
1 The difference, of course, is that the Parti Quebecois, formed in 1968, contested provincial elections
while the Scottish National Party, formed in 1934, contested Westminster seats.
254
Ailsa Henderson. PhD Thesis, Chapter 6
other findings that stress the irrelevance ofmarkers in favour of a more inclusive
notion of nationalism. Jonathan Hearn's recent work (Hearn 2000) argues that the
way in which Scottish national identity has become imbued with notions of
egalitarianism has served to protect those who might otherwise be excluded from a
more ethnic notion of national membership. This thesis does not disagree, but rather
points out that even in the face of inclusive messages, some individuals continue to
feel excluded from a sense of belonging.
Further research could determine whether such a finding calls into question the
division between civic and ethnic nationalism. The results suggest that if inclusive
notions ofmembership characterise civic nationalist movements, then the existence of
perceptions of exclusion call into question the extent to which any nationalist
movement can claim to be inclusive. This is not to say that such a characterisation of
the way national identity functions is accurate but rather that if some individuals feel
excluded because the civic markers inadequately present them with a sense of
belonging, then the movement faces a considerable challenge in proclaiming its
inclusive nature.
Political Attitudes and Social Attitudes
If the first key theme of the thesis addresses the identity process in Scotland and
Quebec, the second theme examines the way that identity process might affect
political culture. The 1997 election studies provide opportunities to measure the
relationship between national identity and political culture. Early wor$!s on political
culture relied on survey data to measure such variables as political efficacy,
satisfaction, confidence and trust (Almond and Verba 1963, Marsh 1977). Later
works rely on large datasets gathered through election studies, World Values surveys
or International Social Survey programmes (Inglehart 1977, 1990, Nevitte 1996) In
this respect this thesis follows these studies in their use of quantitative survey
material. As with earlier literature on the topic, the election surveys indicate that
identity correlates with a small number of attitudes. What the data also show is a
significant divergence on social issues for members of prioritised or equal identity
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groups. Furthermore, it shows that exclusive identity groups, those that hold one
identity only, differ in social characteristics and views of national identity issues such
as nationalism or sovereignty. The exclusive groups differ neither on social issues nor
on political issues. In this the thesis sits well with social identity theorists who chart
the social rather than political influences of identity processes.
The role of social identity theory in articulating a negotiated process helped
considerably in the analysis of interview material gathered for this thesis. The process
by which individuals define the group by a list of characteristics, establish an in-group
and out-group and then seek to ensure the salience of that identity, as advanced by
Tajfel and Turner, may be seen in the hierarchy of identity argument advanced in the
thesis. Furthermore, the debate within national identity literature, whether the nation
exists as a list of characteristics or as a sociological construct, provided an additional
tool of analysis. While it can be argued that each position reflects a exaggerated
starting point for debate rather than an immovable view of the world, the process of
that debate greatly aided the analysis of party documents and interview material. The
promotion ofmarkers of identity and the way in which these markers are received
suggests that both elements, a notion of the things that bind individuals and the sense
ofbelonging, form an essential part of national identity in Scotland and Quebec.
While the thesis sought originally to advance political culture research it may end by
contributing more to the debate surrounding national identity. Political culture
research itself, with several notable exceptions (Inglehart 1977, 1990) has recently
adopted the mantle of explaining value change within - usually North American -
societies rather than explaining how or why such change has occurred or indeed what
such change means. Perhaps this absence is understandable given the considerable
confusion surrounding the definitions and methods used within political culture
research (Lane 1992, Pateman 1989, Reisinger 1995, Welch 1993).
The existence of independent literatures on identity and political culture is reproduced
in the thesis. While it proved relatively simple to relate the results of the interviews
with academic literature on identity, and furthermore to analysis the quantitative
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results in light of contemporary works on political culture, the connection between
these two strands of research proves more elusive. The concern of self-excluded
individuals that they do not belong within national society is mirrored to a certain
extent in the diverse approach of identity groups to social issues. The particular way
in which that sense of exclusion might affect political and social attitudes, however,
lies outwith the analysis of this thesis. Truly, the link between the hierarchy of
belonging that exists within the minds of some individuals, and the resultant effect on
political culture remains an under-explored aspect of identity and political culture.
Difficulties such as this co-exist with other complications which have both marked
and enriched the thesis.
An additional complication was faced in the shifting political system in Scotland. The
absence of a Scottish Parliament at the beginning of the research process is in itself a
significant feature. Equally, the process by which that parliament was established -
the 1997 general election, the 1997 referendum, the Consultative Steering Group, the
1999 Scottish Parliamentary elections, resulting media coverage of the Labour-Liberal
Democrat-led Parliament - can be argued to have had a considerable effect on the way
Scots view their identity and their political attitudes. All interviews were completed
between the referendum on a Scottish Parliament in 1997 and the Scottish
Parliamentary elections in 1999. It could be argued that the interview responses were
thus a more accurate portrayal of pre-devolution views, despite the successful
devolution referendum. The extent to which these views continue to exist after the
establishment of a Scottish Parliament could only be established with longitudinal
work.
The political situation in Quebec has remained more stable than that in Scotland. That
said, the Supreme Court reference case, in which federal government lawyers
encouraged the Supreme Court ofCanada to elucidate the conditions under which
Quebec could separate, in addition to the shifting roles played by individual politicians
point to considerable change within Quebec. In addition, the 1998 Quebec National
Assembly elections witnessed a second-term for the Parti Quebecois government
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despite a smaller percentage of votes that their rivals. The strength of the Quebec
Liberal Party in those elections and decreasing support for sovereignty suggests that
views of the nation and the polity are also changing. As a result this thesis cannot
claim to represent the views of Scots or Quebecois for the unforeseeable future but
rather seeks to provide an accurate portrayal of identity and political culture in both
case studies at the end of the twentieth century.
Directions for future research
This section contains a series of studies and research questions that stand not only as a
wish list for the researcher but also as a guide for students of national identity and
political culture seeking to begin new research projects. With an additional two years
each of these topics would have provided an useful addition to the existing PhD
thesis. Instead, however, they offer directions for future research for those interested
in the identity process and political attitudes.
For the past year the researcher has been teaching American parliamentary internship
students about Scottish Politics. For the class on identity students are asked to
approach 20 Scots with a list of ten questions, one ofwhich must be the Moreno
question on identity. The use of the Moreno question along with other measures of
identity allows student to understand the multi-faceted nature of identity. The project
is designed to enable students to speak to Scots about their experiences and their
views of identity. Students are then required to report to the class on their findings.
While none of the surveys approaches the sample sizes or sampling methods required
of a statistical survey the questions created by students have offered an insight into the
variety ofways one can study identity. Asking individuals whether they think other
people are more Scottish than they are appears to provoke long and varied answers
about the relative inclusiveness of Scotland. Any future work on the nature of
Scottish identity would do well to include such questions as a way of tapping visions
of the identity process.
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Identity research would also benefit from studies correlating the differences between
varying measures of identity. Thus, it would be useful to create a Canadian survey in
which the Moreno question featured alongside the existing thermometer question.
Indeed the identity questions used by private opinion polling firms in Canada, as
featured in chapter four, would be a welcome addition to the Canadian Election
Survey. To supplement existing identity measures the thesis sought to provide a
comprehensive view of identity by interviewing 65 individuals in Scotland and
Quebec. These interviews produced an abundance of useful material. Future
research, however, may choose to concentrate on other methods. In particular, small
groups, composed of individuals with different social characteristics and different
social views, might produce richer results. Indeed, the negotiation process mentioned
in the thesis might appear more visible in the interaction of diverse individuals. This
would allow the researcher to compare the way individuals view the 'right to belong'
of different people and the behaviour of these individuals when faced with those
possessing different markers of identity. The role of small group work in capturing
the interaction of individuals points to another area for future research. Greater
attention to the role of social networks formed around identity issues such as
nationalism or constitutional change could explain the motivations behind self-
exclusion and the link between identity and political attitudes. In other words, a
thesis that seeks to examine cultural approaches to politics would do well to employ
more interactive research techniques.
This conclusion has sought to revisit the research choices and research findings
contained within the thesis. In so doing it has highlighted some of the complications
faced in the research process, and the options available to those embarking on similar
research objectives. With these caveats in mind, however, the thesis is designed to
stand as an original contribution to research both in its use of two increasingly-studied
comparative case studies and in its use of national identity. By design, then, the thesis
sought to fill a gap within the academic literature. The findings of the thesis further
attest to its originality. The way in which markers of identity are promoted and
received in Scotland and Quebec suggests that certain individuals exclude themselves
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from the nation, in large part because they feel they possess insufficient proof of their
right to belong. In their minds, this creates a hierarchy of identity in which values,
ancestry or birth may grant others a greater right to belong. The markers of identity
and the salience of identity within society remain key factors in the articulation of
exclusion. The thesis also demonstrates that even those who feel excluded in some
way possess similar notions of the nation and the polity. Considerable quantitative
data supports this finding. The identity groups listed within the 1997 election studies
for Scotland and Quebec tend to differ more on social issues than on political issues.
Despite the political implications of nationalism and nationalist movements, identity
appears to have a greater impact on views of society and social inclusion. Thus the
thesis not only contributes to knowledge of Scotland and Quebec, but seeks to
advance our understandings of how identity operates and how, if at all, it affects
political culture. The answer suggests that identity does not discriminate between the
political attitudes that constitute political culture but that it affects the sense of
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Jacques Cartier sails up St Lawrence River
Conquest of Quebec
Treaty of Paris, Royal Proclamation
Quebec Act protects status of Catholic Church, seigneurial system of land
tenure and civil code
Constitution Act separates British North America into Upper Canada (Ontario)
and Lower Canada (Quebec)
Rebellions in Upper and Lower Canada
as recommended in Lord Durham's report, Upper and Lower Canada are
merged into the Province of Canada which is then divided into Canada East
(Ontario) and Canada West (Quebec)
Colonial Laws Validity Act prevents colonies from passing legislation that
contradicts British law
Ontario, Quebec, NS and NB join confederation
Red River Rebellion
Statute of Westminster - repeals Colonial Laws Validity Act
Quebec Liberal Party comes to power in Quebec, begins programme of
legislation referred to as Quiet Revolution'
Rene Levesque quits Quebec Liberal Party, Trudeau elected Prime Minister
Rene Levesque founds Parti Quebecois, Official Languages Act (federal)
October Crisis: Front de Liberation du Quebec kidnaps Quebec Cabinet
Minister and British Trade Commissioner
French official language of Quebec
Parti Quebecois win election in Quebec
Charter of the French Language
referendum on sovereignty, 40% of Quebecers back independence
repatriation of the constitution and Charter of Rights and Freedoms
Meech Lake Accord signed
Free trade agreement with US
Meech Lake Accord fails, Bloc Quebecois formed
Oka crisis
Chariottetown Accord signed, Charlottetown Accord fails in nation-wide
referendum
Liberals elected, Bloc Quebecois becomes official opposition
PQ win provincial election
referendum on sovereignty, 49.4% support independence
Bouchard leaves federal BQ to become leader of PQ and premier of Quebec
June: Liberals re-elected, Reform becomes official opposition
federal Conservative leader Jean Charest leaves party to head Quebec Liberal
Party, Oct: Parti Quebecois re-elected,
reference case, Supreme Court says bound to negotiate if clear majority say
yes to clear question
Clarity act before House of Commons
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Table B.2: Chronology for Scotland
Scotland
Declaration of Arbroath
Union of crowns: Scottish King James VI becomes English King James I
Claim of Right
Treaty of Union unites Scottish and English parliaments
Claim of Right II
Scottish Office created
Secretary for Scotland
Scottish Home Rule Association formed
Scottish Labour Party formed
Scottish Grand Committee created - composed of all Scottish MPs
Scottish National Party formed
Scottish Office to Edinburgh
White Paper on Scottish Affairs
Balfour commission recommends enlarged powers for Scottish Office
Scottish Standing Committee created
SNP win breakthrough by-election
Conservative leader Heath announces support for devolution in 'Declaration of
Perth'
Scottish Select Committee created
Labour's Kilbrandon report calls for weak elected assembly in Scotland
Oct: in 2nd election of year SNP elect 11 MPs
Scotland and Wales Act
Barnett Formula used to calculate block grant for Scotland
Scotland Act
referendum on devolution, 32% support devolution
Conservatives elected, Thatcher PM, Scotland Act repealed
Campaign for a Scottish Assembly formed
Claim of Right III recommends formation of SCC
Scottish Constitutional Convention formed, poll tax introduced by PM Thatcher
Scottish Constitutional Commission set up by Scottish Constitutional Convention
local government reorganisation in Scotland
Scottish Constitutional Commission reports to Scottish Constitutional Convention
Stone of Destiny returned
May: Labour elected, Sept: devolution referendum, 74 % support parliament, 64 %
support tax-raising powers
Scotland Act
Consultative Steering Group created
Scottish Parliamentary elections, Labour and LD form coalition, Dewar becomes
First Minister
Scottish Civic Forum created
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Table C.1: Comparative Table: Aggregate Characteristics for Canada
and the United Kingdom
Canada United Kingdom
Population 30 301 200 59 237 000
Size 9 970 610 km2 242 910 km2
Density 3.04 people/ km2 242.0 people/ km2
Time zones 5.5 1
GDP/capita (in US $ 1997) $ 19 703 $ 19 762
Unemployment 8.3 7.8
Average income per week $618.85 £396.86 (UK)
Life expectancymen:women 74.6 : 80.9 74.2 : 80.0
education compulsory to age 16 compulsory to age 16
health care universal publicly- universal, tiered
sponsored
Ethnic minority population 11 % 6 %
Religion no state religion Church of England, state
Roman Catholic 46% church in England
Protestant 36% Church of Scotland,
non 13%, Eastern non- established church in
Christian 3 % Scotland
Protestant 49% (Ang 46%,
Pres 1.5% Meth 1.5%)
Roman Catholic 15%,
Muslim 2%
Language use English 59.2%, French English
(mother tongue) 23.3% Gaelic and Welsh <1%
Chinese 2.5%, German
1.6%
Official language English and French English
Political regime established 1867 17th century
State form Constitutional monarchy Constitutional monarchy
Head of state Queen, governor general Queen
Government structure Parliamentary Parliamentary
Federal state Asymmetrical unitary state
10 provinces, 3 territories 3 regional assemblies
Lower House House of Commons (301) House of Commons (657)
Lib 188, Ret 60, BQ 44, Lab 417, Con 146, LD 46
NDP 21, PC 20, Oth 1 Oth 36
Rlectoral system First Past The Post First Past The Post
Date of last election June 1997 May 1997
Upper House Senate (105) House of Lords (666)
(Lib 52, PC 42, Ind 5, (Con 232, Lab 182, LD 54,
Vacant 6) crossbench 161,
archbishops and bishops
26, other 11)
Method ofselection Appointed Appointed life peers 548
Remaining hereditary 92
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Table C.2: Comparative Table: Aggregate Statistics for Quebec and
Scotland
Quebec Scotland
Population 7 334 500 (24.2%) 5 500 000 (9.2%)
Size 1 540 680 km2 (16%) 78 133 km2 (32%)
Density 4.8 people/ km2 70.4 people/km2
Time zones 2 1
Unemployment 8.3 8.5
Average income per week $578.06 (93.4%) £367.4 (92.6%)
Ethnic minority population 6% 1 %
Religion Roman Catholic 86% Church of Scotland,
Protestant 6%, None established church
4% Presbyterian %




Official language French English
Share of seats in House of 75 of 301 72 of 657
Commons
Distribution of seats BQ 44, Liberal 24, PC Lab 54, SNP 6, LD 10, Other 2
Ind 1
Share of seats in Upper 23 of 105 information not collected by
House House of Lords
Distribution of seats Lib 12, PC 10, Ind 1
Sub-state Legislature National Assembly Scottish Parliament (129)
(125) Lab 56, SNP 35, Con 18, LD





First Past The Post Additional Member System
(73 FPTP + 56 list)
Date of last election Nov 1998 May 1999
( ) refers to percentage of total in Canada and UK




The Selection of Interview Subjects.
Although the first chapter in this thesis addresses methodological issues raised by the
research design, a further word on the selection of interview subjects appears useful.
The thesis used material from 65 interviews in an effort to understand how individuals
view their national identity and political culture. The interviews were conducted in
1998 and 1999. The Scottish interviews took place after the 1997 devolution
referendum and before the 1999 Scottish Parliamentary Elections, while the Quebec
interviews took place both before and after the 1998 provincial election. The
selection of interview subjects was designed to cover a range of political and
constitutional views, and sought a range of professions. Individuals who were
politically implicated, those who were politically active but not aligned with a political
party, and those who chose to participate in social, voluntary or ethno-cultural
organisations were interviewed. Within Quebec, interviews with anglophones and
francophones sought to provide a balanced view. The 65 interview subjects, 40 in
Quebec and 25 in Scotland, were composed of the following types of people.
Table D.1: Interview subjects in Quebec






Liberal Party of Alliance Montreal Canadian Universite
Canada Quebec Gazette Senate d'Ottawa,
Progressive Assembly of Le Devoir Privy Council McGill
Conservative First Nations La Presse Department of University,
Party Canadian Globe and Inter¬ Universite
Reform Party Jewish Mail governmental Laval,
New Democratic Congress Affairs Universite de
Party Quebec Quebec civil Montreal,
Bloc Quebecois, Federation of service Carleton
Parti Quebecois, Ethnic Groups Quebec University,
Quebec Liberal Societe St Commission University of








The first interviews were conducted with academics from English and French
universities in Quebec and Ontario. These interviews provided general information
about the state of affairs in Quebec and the diverse views of national identity and
political culture among Quebecers. Many of the academics had been, or were at the
time, politically active whether with political parties or social organisations. Between
one and four individuals were selected from each political party. The higher number
was used for parties operating within Quebec. Individuals who were responsible for
"the Quebec issue", for federal parties, and those responsible for cultural communities
and citizen engagement, for those operating within Quebec, formed the majority of
party representatives. In addition, anglophones within the Quebec Liberal Party, and
the PQ, and the leader of the Equality Party were consulted to supplement the views
of others within the party. Social and ethno-cultural organisations produced
representatives of the diverse cultural communities within Quebec. In addition,
representatives of Alliance Quebec and the Societe St Jean Baptiste were included to
offer opposing views of the constitutional settlement. A variety of columnists and
editors were consulted for three Quebec papers. Care was taken to balance the views
of anglophones and francophones, federalists, nationalists and sovereignists.
Table D.2: Interview subjects in Scotland
Political Parties Social and ethno- Newspapers Government Academics
cultural Agencies
organisations
Scottish Labour Church of Scotsman Edinburgh City University of
Party Scotland Herald Council Edinburgh
Conservative Charter 88 Daily Record Scottish Office University of
Liberal Democrats Scottish Council Sunday Mail Strathclyde
Scottish National for Minority Rights Edinburgh Glasgow






As in Quebec, interviews began with academics from such diverse departments as
politics, sociology, social anthropology, and media studies. These interviews
provided valuable background information and were used to highlight potential
tensions within understandings of national identity and political culture. In an effort
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to encounter a wide range of people party representatives hailed from different
regions of Scotland. As with the Quebec and federal party representatives, between
two and four were consulted from each party. An effort was made to consult
Members of Parliament and those responsible for policy within the party. Members of
social and ethno-cultural organisations were consulted to determine whether length of
residency or ethnic background changed the way Scots view their identity. As with
the Quebec media representatives, columnists and political editors were sought from
the largest broadsheets and tabloid in Scotland. In addition, the letters page editors
were interviewed. Fewer representatives of government agencies were consulted
within Scotland. In addition to these representatives, two Scottish authors of fiction
were interviewed.
As stated earlier, the researcher sought to maintain a balance among the diverse views
and social characteristics in each location. Thus, an effort was made to balance views
of politics and constitutional preferences, but also to ensure a sense of ethnic and
gender balance among the interviews. In addition, the categories for interview
subjects were used as guidelines. The views of individuals were not taken as
representative of the organisation or institution as such. Often individuals who were,
for example, active within a political party were also members of an ethno-cultural
organisation or wrote for a newspaper. In circumstances such as these it would be
difficult to assume that the attitudes of the individuals were informed primarily by
their place of employment. As a result, quotations in the thesis often refer to more
than one of the individual's distinguishing characteristics. Finally, the resulting list of
Scottish and Quebec interview subjects does not include those individuals who were
contacted but were unable to meet with the researcher. These included members of
the House of Lords, party leaders in Scotland and Quebec, former prime ministers of




Research conducted for the thesis led to the following publications:
In Print
Henderson, Ailsa (1999) "Nationalist Constructions of Identity in Scotland and
Quebec" Scottish Affairs 29: 121-38
Henderson, Ailsa and Amanda Sloat (1999) "New Politics in Scotland: a guide to
Scotland's MSPs" Talking Politics 12(1)
Henderson, Ailsa and Amanda Sloat (1999) "Issues ofRepresentation in the Scottish
Parliament: Scotland's New Politicians" MOST: Journal of the Modern
Studies Association: 17-21
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Holyrood" Talking Politics 12(2)
Microfiche
Henderson, Ailsa (1999) "Political Culture in Scotland and Quebec: Hierarchies of
Belonging, Negotiated Identities and Political Attitudes in the Post-
Referendum Context" AnnualMeeting of the Canadian Political Science
Association. Ottawa. Microfiche.
Forthcoming
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University ofOttawa Press (forthcoming)
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(forthcoming)
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